THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Rates: $26/yr.; $44/2 yrs.; $59/3 yrs. Please add $10 outside the United States and Canada.

The National Interest (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter by The National Interest, Inc., a non-profit partnership of Hollinger International, Inc. and The Nixon Center that has received long-term support from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *P.A.I.S.*, *Historical Abstracts*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *U.S. Political Science Documents*, *Political Science Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*; articles are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, and archived on *Lexis-Nexis*. Periodicals postage is paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices. © 2003 by The National Interest, Inc. *The National Interest* is printed by Kirby Lithographic Co., Inc. It is distributed in the U.S. and Canada by Ingram Periodicals (1240 Heil Quaker Blvd., La Vergne, TN 37086-7000; 615-793-5522) and Bernhard DeBoer (113 East Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110; 973-667-9300) and in the U.K. by Comag Special Services (Tavistock Road, West Drayton, Middlesex UB7 7QX; 44-1895-444055). BPA International Member since 2000.

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

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Print ISSN 0459-7230 Online ISSN 1476-4997
Published May 2003
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Power, Wealth and Wisdom

The United States and Europe after Iraq

David P. Calleo

IN SO SELF-important a field as international relations, it is rare to come across an exuberant page-turner of high quality. Robert Kagan's *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* is such a book—short and very readable, with a gift for capturing elusive arguments in striking phrases.[1] The author scatters his broad learning liberally, and other people's as well. He also provides a vigorous defense for George W. Bush's aggressive foreign policy. But in a debate that has grown dangerously rancorous, his tone is amiable and fair-minded. The book is well worth reading, not least for insight into what the intelligent and civilized American neo-conservative thinks about the world. Taken in the right spirit, it should greatly advance Transatlantic discussion about the world order of the future.

Kagan's argument unfolds like a rocket, with several phases along the same trajectory. The starting point is that America and Europe have fundamentally different worldviews. The United States imagines itself in a Hobbesian world of ceaseless, egotistical conflict, where only superior force can keep order—a world where Mars is King. Europe imagines itself in a world where conflicts are settled by reasoned bargaining among neighbors who eschew the use of force against one another. In Europe's vision, it is Venus who presides. Europeans, celebrating their advanced, pacifist habits, relish a well-developed sense of moral superiority over the Americans. But Europe's enjoyment of its visionary world, Kagan argues, depends on the bellicose habits of the Americans. It is America's power and enthusiasm for using it that insulate Europe from its Hobbesian surroundings. It is Mars that protects Venus' lifestyle.

Kagan goes on to explain why this Transatlantic difference exists. Why do Americans exult in "hard power" and Europeans shun it? Europeans disapprove of military power because they do not themselves possess it. They favor "soft" civilian power, because they have it in abundance.[2] But why do Europeans allow themselves to be so weak militarily? The bigger European states have huge finan-

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[1] New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.

[2] By "hard" power, I think Kagan means mostly military force, whereas his "soft" power lies in the diplomatic and economic realm. These definitions differ from Joseph S. Nye's, where "hard" power is economic as well as military and "soft" power is cultural. See Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 8–12.

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cial and technological resources and long histories of marshalling military force. Kagan's answer is that two world wars of unmatched ferocity have created a new European mentality. In their crowded cockpit of a continent, Europeans have decided that force used among themselves is ruinous for all. European states have gone on to create a political miracle where cooperative reasonableness has exorcised the old demons.

Kagan acknowledges the moral grandeur of Europe's achievement but argues that it has left the continent dangerously weak. Europeans, he decides, are not really confident about the durability of their Union. If their grand experiment proves not universally applicable, they worry it may not endure long in Europe itself. This worry turns them against America. Just as the weak American Republic of the early 19th century tried to isolate itself from the Machiavellian contaminations of monarchical Europe, so today's "Kantian" Europe tries to distance itself from martial America, lest America's way of thinking be imported back into Europe's own internal relations.

Kagan goes on to argue that America's current world predominance has been developing for decades, indeed "for the better part of four centuries." Conscious expansion in "ever-widening arcs . . . has been the inescapable reality of American history." And now, despite the end of the Cold War, "the United States . . . clearly intends to remain the dominant strategic force in East Asia and Europe." The gap between America's military might and Europe's has grown too large, Kagan believes, to be closed in the foreseeable future. As the gap persists, so will the different views about the need for force in the world. Kagan's advice is that Americans and Europeans should recognize and accept their differences. Americans should appreciate what Europe has accomplished and be grateful that peace has descended upon what used to be the world's principal seedbed of war. But Americans should also realize that today's self-centered Europe is unlikely to share the burdens of world order. Americans should not mind. Europe is "not really capable of constraining the United States", he writes, and while Europe's moral and political support would doubtless be useful, it is not essential. "Can the United States prepare for and respond to the strategic challenges around the world without much help from Europe? The simple answer is that it already does."

Europeans, Kagan urges, should accept the consequences of their weakness. They should realize that given "a weak Europe that has moved beyond power, the United States has no choice but to act unilaterally." Europe should "move beyond fear and anger at the rogue colossus." It should understand the vital necessity of "a strong, even predominant America—for the world and for Europe especially." Europeans should, in fine, count American hegemony "an acceptable price to pay for paradise."

Kagan closes, however, with the hope that a more confident United States will take better care to show a "decent respect for the opinion of mankind." Having America and Europe on friendly terms would certainly be better for spreading their common Western beliefs. "Their aspirations for humanity are much the same", he writes,

> even if their vast disparity of power has now put them in very different places. Perhaps it is not too naively optimistic to believe that a little common understanding could still go a long way.

After so many forthright and confident pages, Kagan's anodyne ending is unconvincing. The role he assigns Europe in the newest American century may seem satisfactory in Washington and perhaps in London, but it does not appear to go

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down well in Paris or Berlin, nor in Moscow or Beijing.

Kagan's argument nevertheless seems powerful at home, but less because of its conclusions than its premises. These premises reflect a variety of interlocking assumptions widely shared among American foreign policymakers and analysts. We should be grateful to Kagan for demonstrating these assumptions so forcefully and showing just where they lead. Those uneasy with his triumphalist conclusions might therefore start by re-examining his triumphalist assumptions. This means trying to decide not only whether conflicting Transatlantic ambitions can be reconciled, as Kagan suggests, but whether the world is really as he describes it. Three large issues immediately come to mind. First, is America as powerful as Kagan says? Second, is Europe as weak? And third, whose political-philosophic orientation is more in tune with the likely world of the future?

American Power

SINCE THE collapse of the Soviet Union, the military invincibility of the United States has grown into an almost unchallenged article of faith among American foreign policy elites. According to this faith, America's global power is limited principally by its own political scruples and humanitarian self-restraint. Believing that the United States has such overwhelming power encourages a highly developed sense of responsibility among American leaders. Faith in their own strength puts them in the uncomfortable moral position of an omnipotent god, to wit: If there is evil in the universe, it is America's fault for not removing it. Such a heightened sense of national duty gives a particular comparative advantage to America's reigning neo-conservatives. Not much given to national self-criticism or doubt, they believe America's power to be not only invincible, but uniquely just.

Not surprisingly, the neo-conservative conscience tends to be highly critical of those periods in recent American history when others have been in charge. It sees American leaders as having often failed their responsibility. Among recent past presidents, only Ronald Reagan meets their standards for using America's power properly. The happy result, neo-conservatives believe, was to rid the world of the Soviets. Had we continued to use our military power vigorously, they also believe, we could have made today's world much less dangerous. Instead, the first Bush Administration hesitated to eliminate Saddam Hussein and, under Bill Clinton, the United States relapsed still further into self-denying weakness. Neo-conservatives blame the Transatlantic alliance for reinforcing these tendencies to self-doubt and self-limitation. What Europeans see as prudent self-restraint, neo-conservative Americans count as pusillanimous diffidence.

Most countries believe themselves virtuous, but nowadays no other country believes itself omnipotent. The neo-conservative judgment that diffidence is dysfunctional for America rests on faith in the country's crushingly superior military power. But America's military prowess is perhaps less absolute and less useful than the confidence of neo-conservatism might lead us to imagine. We won the Gulf War of 1991 easily, for example, but only after sharply limiting our objectives. The previous war—Vietnam—we lost. The Korean War was a draw. Neo-conservatives, of course, tend to assume credit for destroying the Soviet Union. But the Soviets were defeated not in battle but by their own "overstretch"—outsized geopolitical ambition resulting in ruinous economic policies while pursuing excessive military power. It may be more accurate, therefore,

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to say that the Soviets defeated themselves.[3]

In the "unipolar" era, the United States has so far used its military might against either very small powers—Grenada and Panama—or against relatively helpless "rogue states"—Serbia, Afghanistan or Iraq. While sometimes brilliantly successful, these latter operations have depended primarily on overwhelming aerial bombardment against opponents with little air defense. They are the present-day equivalent of 19th-century gunboat diplomacy. America's airpower plays the role of Britain's navy, keeping order among the "heathen" powers abroad while delighting the jingoists at home. Until the Iraq War, however, these hegemonic expeditions have been notable for their aversion to the full or prolonged use of American ground forces. Until recently, this aversion seemed a significant limit on America's martial ambitions. Presumably, a hegemonic global power has to be able to do more than punish "evil-doers" from the air, particularly if it plans to reform its ex-enemies into democracies, a fate the neo-conservatives proclaim for Iraq and others besides. Doing that requires an army able not only to defeat the enemy but to occupy his territory, perhaps for a long time.

No one can deny that substantial American ground forces were deeply and successfully engaged in the recent Iraq War. It remains to be seen, however, what military and political lessons will follow. The durability of the American triumph in Iraq will presumably depend on factors more political and diplomatic than strictly military. Ultimate success will depend on how the occupation is handled and legitimized. It will also depend on public support in the United States itself. Here, economic factors will probably play a significant role. Already, the high economic costs of the administration's policies are cause for serious concern. In the presidential election of 2004, the Democrats will presumably seek advantage from the country's deteriorating economic performance. So far, however, Democrats have not been very effective critics of neo-conservative geopolitics. They do not so much reject American "triumphalism" as offer a different variety of it.

Arguably, the Clinton Administration was no less "unipolar" than either Bush Administration. It should be recalled that Hubert Védrine was dubbing the United States a hyperpower needing to be balanced well before the current administration came into office. Clinton's triumphalism merely took a more economic than a military form. The United States was to be the world's predominant economy, the undisputed leader in new technology. This was the second coming of the American Challenge to Europe. But Clinton's initial step in "growing" his super-economy was to use deep cuts in military spending, made possible by the Soviet demise, to restore America's fiscal order, in ruins from the heavy military buildup of the Reagan era.[4] The return to fiscal virtue produced the effects classical

[3]For elaboration and references, see my *Rethinking Europe's Future* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 115–27.

[4]In 1988, U.S. defense spending was $403 billion; by 1998 it had fallen to $259 billion (in constant 1998 dollars). In Britain and France, military budgets, initially smaller, were subsequently cut much less. As a percentage of GDP from 1985 to 1995, UK defense spending fell from 5.2 percent to 3.1 percent, and French spending fell from 4 percent to 3.1 percent. U.S. defense spending fell more dramatically, from 6.5 percent to 3.8 percent. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1998–1999* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 16, 306.

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economists had always predicted. With a radical drop in government borrowing, interest rates fell and private investment rose accordingly, encouraged by a new sense of security—both geopolitical and macroeconomic. Along with high investment came a remarkable rise in productivity, hastened by a burst of technological innovation.

By the end of the decade, however, the boom was a bubble. Clinton's unipolar vision carried its own form of overstretch. Although his administration did cure the radical fiscal deficit inherited from Reagan, it failed to deal with Reagan's other poisoned legacy: the economy's huge external imbalance, an old American problem that Reaganomics greatly exacerbated. The external deficit worsened throughout the Clinton boom and now is worse than ever. What does this deficit mean, and how is it related to American military power?

A HUGE AND continuing external deficit means simply that the United States regularly consumes and invests more than it produces. The difference has to be imported; it has to be financed by foreigners. Financing from abroad was no problem in the Clinton era as Europeans flocked to invest in the booming American economy. And despite the massive inflow of foreign capital, price and wage inflation were kept at bay by the strong dollar and cheap imports from Asia. In the end, however, inflation did reveal itself as "asset inflation"—over-investment in the classic manner—which led the way from boom to crash. Needless to say, as the bubble burst, European investors lost their ardor for pouring capital into the United States. Slackening foreign investment has exacerbated the crash and continues to weaken the dollar.[5] What are the implications for American power?

The United States has, of course, run large external deficits with the world economy through much of the postwar era. When one formula for financing the deficit has failed, we have always been able to find another. The U.S. government always had two major advantages in this: the Cold War and the dollar. The Soviet threat gave the United States great bargaining leverage over its rich protectorates, Europe and Japan, while the dollar's international role gave successive administrations wide ability to create new money to spend in the world. Both advantages are now eroded. The end of the Cold War has deprived the United States of its former geopolitical leverage; the advent of the euro threatens America's monopoly power over the world's money. Now that Clinton's investment boom is over, financing America's future deficits is likely to grow more expensive. It will take higher interest rates to lure foreign savings. Higher rates seem likely to force American politics into harsher choices—between guns and butter, or growth and

[5]According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, net FDI inflows into the United States have dropped from $300 billion in 2000 to $23 billion in 2002. In its country report on the United States, the *Economist Intelligence Unit* notes: "The U.S. current account deficit remains worryingly large, exceeding US$ 500bn in 2002, or 4.8% of GDP. . . . Deficits of this magnitude are worrying because they need to be funded by continued large-scale capital inflows from the rest of the world. It is becoming increasingly difficult to attract these funds—a key reason why the U.S. dollar fell during 2002. Foreign governments and central banks are now providing a significant minority of all capital flows into the U.S., suggesting that the private sector's appetite for U.S. dollar assets has waned." (*Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report United States—Online Version", April 1, 2003, available at db.eiu.com.)

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consumption. Arguably, this would be true even if the Clinton policies were still in effect. But President Bush's geopolitical and fiscal policies promise to make a difficult situation worse. While Clinton's policies did not diminish America's overabsorption and consequent external deficit, they did at least eliminate the fiscal deficit.

The present Bush Administration came into office scornful of Clinton's fiscal priorities. As in the Reagan era, the desire to increase military power has taken precedence over budget balancing. Bush was able to use 9/11 to carry a giant increase in military spending. Meanwhile, his administration proposed the familiar neo-conservative fiscal model of the Cold War—tax cuts to go with heavy increases in military spending. Like the Reagan experiment, the Bush model implies large Federal deficits. The budget surplus inherited from Clinton was an early casualty.[6] Meanwhile, the huge external deficits grow worse. In effect, the United States has returned to the "twin deficits" of the pre-Clinton era. Current projections foresee a U.S. current account deficit of $500 billion for 2003,[7] and a budget deficit of $246 billion for the coming fiscal year—not counting the extra military costs of the war, for which the administration has asked a further $74.7 billion.[8] Estimates for occupation and reconstruction costs in Iraq vary widely, but the amounts will certainly be significant.[9]

Budgetary expectations have to be weighed in the light of the administration's new strategic doctrine. That doctrine, formally proclaimed in September 2002, warns that, given today's weapons of mass destruction, together with the lunatic proclivities of rogue states and terrorist organizations, the United States "cannot remain idle while dangers gather." America's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that the doctrine is meant to be taken seriously. But the doctrine's logic and language imply a still wider application—not merely preemptive strikes at rogue states, but preventive war whenever a hostile power or coalition threatens American military primacy in any of the world's major regions. Such a doctrine suggests a formidable circle of potential enemies, many with large armies. Indeed, if the doctrine's logic is taken seriously, the United States could

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[6]The Bush Administration inherited a budget surplus of $236.4 billion in FY2000. The CBO projects a deficit of more than $300 billion for FY2003, a budgetary shift of more than $536 billion in less than three years. See Congressional Budget Office, "Monthly Budget Review", May 9, 2003, and "Historical Budget Data, Table 1: Revenue, Outlays, and Surpluses, Deficits, and Debt Held by the Public, 1962–2002 (in billions of dollars)."

[7]The IMF projects the current account deficit to remain at around 4 percent of GDP for 2004—around $500 billion. See IMF, United States 2002 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report. IMF Country Report No. 02/166, August 2002. Other reports project an even worse development. The British Market Strategy and Economic Analysis, for example, sees the U.S. current account deficit around 5 percent of GDP—or approximately $575 billion. See www.macro-dev.com.

[8]The $74.7 billion figure includes $62.6 billion for Iraq War expenses over a six month period, $7.8 billion for Iraqi reconstruction and relief, and $4.2 billion for homeland security costs related to the war. See Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "Press Release", March 25, 2003.

[9]One early official estimate put the cost of stationing troops in Iraq to be $1–4 billion per month, once the fighting ended. Congressional Budget Office, "Budget and Economic Outlook, 2004–2013", January 2003, Box 1–3. This figure does not include any reconstruction costs.

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eventually look forward to war with China, Russia, perhaps even Europe. Meanwhile, there are lesser but more urgent challenges—North Korea and Iran, for example. Even the lesser challenges point to a continuing large investment in military power, with heavy fiscal consequences.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR 2001
(in constant 2000 $U.S.)

	In billions of $U.S.	*In $U.S. per capita*	*Percentage of GDP*
Russia	*$64*	*$440*	*4.3%*
China	*$46*	*$36*	*4.0%*
Japan	*$39.5*	*$310*	*1%*
United Kingdom	*$34.7*	*$583*	*2.5%*
France	*$32.9*	*$553*	*2.6%*
Germany	*$26.9*	*$328*	*1.5%*
United States	*$332.4*	*$1,128*	*3.2%*

These geopolitically-driven fiscal prospects raise the all-important question of whether the neoconservative global agenda is economically sustainable. Just as there has been a revival of "Reaganomics" in America, so it seems likely there will soon be a revival of "declinism", with its warning of hegemonic "overstretch." A feeble economy seems a likely and reinforcing complement to such a revival.

To say that a policy is economically ruinous is not to say that it is impossible. But sustaining the financial burdens of the Bush geopolitical agenda implies a radical change in the country's political culture, together with a more authoritarian state than Americans are used to. The public may reject the Bush agenda and return the country to a different administration with a different geopolitical worldview. Or the Bush Administration can change itself. But the longer the current geopolitical agenda holds sway, the more its expectations of the rest of the world's hostility will become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the harder it will be for America to turn back. And the more the American and global economies are abused by huge deficits and unstable money, the greater will be the damage and the longer the time needed to recover. As in the 1930s, the collateral social and political consequences may be severe.

Europe's Weakness

THESE considerations ought to be kept in mind while assessing Europe's comparative military power. Kagan finds Europe militarily weak because its defense spending is low compared to that of the United States. The methodology of his comparison seems dubious, however. Any assessment of relative military power should obviously be linked to the geopolitical goals meant to be served. Europe is not planning to assert military hegemony over the world, nor is it expecting an American military invasion. Why then compare Europe's military spending with America's? Why should such a comparison tell us whether Europe's spending is adequate?

The United States and the European Union, moreover, are very different political constructions, above all in the military field, which is the least integrated within the EU. The European Union has three major independent military powers—Britain, France and Germany.

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Comparative spending figures are interesting but do not necessarily lead to Kagan's conclusions. In 2002, the three European powers spent $35, 32 and 23 billion respectively on national defense—a total of roughly $90 billion, as opposed to roughly $350 billion for the United States.[10] Looked at in relation to population or GDP, the three big European military powers combined spent roughly half the U.S. outlay. Nevertheless, the three European states spent together more than Russia, China or Japan. What do these figures tell us? Is it that everyone else in the world is spending too little on defense, or that the United States is spending too much?

Another methodological problem: overall spending figures do not necessarily reflect qualitative differences. Europe is often said not only to spend less, but to be far behind the United States in military technology. But while Europe certainly cannot match American assets, its deficiencies are not exactly technological. In such egregious cases as airlift or satellite intelligence, Europeans are not so much technologically backward as much more careful with their money. Because they are a confederacy of competing economies, launching big weapons projects involves complex negotiations over sharing the industrial costs and benefits. This often takes a great deal of time. But stinginess toward military spending is not necessarily a weakness. An unwillingness to let military spending wreck fiscal balance might even be considered a virtue. It depends on whether the resulting military forces are adequate to defend Europe at home and to meet a reasonable definition of Europe's ambitions and responsibilities in the world.

During the 1990s, Yugoslavia provided the most damning evidence of Europe's military incapacity. As Kagan emphasizes, not until the Americans took charge and put in large forces of their own did the killing stop. But Europe's weakness in the Balkans, deplorable as it was, was less military than political. Starting in 1992, when European forces were first deployed, there was little agreement among Europe's three major military powers. Germany, despite its diplomatic support for Croatia, was extremely reluctant to get involved militarily. Britain and France both put in substantial forces, but worked at cross-purposes: while France wanted to demonstrate a success for the EU and for European self-sufficiency, Britain feared that NATO might be thus rendered redundant. As a result, London worked to limit the mandate and means of the European forces. These limits were so effective that the European troops were at risk of becoming hostages.

Europeans drew diverse lessons from their experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo—some that American military power was indispensable, others that it could not always be counted upon to serve European purposes. Europe's poor showing did spur interest in a collective European military force. Chief among the proposals was the St. Malo initiative of 1998, proposed by the British to the Germans and the French. Plans were fashioned for a joint European intervention force of 60,000 by mid-2003. Some major European weapons orders also ensued, together with heightened industrial cooperation and even some transnational mergers. The project still goes on but is plagued by a lack of consensus among the European states, now exacerbated by their differences over the Anglo-American invasion and occupation of Iraq. Europe thus still remains unable to focus effectively the military power that its states actually possess.

This situation is likely to persist until European states find their debilitating divisions intolerable. This will happen

[10]International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 2002–2003* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 243, 248–9, 252–5.

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when the Germans—and perhaps the British, as well—finally decide that the political cost of relying on the Americans for military protection is too great for Europe's own collective interest. Much will depend on whether events reinforce or diminish the sense of common European interest. The second Gulf War may well have a considerable effect, one way or another. Initially, it seems to have driven the French and Germans closer together and farther from the Americans and the British. Longer-term reactions remain to be seen.

Neo-conservatives lay Europe's military weakness not to its political divisions, however, but to its shared political culture—a preference for soft or civilian power so great that it amounts to a renunciation of hard military power. But this is at least partly wrong. Germany may still abhor hard power, but Britain and France do not. Nevertheless, it is true that Europeans *prefer* soft power. In other words, they prefer to stabilize and shape the world through economic blandishments and sanctions, diplomatic persuasion, cultural affinity and prestige as opposed to military force. Many disparage Europe's preference by noting that it depends on America's hard power to restrain the world's bullies and gangsters. Doubtless they have a point. Nevertheless, their faith in hard power ignores decades of Cold War strategic thinking about the limits of such power.

The main geopolitical conclusion drawn from Cold War strategic doctrine was that nuclear weapons do not lend themselves to a hegemonic world system.[11] The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction held not only that the bipolar giants were mutually unassailable, but that relatively small nuclear forces, capable of delivering hydrogen bombs to a dozen major cities, provided their owners with a high measure of protection, even though their antagonist might be a superpower able to launch thousands of warheads in retaliation. Neo-conservatives hate these doctrines of Mutual Assured Destruction and asymmetrical deterrence, but there is no reason to believe that the end of the Cold War has upset their logic. Such doctrines represent, of course, a great equalizer among nations. They suggest a world whose order can, of necessity, only be sustained by a cooperative balance of power—in other words a plural concert rather than a hegemonic, or unipolar, system.

The same logic presumably applies to most other "weapons of mass destruction." The Bush Administration's emphasis on preventing the spread of such weapons suggests that it has not forgotten this logic. The current spectacle of North Korea must surely refresh its memory. Hence we bear witness to its campaign to restrict pre-emptively the charmed circle of states that would make themselves exempt from easy application of American hard power.

But the campaign runs a high risk of being self-defeating. Relatively weak countries, targeted as "rogue states" and repeatedly threatened with military attack, are naturally desperate to achieve the deterrence that only weapons of mass destruction can provide. If rich and crowded Western countries want to discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction, it seems unwise constantly to threaten weaker non-Western states with superior military power. Of all

[11] See Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan Press/ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983); General Pierre Gallois, *Stratégie de l'âge nucléaire* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1961), translated as *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); and General André Beaufre, *Dissuasion et stratégie* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964), translated as *Deterrence and Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

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forms of power, hard military power is the most vulnerable, the easiest for rogue states to trump. By contrast, the Western states' soft power over the rest of the world is vastly greater and more secure. Today's preoccupation with terrorism makes the pluralist argument for soft power even more compelling. Terrorism is the natural refuge of the desperate and the weak, the natural way to overcome the superior hard power of the strong. The more powerful states exercise their hard power, the more weak states will seek refuge in terrorism. By contrast, soft power, applied with realism and generosity, trammels the weak and, with luck, promotes their transformation.

Why, therefore, should Europeans be reproached for emphasizing and developing their soft power? Major states cannot, of course, dispense entirely with the need for hard power. Europe doubtless needs more of it to deter violence in its own surroundings. But surely soft power provides more efficacious tools for shaping today's world. It is no doubt helpful to be able to bomb Taliban tribesmen in order to install a government less friendly to terrorists. But as the Russian misadventure in Afghanistan suggests, military superiority cannot by itself build a strong and stable nation that will remain inhospitable to terrorists. Given the growing reach of terrorism, not to mention the increasing ease of acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the constant exertion of hard power against weaker states seems predictably self-defeating.

The Future of Power

THE VIRTUE of soft power has long been a fashionable topic in liberal American circles. Those who have talked it up, however, have generally assumed U.S. superiority in soft as well as hard power. For a long time, the United States has enjoyed a great capital of respect and good will around the globe thanks to a half-century of enlightened leadership. That capital seemed intact so long as the Soviet Union provided a credible and extremely disagreeable threat to the world's other major countries. But recent events suggest that America's soft power is eroding fast. For the first time since the end of World War II, the United States has been unable to put together a creditable international coalition to support a major intervention. Indeed, we have found in Iraq a U.S. initiative vigorously denounced by a phalanx of Eurasian great powers—France, Germany, Russia and China. Nor was our flagrant and vehement cajoling, bribing and threatening of small states able to produce anything close to a simple majority on the Security Council, where two of our principal European allies—France and Germany—took the lead in forming a majority against us. Europe may be ruled by Venus, but Venus is evidently no pushover.

No one can say how the Iraq War will eventually turn out politically. It seems a fateful moment for Transatlantic relations. Few think it a promising time for Western solidarity. Unless the Bush Administration has deliberately aimed to destroy the Atlantic Alliance, as some half suspect, it has clearly made some major miscalculations about at least two of our major European allies. This suggests that neo-conservative views are seriously out of touch with public thinking in that part of the world, by far the closest and most important to us. The consequent rupture with France and Germany represents a severe failure of the American political imagination. Kagan, for all his brilliance and sympathy, illustrates that failure. He praises Europe, but perhaps he does not really understand it.

Kagan sees the European Union as a product of the Enlightenment—a "Kantian" construction where pacifist

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democracies renounce power to produce perpetual peace. To see Europe in this way makes it easy to underestimate its vitality. Kant's abstract and denatured view of politics is inadequate to explain the richly complex process through which Europe's nation-states have been forming a Continental commonwealth. Their Union is rooted in ideas older and richer than Kantian peace theory—ideas that stretch deep into medieval Europe. This emergent Europe truly is "Old Europe"—the Europe of Dante and Aquinas, Montaigne and Montesquieu, Machiavelli and Talleyrand, Burke, Hegel and List. Like any dynamic constitutional system, it juxtaposes opposite but complementary principles—unity and diversity, common interests and special interests, community and individuality, common action and a balance of power.

Just as it is unwise to underestimate the vitality of this new Europe, it is wrong to believe it unconcerned with power. On the contrary, thanks to its own tragic history, today's Europe is very much aware of power—above all aware of the terrible temptations and dangers of unbalanced power. Its natural bent is toward building a balanced concert of states to control power. When faced with conflict—internal or external—Europe's instinct is toward conciliation, toward finding common ground. It has grown skillful at focusing soft power to nudge contending parties into agreement.

America's neo-conservatives, determined to avoid "appeasement" at all costs, detest and fear these conciliatory European proclivities. Where promiscuous Europe sees a world where everyone is a potential friend, martial America lives in a world where every independent power is a potential enemy. Given the seemingly inevitable rise of Asian great powers, not to mention Russia and Europe itself, and given the enormous differences in wealth between old and new great powers, America's martial approach to world order seems unpromising. The 21st century does not invite global hegemony. Europe's approach seems wiser. Maybe Mars had better lie down with Venus.

Meanwhile the insistent denigration of Europe in American public discourse, and notably of France, is seriously disquieting. Kagan, of course, is too knowledgeable, thoughtful and civilized for this coarse brand of American chauvinism. His book repeatedly urges Americans and Europeans to accept their differences and move on to serve their common purposes. But Kagan's analysis makes Transatlantic cooperation a mere choice for an omnipotent America rather than a necessity. Given the world's longer trends toward a multipolar system, his view seems dangerously complacent.

Certainly, a more serious estrangement between the United States and "old" continental Europe would serve the interests of neither side. Instead, a global concert is urgently needed to manage the world's accumulating problems, above all to accommodate peacefully the rising great powers of Asia. To build such a world order, Americans and Europeans need each other's strength and wisdom. We also need each other to balance our own respective continental systems. Kagan rightly notes how America's presence in Europe has silently made possible France and Germany's vital collaboration in the EU. It is no less true, however, that a strong European presence in American policymaking has become essential to containing our huge military power and, thereby, to preserving our own constitution. A good polity always needs to balance power, wisdom and virtue. Today, triumphal America has too much power and thinks it has too much virtue. Perhaps it is time for more wisdom—time to summon neither Mars nor Venus, but Minerva. □

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America as European Hegemon

Christopher Layne

AS THE WISEST of all American philosophers, Yogi Berra, has insightfully observed, making predictions is hard, especially about the future. And he might have added—pointing to the predictions of an impending Euro-American rupture that have been a staple of debates about U.S.-European relations at least since the 1956 Suez crisis—prognosticating accurately about the future of Transatlantic relations is extra hard. Through all the ups and downs in U.S.-European relations over the years, those many Chicken Littles who have gone out on a limb to forecast an impending drifting apart of Europe and the United States never have had their predictions validated by events.

Until now, perhaps?

The Iraq War has produced a very different kind of rift. The damage inflicted on Washington's ties to Europe by the Bush Administration's policy is likely to prove real, lasting and, at the end of the day, irreparable. In other words, if the fat lady isn't singing already, she clearly can be heard warming up her voice.

To understand why this crisis is different, we must understand its causes. The rupture between the United States and Europe is not, as some have asserted, mainly about an alleged Transatlantic rift in the realm of culture, values and ideology.[1] It is not about the relative merits of unilateralism versus multilateralism. It is not even about the issues that framed the debate about Iraq during the run-up to war (Should the weapons inspections process have been allowed to play out? Was the United States wrong to go to war without a second resolution from the United Nations Security Council?). For sure, Iraq was a catalyst for Transatlantic dispute, but this crisis has been about American power—specifically about American hegemony.

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Of Balance and Hegemony

WHEN FUTURE historians write about how American hegemony ended, they may well point to January 22, 2003 as a watershed. On that day, commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Franco-German Treaty negotiated by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer as a bulwark against American hegemony, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder jointly declared that Paris and Berlin would work together to oppose the Bush Administration's evident intent to resolve the Iraqi question by force of arms. Later that day, in a Pentagon briefing, Secretary of Defense

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AP photo

Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac in Paris, January 22, 2003

Donald Rumsfeld responded to the Franco-German declaration by contemptuously dismissing those partners as representing the "Old Europe", thereby triggering a Transatlantic earthquake, the geopolitical after-shocks of which will be felt for a long time. And well they should, for these contratemps reflect what is already a very old issue.

The problem of hegemony has been a major issue in U.S.-European relations since the United States emerged as a great power at the end of the 19th century. The United States fought two big wars in Europe out of fear that if a single power (in those cases, Germany) attained hegemony in Europe, it would be able to mobilize the continent's resources and threaten America in its own backyard, the Western Hemisphere. The conventional wisdom holds that America's post-World War II initiatives—the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty—were driven by similar fears of possible Soviet hegemony in Europe. Indeed, many American strategic thinkers define America's traditional European strategy as a text-book example of "offshore balancing."

As an offshore balancer, the United States supposedly remains on the sidelines with respect to European security affairs unless a single great power threatens to dominate the continent. America's European grand strategy, therefore, is said to be counter-hegemonic: the United States intervenes in Europe only when the continental balance of power appears unable to thwart the rise of a would-be hegemon without U.S. assistance. The most notable proponent of this view of America's European grand strategy toward Europe is University of Chicago political scientist John J. Mearsheimer.[2] He argues that the United States is not a global hegemon. Rather, because of what he describes as the "stopping power of water", the United States is a hegemon only in its own region (the Western hemisphere), and acts as an offshore balancer toward Europe. He predicts that the United States soon will end its "continental commitment" because there is no

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European hegemon looming on the geopolitical horizon. As an offshore balancer, Mearsheimer says, the United States will not remain in Europe merely to play the role of regional stabilizer or pacifier.

There is just one thing wrong with this view: it does not fit the facts.

If American strategy toward Europe is indeed one of counter-hegemonic offshore balancing, it should have been over, over there, for the United States when the Soviet Union collapsed. By a different but not far-fetched reckoning, it should have been over in the early 1960s, when the Europeans were capable of deterring a Soviet military advance westward without the United States. With no hegemonic threat to contain, American military power should have been retracted from Europe after 1991, and NATO should have contracted into non-existence rather than undergoing two rounds of expansion. Of course, it may be that America will ultimately be ejected from the continent by the Europeans, but there are no signs that the United States will voluntarily pack up and go home any time soon.

It is not a "time lag", or mere inertia, that has kept American military power on the European continent more than a decade after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. There is a better explanation for why U.S. troops are still in Europe and NATO is still in business. It is because the Soviet Union's containment was never the driving force behind America's post-World War II commitment to Europe. There is a well-known quip that NATO was created to "keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in." It would be more accurate to say that the Atlantic Alliance's primary *raison d'être*, from Washington's standpoint, was to keep America in—*and on top*—so that Germans could be kept down, Europe could be kept quiet militarily, and the Europeans would lack any pressing incentive to unite politically. The attainment of America's postwar grand strategic objectives on the continent required that the United States establish its own hegemony over Western Europe, something it would probably have done even in the absence of the Cold War. In other words, NATO is still in business to advance long-standing American objectives that existed independently of the Cold War and hence survived the Soviet Union's collapse.

American Aims

WE USUALLY look to history to help us understand the present and predict the future. But the reverse can be true, as well: sometimes recent events serve to shed light on what happened in the past, and why it happened. Many may react skeptically to the claim that America's postwar European grand strategy was driven at least as much—probably more—by non-Cold War factors as by the Soviet threat. But Washington's post-Cold War behavior provides a good deal of support for this thesis.

For starters, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union began to unravel, the first Bush Administration did not feel in the least bit compelled to reconsider the relevance of, or need for, either the U.S. military commitment to Europe or NATO. As Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, both of whom served that administration as senior foreign policy officials, have observed:

> [The] administration believed strongly that, even if the immediate military threat from the Soviet Union diminished, the United States should maintain a significant military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future. . . . The American troop presence thus also served as the ante to ensure a central place for the United States as a player in European politics. The Bush administration placed a high value

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on retaining such influence, underscored by Bush's flat statement that the United States was and would remain 'a European power.' . . . *The Bush administration was determined to maintain crucial features of the NATO system for European security even if the Cold War ended.*[3]

The Clinton Administration took a similar view. As one former State Department official avers, NATO to had be revitalized after the Cold War because American interests in Europe "transcended" the Soviet threat.[4] And using phraseology reminiscent of Voltaire's comment about God, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, "Clearly if an institution such as NATO did not exist today, we would want to create one."[5]

The fact that American policymakers did not miss a beat when the Cold War ended with respect to reaffirming NATO's continuing importance reveals a great deal about the real nature of the interests that shaped America's European grand strategy after World War II, and that continue to do so today. The truth is that, from its inception, America's postwar European grand strategy reflected a complex set of interlocking "Open Door" interests.* These interests are at once economic, strategic and broadly political in nature.

The first of these is that U.S. postwar officials believed that America had crucial economic interests in Europe. Even if there was no communist threat to Western Europe, State Department Policy Planning Staff Director George F. Kennan argued in 1947, the United States had a vital interest in facilitating Western Europe's economic recovery: "The United States people have a very real economic interest in Europe. This stems from Europe's role in the past as a market and as a major source of supply for a variety of products and services."[6] These interests required that Europe's antiquated economic structure of small, national markets be fused into a large, integrated market that would facilitate efficiencies and economies of scale.** As the U.S. Ambassador to France, Jefferson Caffery, argued in 1947, economic integration would "eliminate the small watertight compartment into which Europe's pre-war and present economy is divided."[7] Paul Hoffman, director of the Economic Cooperation Agency (which administered Marshall Plan aid to Europe), elaborated on the reasons why Washington favored Western Europe's economic integration: "Europe could not be self-supporting until it had made great progress towards unity and until there was a wide, free, competitive market to lower costs, increase efficiency, and raise the standard of living."[8]

To prevent far Left parties (especially the communists) from coming to power on the Continent's western half after World War II, U.S. aims also required political and social stability there. Washington was not really so concerned that such governments would drift into Moscow's political orbit, but it was very

*The seminal work of the "Open Door" school, of course, is William Appleman Williams' *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Delta, 1962). Williams' work has acted as a powerful stimulus that produced a broad body of historical scholarship that both built upon, and refined, the Open Door interpretation. When read as a whole, it encompasses economics, ideology, national interest and security as key factors in shaping U.S. grand strategy—and underscores their interconnectedness.

**In notes prepared for Secretary of State George Marshall, Kennan argued that the Marshall Plan was necessary for two reasons, the first of which was "so that they can buy from us." The second reason was "so that they will have enough self-confidence to withstand outside pressures." Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, July 21, 1947, FRUS 1947, III, p. 335.

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concerned that they would embrace the kinds of nationalist, or autarkic, economic policies that were anathema to America's goal of an open international economy. As Averell Harriman, the U.S. Special Representative in Europe, put it, Washington was committed to multilateral trade and was "opposed to restrictive policies and especially to the creation of an autarkic Europe."[9]

Second, American strategists perceived that U.S. economic interests would be jeopardized if postwar Europe relapsed into its bad habits of nationalism, great power rivalries and realpolitik. To ensure stability in Europe after World War II, the United States sought to create a militarily de-nationalized and economically integrated—but *not* politically unified—Europe. Washington would assume primary responsibility for European security, thereby precluding the re-emergence of the security dilemmas (especially that between France and Germany) that had sparked the two world wars. In turn, Western Europe's economic integration and interdependence—under the umbrella of America's military protectorate—would contribute to building a peaceful and stable Western Europe. In this respect, U.S. economic and security objectives meshed nicely.

Postwar U.S. policymakers viewed Europe's traditional balance of power security architecture as a "fire trap" and, as Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett said following World War II, Washington wanted to make certain that this fire trap was not rebuilt.[10] Starting with those who were "present at the creation", successive generations of U.S. policymakers feared the continent's reversion to its (as Americans see it) dark past—a past defined by war, militarism, nationalism and an unstable multipolar balance of power. For American officials, Europe indeed has been a dark continent whose wars spilled over across the Atlantic, threatened American interests and invariably drew in the United States. Secretary Rumsfeld's disparaging remark about the "Old Europe" thus stands in a long and consistent line of American attitudes toward the Continent and its various historical crimes and misdemeanors.

After World War II, Rumsfeld's cabinet predecessors sought to maintain U.S. interests by breaking the Old Europe of its bad old geopolitical habits. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it in 1953,

> Surely there is an urgent, positive duty on all of us to seek to end that danger which comes from within. It has been the cause of two world wars and it will be disastrous if it persists.[11]

Even during the Cold War, American policymakers acknowledged that, quite apart from the Soviet threat, the United States needed to be present militarily in Western Europe to create a political environment that permitted "a secure and easy relationship among our friends in Western Europe."[12] As Secretary of State Dean Rusk said in 1967, the U.S. military presence on the continent played a pivotal role in assuring stability *within* Western Europe: "Much progress has been made. But without the visible assurance of a sizeable American contingent, old frictions may revive, and Europe could become unstable once more."[13] Former Secretary of State Acheson, too, observed in the mid-1960s that, as the vehicle for America's stabilizer role in Western Europe, "NATO is not merely a military structure to prepare a collective defense against military aggression, but also a political organization to preserve the peace of Europe."[14]

The U.S. goal of embedding a militarily de-nationalized, but economically integrated Western Europe within the structure of an American-dominated

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"Atlantic Community" dovetailed neatly with another of Washington's key post-1945 grand strategic objectives: preventing the emergence of new poles of power in the international system—in the form either of a resurgent Germany or a united Europe—that could challenge America's geopolitical pre-eminence. Since the 1940s, Washington has had to perform a delicate balancing act with respect to Europe. To be sure, for economic reasons, the United States encouraged Western Europe's integration into a single common market, but the United States sought to prevent that from leading to its political unification.

To prevent the emergence of a politically unified Western Europe, successive U.S. administrations sought to "denationalize" the region by establishing a military protectorate that integrated Western Europe's military forces under, and subordinated them to, American command. The goal was to neuter Western Europe geopolitically and thereby circumscribe its ability to act independently of the United States in the high political realms of foreign and security policy. Embedding West European integration in the American-dominated Atlantic community would prevent the Europeans from veering off in the wrong direction. "An increased measure of Continental European integration", Acheson and Lovett told President Truman,

> can be secured only within the broader framework of the North Atlantic Community. This is entirely consistent with *our own desire to see a power arrangement on the Continent which does not threaten us* and with which we can work in close harmony.[15]

Acheson stated American strategic concerns with crystal clarity when he spoke of the necessity of a "well-knit large grouping of Atlantic states within which a new EUR grouping can develop, thus ensuring unity of purpose within the entire group and precluding [the] possibility of [a] EUR Union becoming [a] third force or opposing force."[16]

Europe's military absorption into the Atlantic Community went hand in hand with its economic integration. By persuading the West Europeans to "pool" their military and economic sovereignty, Washington aimed to strip them of the capacity to take unilateral national action.[17] As Kennan observed, Western Europe should be unified on terms which "would automatically make it impossible or extremely difficult for any member, not only Germany, to embark upon a path of unilateral aggression." But it was the American diplomat Charles Bohlen who cut to the heart of the U.S. de-nationalization strategy when he said, "Our maximum objective should be the general one of making common European interests more important than individual national interests."[18]

For the United States, therefore, institutions such as NATO, the aborted European Defense Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Common Market were the instruments it employed to contain the West Europeans.* As the State

*Referring to NATO and the ECSC, Secretary of State Dulles observed, "These represent important unifying efforts, but it cannot be confidently affirmed that these organizations are clearly adequate to ensure against a tragic repetition of the past where the Atlantic community, and particularly Western Europe, has been torn apart by internecine struggles." He then underscored the need for even greater unity within the Atlantic Community, not simply to meet the Soviet threat, but "forms of unity and integration which would preserve the West from a continuance of internal struggles which have been characteristic of its past." U.S. Delegation at North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to Dept. of State, May 5, 1956, *FRUS 1955–57*, IV, pp. 68–9.

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Department said, the United States hoped that "cautious initial steps toward military, political, and economic cooperation will be followed by more radical departures from traditional concepts of sovereignty."[19] The American aim was to create "institutional machinery to ensure that separate national interests are subordinated to the best interests of the community", and achieving this subordination was deemed essential if the United States was to accomplish its grand strategic purposes in Europe.[20]

The Continental Response

JUST AS FEAR of a European hegemon led the United States to intervene in Europe's two great wars of the 20th century, the West Europeans after World War II understood that America had established its own hegemony over them. As realist international relations theory suggests, Western Europe tried to do something about it.

To be sure, West European balancing against the United States was constrained. On the one hand, although the West Europeans feared American power, they feared the Soviet Union even more during the Cold War. In a more positive sense, too, following World War II, Washington was able to use the carrot of economic assistance—notably, the Marshall Plan—to keep Western Europe aligned (albeit very tenuously at times) with the United States. Nevertheless, throughout the post-World War II era, West European inclinations to balance against American power were never far from the surface.

In the five years or so after the end of World War II, it was Britain that hoped to emerge as a "Third Force" in world politics to balance both the United States and the Soviet Union. As the British diplomat Gladwyn Jebb put it, London needed to prevent the geopolitical equilibrium from being undermined "by a 'bipolar' system centering around what Mr. Toynbee calls the two 'semi-barbarian states on the cultural periphery'."[21] The accelerating decline of Britain's relative power, of course, put paid to London's Third Force aspirations, but continental Europe's Third Force aspirations remained. In the late 1940s and 1950s, one of the hopes of the founding fathers of today's European Union was that the European Coal and Steel Community, and then the Common Market, would prove to be the embryo of a united Europe that could act as a geopolitical and economic counterweight to the United States. Commenting on the motives driving the West Europeans to integrate, the diplomatic historian Geir Lundestad observes:

> Although they wanted the two sides of the Atlantic to cooperate more closely, in a more general sense it was probably also the desire of most European policymakers to strengthen Western Europe *vis-à-vis* the United States. This could be done economically by supporting the Common Market and politically by working more closely together on the European side.[22]

Even Jean Monnet, author of the Schuman Plan that led to the ECSC and the "father" of European integration, first toyed with the idea of an Anglo-French federation in the late 1940s because he saw this as the basis of a European bloc that could stand apart from both the United States and the Soviet Union.[23]

The 1956 Suez crisis gave fresh impetus to the arguments that Western Europe needed to counterbalance the United States. Britain's initial reaction to its humiliation by the Eisenhower Administration was to consider reviving the Third Force concept: "We should

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pool our resources with our European allies so that Western Europe as a whole might become a third nuclear power comparable with the United States and the Soviet Union."[24] Under Harold Macmillan, of course, Britain rejected becoming part of a West European Third Force, opting instead to curry favor—and maintain influence—with Washington through the "special relationship" ("playing Greece to America's Rome"). On the Continent, however, Suez focused French and West German attentions on the need for a West European counterweight to American power. As William I. Hitchcock recounts, Adenauer and French Premier Guy Mollet were meeting in Paris on November 6, 1956, at the height of the Suez crisis (and the simultaneous turmoil in Hungary). Shortly after Adenauer exclaimed that it was time for Europe to unite "against America", Mollet excused himself to take a phone call from the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, who informed Mollet that, under U.S. pressure, London had decided to call off the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal Zone. When a crestfallen Mollet returned to the meeting room and conveyed the content of the telephone conversation to his guest, Adenauer consoled him by saying, "Now, it is time to create Europe."[25]

By the early 1960s, French President Charles de Gaulle believed that Western Europe had recovered sufficiently from World War II's dislocations and was poised to re-emerge as an independent pole of power in the international system. De Gaulle, clearly one of the 20th century's towering figures, was well versed in the realities of international politics. Following Washington's successful facing-down of the Soviet Union in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, he concluded *then* that the world had become "unipolar"—dominated by a hegemonic America. To balance U.S. hegemony, de Gaulle pushed for France to acquire independent nuclear capabilities, and he sought to build a West European pole of power based on a Franco-German axis. That is what the 1963 treaty—the one Chirac and Schröder were commemorating on January 22—was all about, a fact that Washington apprehended clearly. U.S. policymakers were deeply concerned that Paris would lure West Germany out of the "Atlantic" (that is, U.S.) orbit, because such a Euro-centric strategic axis, as a 1966 State Department cable explicitly said, "would fragment Europe and divide the Atlantic world."[26] In plainer English, the foundations of America's European hegemony would be undermined.

Washington recognized the Gaullist challenge for what it was—a direct assault on U.S. preponderance in Western Europe—and reacted by re-asserting its own hegemonic prerogatives on the Continent. President Kennedy gave eloquent expression to the fear that Western Europe's emergence as an independent pole of power in the international system would be inimical to U.S. interests, and his doing so shows that U.S. concerns on this score were not limited to the immediate postwar period, as sketched out above. Kennedy voiced concern that U.S. leverage over Europe might be waning because the West Europeans, having staged a vigorous postwar recovery, were no longer dependent on the United States economically. Noting that "the European states are less subject to our influence", Kennedy expressed the fear that "if the French and other European powers acquire a nuclear capability they would be in a position to be entirely independent and we might be on the outside looking in."[27] By pushing for a Multilateral Nuclear Force for Western Europe (in reality, one that kept Washington's finger firmly on the trigger), the United States sought—unsuccessfully—to derail France's nuclear ambitions.

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With considerably more success, however, the United States did manage to take the teeth out of the Franco-German Treaty. In so doing, Washington played the hardest kind of hegemonic hardball. Threatening to rescind the security guarantee that protected West Germany from the Soviets, the U.S. government insisted that the Bundestag insert a preamble to the treaty reaffirming that Bonn's Atlantic connection to the United States and NATO took supremacy over its ties with Paris.* This intervention by the United States hastened Adenauer's retirement and helped ensure that he would be succeeded by the more pliable Atlanticist, Ludwig Erhard.

What's New?

NOW, FORTY years later, the United States and Europe are still playing the same game. America still asserts its hegemony, and France and Germany still seek (so far without much success) to create a European counterweight. As has been the case in the past, too, Washington is employing a number of strategies to keep Europe apart.

First, the United States is still actively discouraging Europe from either collective, or national, efforts to acquire the full-spectrum of advanced military capabilities. Specifically, the United States has opposed the EU's Rapid Reaction Force (the nucleus of a future EU army), insisting that any European efforts must not duplicate NATO capabilities and must be part of an effort to strengthen the Alliance's "European pillar." The United States is also encouraging European NATO members to concentrate individually on carving-out "niche" capabilities that will complement U.S. power rather than potentially challenge it.

Second, Washington is engaged in a game of divide and rule in a bid to thwart the EU's political unification process. The United States is pushing hard for the enlargement of the EU—and especially the admission of Turkey—in the expectation that a bigger EU will prove unmanageable and hence unable to emerge as a politically unified actor in international politics. The United States also has encouraged NATO expansion in a similar vein, in the hope that the "New Europe" (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania)—which, with the exception of Romania, will join the EU in 2004—will side with Washington against France and Germany on most issues of significance. For the United States, a Europe that speaks with many voices is optimal, which is why the United States is trying to ensure that the EU's "state-building" process fails—thereby heading off the emergence of a united Europe that could become an independent pole of power in the international system.

Finally, the United States has continued to remind the rest of Europe, sometimes delicately, sometimes in a heavy-handed fashion, that they still need an American presence to "keep the Germans down." For example, at his speech in Prague during the November 2002 NATO summit, President George W. Bush—just before invoking the historically freighted memories of Verdun, Munich, Stalingrad and Nuremberg—alluded in a not-so-subtle fashion to the German threat from

*As Secretary of State Rusk said, "If Europe were ever to be organized so as to leave us outside, from the point of view of these great issues of policy and defense, it would become most difficult for us to sustain our present guarantee against Soviet aggression. We shall not hesitate to make this point to the Germans if they show signs of accepting any idea of a Bonn-Paris axis." Rusk to the Embassy in France, May 18, 1963, *FRUS 1961–63*, XIII, p. 704.

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World War II to make the case for a U.S. role in Europe:

> U-boats could not divide us. . . . The commitment of my nation to Europe is found in the carefully tended graves of young Americans who died for this continent's freedom. That commitment is shown by the thousands in uniforms still serving here, from the Balkans to Bavaria, still willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for this continent's future.

Washington's aim of keeping Europe apart paid apparent dividends when, at the end of January, the leaders of Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic signed a letter urging Europe and the international community to unite behind Washington's Iraq policy. This letter was notable especially because it illustrated that the United States is having some success in using the "New Europe" to balance against the "Old" Franco-German core. Clearly, Washington hopes that states such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania will not only line up behind the United States within NATO, but will also represent Atlanticist interests over European ones within the EU itself.

In short, U.S. policy seeks to encourage an intra-European counterweight that will block French and German aspirations to create a united Europe counterweight to American hegemony. Indeed, in the wake of the Iraq War, Transatlantic relations are characterized by a kind of "double containment" in Europe: the hard core of Old Europe (centered around France and Germany, and possibly supported by Russia) seeks to brake America's aspirations for global hegemony, while the United States and its "New European" allies in central and eastern Europe seek to contain Franco-German power on the Continent. It is an old game, in a new form.

The Widening Atlantic

IN THE DECADE between the Soviet Union's collapse and 9/11, American hegemony (or as some U.S. policymakers called it during the Clinton Administration, America's "hegemony problem") was the central issue in American grand strategy debates. It still is. Although American policymakers have developed a number of (too) clever rationales to convince themselves that the United States will escape the fate that invariably befalls hegemons, the fallout of the Iraq crisis on the Transatlantic relationship illustrates that concern with America's hegemonic power—and the way it is exercised—is not confined to the Middle East and Persian Gulf.[28]

Why do France, Germany and much of the rest of the world, including other major powers such as Russia and China, worry about American hegemony? The simple answer is that international politics remains fundamentally what it has always been: a competitive arena in which states struggle to survive. States are always worried about their security. Thus when one state becomes overwhelmingly powerful—that is, hegemonic—others fear for their safety.

Doubtless the Bush Administration's fervent hegemonists will scoff at the idea that the United States will become the object of counter-hegemonic balancing. They clearly believe that the United States can do as it pleases because it is so far ahead in terms of hard power that no other state (or coalition of states) can possibly hope to balance against it.[29] They also know, and know that Europeans know, that the United States does not and will never literally threaten Europe with its military power. This confidence is misplaced, however, because it overlooks the effects of what can be called "the hegemon's temptation."

A hegemonic power like the United

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States today has overwhelming hard power—especially military power—and indeed there is no state or coalition with commensurate power capable of restraining the United States from exercising that power. For hegemons, the formula of overwhelming power and lack of opposition creates powerful incentives to expand the scope of its geopolitical interests. But over time, the cumulative effects of expansion for the United States—wars and subsequent occupations in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and the War on Terrorism; possible future wars against North Korea, Iran, Syria, or China over Taiwan—will have an enervating impact on U.S. power.

At the end of the day, hegemonic decline results from the interplay of overextension abroad and domestic economic weakness.* Over time, the costs of America's hegemonic vocation will interact with its economic vulnerabilities—endless budget deficits fueled in part by burgeoning military spending, and the persistent balance of payments deficit—to erode America's relative power advantage over the rest of the world. As the relative power gap between the United States and potential new great powers begins to shrink, the costs and risks of challenging the United States will decrease, and the pay-off for doing so will increase. As the British found out toward the end of the 19th century, a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity.

There are already today other potential poles of power in the international system waiting in the wings that could quickly emerge as counterweights to the United States. And with the Iraq crisis revealing the stark nature of American hegemony, these new power centers have increasingly greater incentive to do so. Here, by facilitating "soft" balancing against the United States, the Iraq crisis may have paved the way for "hard" balancing as well. Since the end of World War II, policymakers and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic have realized that Europe is a potential pole of power in the international system. Will France and Germany provide the motor to unite Europe in opposition to the United States? Time, of course, will tell.

But for sure, this is not 1963. The Cold War is over, and France and Germany are freer to challenge American hegemony. The EU is in the midst of an important constitutional convention that is laying the foundation for a politically unified Europe. And even as the Iraq War proceeded, there were straws in the wind pointing in the direction of hard balancing against the United States. Most notable are indications that France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg may act together to create Europe's own version of a coalition of the willing—by forming a "hard core" of enhanced defense cooperation among themselves.

In the short term, however, Paris and Berlin—supported by Russia—have lead the way in soft balancing to counter American hegemony. By using international organizations like the United Nations to marshal opposition to the United States, France and Germany—and similarly inclined powers such as Russia and China—are beginning to develop new habits of diplomatic cooperation to oppose Washington.

Similarly, it is likely that France and Germany (again, joined by Russia and China) will be more likely to cooperate in propping up key regional powers that might be the next targets in Washington's geopolitical gunsight. Iran is one such

*The two classic elaborations are Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987).

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potential target. With Washington bidding for hegemony in the Persian Gulf region by establishing a protectorate over postwar Iraq, France and Germany—Russia and China, too—will have strong incentives for collaborating to ensure their own strategic and commercial interests in the region by building up, and supporting, Iran (and perhaps Syria) as a counter-weight to U.S. regional power. It was no coincidence, after all, that Dominique de Villepin showed up in Tehran within days after the fall of Baghdad.

AT THE END of the day, the most telling piece of evidence that the Iraq War marks a turning point in Transatlantic relations, and with respect to American hegemony, is this: Despite widespread predictions that they would fold diplomatically and acquiesce in a second UN resolution authorizing the United States and Great Britain to forcibly disarm Iraq, Paris and Berlin (and Moscow) held firm. Rather than being shocked and awed by America's power and strong-arm diplomacy, they stuck to their guns—just as Britain and France did *not* do at Suez—and refused to fall into line behind Washington. What this shows, at the very least, is that it is easier to be Number One when there is a Number Two that threatens Numbers Three, Four, Five and so on. It also suggests that a hegemon so clearly defied is a hegemon on a downward arc.

Many throughout the world now have the impression that the United States is acting as an aggressive hegemon engaged in the naked aggrandizement of its own power. The notion that the United States is a "benevolent" hegemon has been shredded. America is inviting the same fate as that which has overtaken previous contenders for hegemony. In the sweep of history, the Bush Administration will not be remembered for conquering Baghdad, but for a policy that galvanized both soft and hard balancing against American hegemony. At the end of the day, what the administration trumpets as "victory" in the Persian Gulf may prove, in reality, to have pushed NATO into terminal decline, given the decisive boost to the political unification of Europe (at least the most important parts of it), and marked the beginning of the end of America's era of global preponderance. □

Notes

[1]Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

[2]See Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

[3]Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 169–70 (emphasis added).

[4]Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 290.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 261.

[6]PPS/4, "Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint", July 23, 1947, *PPSP*, I, p. 31.

[7]Caffery to Marshall, July 10, 1947, *FRUS 1947*, III, p. 317.

[8]Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State, September 15, 1949, *FRUS 1949*, IV, p. 657.

[9]Harriman to Hoffman, March 12, 1949, *FRUS 1949*, IV, pp. 375–6.

[10]See, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 6, 1948, *FRUS 1948*, III, p. 151; Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 8, 1948,

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FRUS 1948, III, pp. 167–8.

[11]Statement by Dulles to the North Atlantic Council, December 14, 1953, *FRUS 1952–54*, V, p. 461.

[12]Talking Paper prepared in the Department of Defense, undated, *FRUS 1964–68*, XIII, p. 728.

[13]Letter from Rusk to Senator Mansfield, April 21, 1967, *FRUS 1964–68*, XIII, p. 562.

[14]Memorandum by the Acheson Group, undated, *FRUS 1964–68*, XIII, pp. 406–7.

[15]Acheson and Lovett to Truman, July 30, 1951, *FRUS 1951*, III, p. 850 (emphasis added).

[16]Acheson to Bruce, September 19, 1952, *FRUS 1952–54*, V, p. 324.

[17]Paper Prepared by Kennan, February 7, 1949, *FRUS 1949*, III, p. 92.

[18]Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, January 24, 1950, *FRUS 1950*, III, p. 622.

[19]Policy Statement of Department of the State, September 20, 1948, *FRUS 1948*, III, pp. 652–3.

[20]Paper Prepared in the Department of State, n.d., "Economic Benefits of European Integration", *FRUS 1949*, III, p. 133.

[21]Jebb quoted in Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–52* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 113.

[22]Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 135.

[23]François Duchene, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York: Norton, 1994), pp. 186–7.

[24]Quoted in David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988), p. 235.

[25]Hitchcock, "Reversal of Fortune: Britain, France, and the Making of Europe, 1945–1956", in Paul Kennedy and Hitchcock, eds., *From War to Peace: Altered Strategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 100–1.

[26]Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, February 2, 1966, *FRUS 1964–68*, XIII, pp. 308–9.

[27]Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council, January 22, 1963, *FRUS 1961–63*, XIII, p. 486.

[28]See Josef Joffe, "Continental Divides", *The National Interest* (Spring 2003).

[29]See Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisitied", *The National Interest* (Winter 2002/03).

Jefferson's "Old Europe"

We are destined to be a barrier against the returns of ignorance and barbarism. Old Europe will have to lean on our shoulders, and to hobble along by our side, under the monkish trammels of priests and kings, as she can. What a colossus shall we be when the southern continent comes up to our mark! What a stand will it secure as a ralliance for the reason and freedom of the globe! I like the dreams of the future better than the history of the past.

—Thomas Jefferson to John Adams
August 1, 1816

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Croesus and Caesar

The Essential Transatlantic Symbiosis

Richard Rosecrance

A VENGEFUL United States is snubbing its German allies for opposing the war against Iraq. Prickly France has become a porcupine sitting on America's lap; Moscow and Beijing have followed Paris' lead since the United States and Britain subdued Ba'athi Iraq. Some opine, and others worry, that a belligerent United States or a reactive European Union will throw NATO into the dust bin of fast-moving history. The United States may think it does not need Europe, and Europe may reject association with the American hyperpower. Some Continentals now call more openly for European balancing against a "rogue United States."

This, however, will not happen. The EU will not seek to become another military superpower to contend with or threaten America. The defeat of Iraq will not lead to the end of the American era, with Europe as America's residuary legatee. Nor is the altercation between Europe and America properly cast as a spat between different visions of the social order—with Brussels and the European Commission representing the "paradise" of social democracy and Washington the "power" of the preponderant state. Europe, in fact, does not play Venus to America's Mars.

Amid much bluster on both sides, the paramount truth is that the two major centers are both powerful, but act in different spheres—and they desperately need each other. Neither can, or at any rate should, talk cavalierly of going it alone. Most specifically, America needs Europe's financial power, and Europe requires America's military protection.

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America Needs Europe

THE MOST appropriate metaphor for comparing Europe and America, for those who insist on them, has nothing to do with planets. It rather compares Europe's Croesus to America's Caesar, the paradigmatic example of the power of Rome. Croesus, King of Lydia in the 6th century B.C.E., accumulated vast wealth, and so does Europe today. America is a new Rome that bestrides the world politically and militarily, but rests on shaky financial foundations. Power requires wealth, and wealth cannot protect itself without power. In Washington, Americans berate Europeans for failing to share the burdens of military spending and for free-riding on American largesse. The Bush Administration vilifies most of its NATO allies for lacking military might and having to rely on American air and sea power

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to get their slender forces to any theater of operations. The so-called European "rapid reaction force" is not rapid, nor will it ever be much of a force. American pundits declare that only European rearmament will remedy this deficiency and restore equality to the link with the United States.

This view is as mistaken as it is common. Military clout is not the appropriate way to measure the European contribution to NATO or to America. With little fanfare, the Europeans (and their Japanese cohorts) have shored up American power against the force of financial tides, enhancing Washington's strength and resiliency. Without the help of Europe and Japan, the United States could not have undertaken or sustained its frequent international military operations. Lacking this financial shield, U.S. foreign and security policy would have been checked and doomed to failure. So it has been for decades.

European strength has always rested on monetary foundations. In the past, Holland and then Great Britain commanded the world economy and plucked imperial spoils as a willful child eats chocolate. These nations could finance operations overseas, run commercial economies at home and still expand their territorial orbits. As Niall Ferguson points out, Britain won contest after contest because its money market was deeper and more resilient than those of its rivals.[1]

The United States inherited this role after World War I and enlarged it after World War II, when the reigning American trade surplus emptied European coffers and American credit refloated capitalist growth. Brimming with wealth, the United States could finance both its military role and expand American private capitalism worldwide while contributing to Europe's rehabilitation. But the American financial reservoir ran dry in the 1960s: since then, the United States has not been able to bankroll its military and economic sectors at the same time.

So Europe (and Japan) has. Since the late 1960s, the Europeans have been called on repeatedly to bail America out economically, and they have done so. In 1971, Europe permitted the United States to go off the gold standard, devalue its currency and levy import surcharges against its trading partners without retaliation. Europe did not punish America for its breach of faith: instead it helpfully maintained the high value of the franc and the deutschemark. In 1978–79, American inflation rates rose above the interest rate, negating any incentive to save in the United States. This led, predictably, to a run on the dollar. Spurred by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Federal Reserve Chief Paul Volcker moved to collar inflation with a high interest rate policy, and the dollar regained its footing. After the dollar had climbed to prodigious heights under Ronald Reagan (fostering a huge trade deficit in the United States in the bargain), Europe helped to engineer a soft landing in both 1985 and 1987 as the dollar returned to earth. This prudent division of Western labor represents a still underappreciated reason for the West's victory in the Cold War. The Soviets, in contradistinction, had nothing comparable to it.

Nor did Europe ever take advantage of American weakness when the United States ran into financial trouble. In 1987, the Europeans stood ready to help the Federal Reserve halt the collapse of the New York stock market on October 19. On that date the Dow-Jones Average suffered its largest one-day decline in history, plunging 22 percent in a single session. When the new Fed Chief Alan Greenspan lowered interest rates and ploughed $100 billion

[1]See, at the least, "True Cost of Hegemony: Huge Debt", *New York Times*, April 20, 2003.

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of liquidity into the financial system—floating struggling firms and the exchange itself—the Bundesbank did not devalue the deutschemark in response. Europe and Japan continued to hold funds in New York and did not raise interest rates to counter the inflationary effect of American credit. Germany asked the United States to cut its fiscal deficit but remained ready to support America even when forced in effect to import U.S. inflation. Japan also resumed buying dollars.

Such past services from Europe were, of course, self-interested in the larger sense, but that takes nothing away from their importance. Nonetheless, these services pale beside the tasks the European Croesus will have to undertake in the future. The United States is now running unparalleled trade and fiscal deficits. The trade deficit alone stands at more than $500 billion a year, almost 5 percent of GDP. America is now borrowing 5 percent of world savings, sucking $1.5 billion a day into the United States. The budget deficit, fanned by President Bush's tax cuts, may rise to $500 billion a year, reaching $2 trillion in the next several years. If foreign capital does not enter the United States in huge amounts, the dollar could go into free fall, resulting in renewed inflation. The Fed would then have to raise interest rates, and the American economy would likely plunge into deep recession.

This crisis could occur well before 2004, and President Bush's re-election would then be up for grabs. The political outcome in the United States could thus depend upon what politicians and politically influential bankers in Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt, London and Tokyo decide to do to help—or not help, as the case may be.

It is true that investing in America is still in Europe's own economic interest. Investments yield more in New York than they do in Paris. In the short term, though, Europeans and Japanese have lost money in the United States. The New York stock market has not gone up, and European returns on U.S. investments are cancelled by currency losses. As Europe enlarges, the expansion of the European market will draw money back to Brussels. In the longer term, however, U.S. growth will return, and Europe will want to share in its benefits. As the dollar falls, Europe will substitute new foreign direct investment for trade with the United States. If one takes even a casual glance at the size of such investments in the United States, one sees immediately that their value dwarfs that of commerce. This is not going to change radically or soon. Europe will still place large funds in the American economy. But enough funds, and on what terms?

Europe Needs America

AS A "peaceful power", Europe does not want, or at any rate should not want, to separate from the United States and rebuild its own major military capabilities. It needs American defense protection while integrating with a still unstable region stretching beyond east-central Europe to Central Asia. Robert Mundell, the father of the euro, believes that as many as fifty countries will eventually join the EU—even some from North Africa—and adopt the euro as their national currency. America, not Europe, will defend these expanded borders—and Europeans recognize that they must play their financial part to receive help in protecting their growing perimeter.

To be sure, the euro will probably rise to become a competitive world currency with the dollar, but this prospect ought not be feared. It will give America an opportunity to export to European markets in a major way. Washington will also then have a partner in providing liquidity

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to other nations through deficits in the balance of trade. Europe's economic power will probably grow, despite its demographic doldrums, equaling or even surpassing that of the United States. But this does not mean that Europe will shoulder the world's, or even its own, military burden—and the richer it gets the more it will need U.S. military protection.

Yet Europe as a pacific economic giant will not be inward-looking. It will seek to influence others to follow its peaceful mission. Other nations may well emulate its strikingly successful institutions and policies. By expanding, the new Europe will bring peace and prosperity to eastern Europe and perhaps even to Russia, but it will not police the world. The NATO link with the United States will still be essential in all of this. That is why it is both erroneous and self-defeating to claim that America does not need Europe or Europe the United States. America and Europe are essential and reciprocal counterparts to one another in the structure of world power.

Then there is the continuing threat of terrorism. This threat will not disappear now that the war with Iraq is over; terrorism may even spread, at least in the short run. Neither the technical revolution in military affairs that has occurred in the United States nor the growing imperial reach of America's conventional forces can vanquish terrorism. For that, the United States will need cooperation and the shared intelligence of many other countries, particularly those of an enlarged European Union. There are no superpowers in the war against terrorism—every nation can be a military theater where battles may be won, and Pakistan's cooperation may be as important as Russia's. International cooperation between the United States and Europe is essential to win the long bout against terrorism.

EUROPEANS and Americans alike have been predicting the demise of NATO and the end of U.S. and European cooperation since Suez in 1956. The alliance, however, has not collapsed—and it won't. In the last thirty years, Europe has carried the primary financial burden, allowing the United States to maintain an essentially unbalanced economy while acting as the world's gendarme. Europe has not built up its military strength, but instead has done something much more important: it has created the financial conditions that have allowed the United States to act.

Americans may complain about the recent actions of Monsieur Chirac and Herr Schröder, but if they insist on remaining oblivious to Europe's critical financial role, they only contribute to an atmosphere in which that role is weakened. And Europe, which will not act militarily on its own in any serious way, should stop squawking about the use of American force as though, cases aside, there is something wrong about it in principle. The Atlantic economic and military partnership serves both Americans and Europeans, and it will become firmer as the true basis of the relationship dawns on both sides of the Atlantic. One hopes this happens sooner rather than later, for Caesar needs Croesus, and Croesus needs Caesar, now. □

From a Distance

The human being is in the spiritual sense a long-sighted creature. We see most clearly at a distance; details confuse us; we must get away from what we desire to judge; summer is best described on a winter day.

—A.S. Byatt, *The Biographer's Tale*

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Occupational Hazards

Myths of 1945 and U.S. Iraq Policy

Douglas Porch

NOW THAT Iraq is *Saddamfrei*, that shattered country is to benefit from a Bush Administration reconstruction program that the *New York Times* called in mid-April "the most ambitious American effort to administer a country since the occupations of Japan and Germany at the end of World War II." This laudable objective became obscured in the first five weeks after the end of major fighting, when disagreements erupted in high places over the aims and timetables of U.S. policy in Iraq. The public watched a U.S. team stumble into the Mesopotamian huddle without a playbook.

Peacekeeping, like war, is an interactive process. The United States was clearly caught flat-footed by the level of anarchy that ensued in Baghdad and in the shatterbelt of Arab-Kurdish contact in the north. The mission was mis- or understaffed—a *soupçon* of civil affairs, military police lite, and administrators either clueless about what they should be doing, or unwilling or unable to function because of poor security. In the midst of mayhem, General Jay Garner, Washington's Douglas MacArthur designate, behaved like a patient off his medication. In a moment of delusional optimism, he averred that his tenure would last "three months or so", but that his legacy would be a democratizing, if not fully democratic, country under paroled Iraqi command. A little later, on April 23, he averred that, although the Iraqis may dislike us now, "in very short order, you'll see a change in attitudes and the will of the people themselves."[1] Alas, Garner was yanked, denied the opportunity to savor the promised effusions of Iraqi gratitude.

The way things are shaping up, it appears that unless American administrators get a grip on the post-conflict disorder in Baghdad, Bush 41's Iraqi ulcer may become Bush 43's Middle Eastern hematoma. The smart money bet is that, for political reasons alone, the administration must get a handle on the situation. Anglo-American reconstruction of Iraq will therefore be neither brief nor cheap. For some commentators, this fact constitutes a post-September 11 affirmation of the alleged neo-conservative ideology of the Bush Administration. For others, it follows the logic of events: bad guys did unspeakable things to the United States on September 11, 2001, and other bad guys, linked to rogue states, could cause even worse mischief in the future. One therefore does not depose a terrorism-aiding regime only to allow a clone to rise in its wake. The surprising capacity of the

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Iraqi Shi'a to mobilize and organize, with and without aid from Iran, quickly vaporized hopes for an express, consequence-free exit of occupation forces.

So it was that the President's May 16 appointment of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III as chief civilian administrator in Iraq seemed to bring some closure to the uncertainty. The notion of an Iraqi provisional government has been scrapped for now, with both the White House and Downing Street judging the political situation as being too fluid, and the potential Iraqi political players too disparate, disorganized, and unrepresentative to anchor a coherent political system. In the meantime, Americans and British, not Iraqis, are sovereign in Iraq. Not only is the Ba'ath Party history, but Bremer has required 30,000 party members who served in the public sector to seek alternative employment—and he has decreed the disbanding of the Iraqi armed forces.

THIS TURN of events has buoyed those who feared a short-winded U.S. effort in Iraq. But nation-building in Iraq is war by other means. Recalcitrant supporters of the *ancien régime* have been put on notice that targeted looting, a sort of low-level guerrilla warfare with the purpose of making the country ungovernable, will not work. Washington has sent a message to Iran that its sycophants in Iraq will not be able to hijack a coalition military victory for its own purposes. Above all, the adjusted course speaks to America's determination, as in the past, to append democratic reconstruction to military victory.

The towering symbol of that past, of course, is the post-World War II occupations of Japan and Germany. Candidate George W. Bush, the ideological agnostic who repudiated nation-building and state-building as the false creed of New Deal liberals and UN idealists, has lately become a born again reconstructionist. He has rediscovered the post-1945 American rehabilitation of Japan and Germany as models for what the United States must do in postwar Iraq. At the American Enterprise Institute's annual dinner on February 26, he said:

> America has made and kept this kind of commitment before—in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments.

The dedication to such a result having been proclaimed from the highest office in the land and reconfirmed by a Presidential Envoy, other pieces of the Iraq puzzle will now presumably fall into place. The American occupation will soon normalize everyday life: get the ministries running, the schools to their sessions, the electricity working and the water running and clean, and so on. Meanwhile, Iraq's deposed leaders will have their days in a court of one kind or another, as Iraqi institutions are cleansed of the Ba'ath Party under the watchful eye of the U.S. military. As these efforts proceed, and as postwar Iraq settles down, the majority of Iraqis will grow receptive to occupation goals and even embrace a protracted U.S. troop presence.

Over the slightly longer haul, revived oil revenues will supposedly ease the economic burdens of rehabilitation. The once-flourishing Iraqi middle class will be resuscitated, along with its hypothetical democratic traditions and the vibrant civil society that allegedly characterized pre-Ba'athi Iraq. With any luck, too, fear of Tehran promoting Islamist parties among Iraq's significant Kurdish and Shi'a populations will encourage an insecure post-Saddam Iraqi government to nestle in the embrace of the United States.

There are those, as well, who see the success of the U.S. occupation of Iraq as

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having broader positive regional implications. William Safire predicts that under U.S. tutelage Iraq "will become the center of an arc of freedom from Turkey in the north to Israel in the south." Even Egypt, according to Safire, will "not long resist a tidal wave of liberty" that will sweep the Middle East.[2]

But not everyone agrees. As to this last, regional point, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, speaking in Cairo on March 31, claimed that a U.S.-led war against Iraq would spawn "one hundred more bin Ladens." The war, and the ensuing U.S. occupation, would lead not to liberalization but instead to the damming up of any incipient waves of democracy in the region. It would "open the gates of hell", as former Egyptian foreign minister and now Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa said in Cairo on March 22. These two ought to know.

The other skeins of optimism may be questioned, as well. How will the United States nurture a democratic government that Iraqis see as legitimate? Since democracy is alien to the country, it may take a long time for the United States to build it; yet the closer the United States is associated with the effort, the fewer nationalist credentials will be enjoyed by those who emerge from under its wing. Moreover, the longer all this takes, the more likely the rise in resentment against what will seem to average Iraqis and other Arabs nearby as a colonial occupation. Already, Iraqis are complaining that they enjoyed more freedom under the British colonial regime than under Bremer. Continued chaos, assassinations and revenge killings, and the slow re-establishment of services make some Iraqis positively nostalgic for Saddam. Without access to a credible media, Arab rumor mills churn out black legends that the postponement of Iraqi self-government masks a Western confiscation of Iraq's oil. So while the temptation to declare victory and leave prematurely has clearly been avoided, other temptations, such as throwing good effort after bad if things do not go as planned, loom.

It may be that the U.S. occupation of Iraq will go precisely as the President seems to envision. One can hope so. But it will do no good to imagine the post-1945 U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan as sources of inspiration. The more one mines these experiences, the less appropriate to the moment and downright nontransferable they look. Indeed, it may be that the best purpose of studying those experiences is to learn what *not* to do, for the course of true democracy in Germany and Japan after 1945 did not run smoothly.

The Way We Were

IN THE SILVERY haze of our recollection of the "greatest generation", the reconstruction and transformation of Germany and Japan from totalitarian war-makers into peaceable democratic nations was an easy road of intentions and hard work turned into benign consequences. The truth is, however, that a full decade after World War II's finale, many U.S. "nation-builders" considered their efforts a *nearly complete failure*—and for good reason.

The fundamental problem was one of inflated, and subsequently dashed, expectations. American occupiers assumed that, once the virus of authoritarian rule had been purged, grateful Japanese and Germans would enthusiastically embrace democracy. Instead, U.S. reformers encountered torpor, resentment and resistance. General Lucius Clay, who presided over Germany's U.S. zone of occupation, called de-nazification his "biggest mistake"—a "hopelessly ambiguous procedure" that created "a pathetic 'community of fate' between small and big Nazis" and elicited the hostility of the population.[3]

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John D. Montgomery, a Military Government officer in postwar Germany, confessed that the New Deal activism that fueled a missionary zeal to convert erstwhile adversaries to democracy encountered a stone wall of local enmity. "We had success in small ways", he wrote, "but in 1955, I was not at all sure either country was going to be a democracy."[4]

He was right to worry. Indeed, hardly had the U.S. occupation ended when war criminals were set free, "undemocratic" bureaucratic privileges and status were reinstituted, education reforms were abandoned and quiet retribution was meted out to many who had supported the occupation. Surveys taken a full decade after the war discovered that a *majority* of Germans still believed that "Germany's best time in recent history had been during the first years of the Nazis." A significant minority opined that "Nazism was a good idea badly carried out" and believed "Hitler was a great German leader."[5] Writing in 1961, an American historian of the occupation of Germany recorded that "most of what Americans tried to promote as positive programs produced negative effects that far outweighed their positive results."[6]

Of course, it is true that both Japan and Germany evolved over time into flourishing democracies, pillars of harmony rather than enemies of peace. In retrospect, this transformation appears nothing short of miraculous. Both countries, after all, incubated aggressive military cultures before 1945. And while Japan and Germany had experimented with representative democracy, their feeble civil societies succumbed rather easily to political violence and intimidation in the 1930s. So how did success come about?

The truth is that the successful rehabilitation of the two former Axis powers resulted less from Allied occupation policies than from an array of other factors in combination. These included enlightened political leadership, "economic miracles" spurred by the Marshall Plan in Europe and the Korean War in Japan, and the precedent, however frail, of functioning democratic government in both countries. Japanese and Germans were both talented, innovative, technologically-advanced peoples in 1945 who had been abused by their political systems and pulverized by the war. They had both the skills to rehabilitate their economies and the deep desire to put the past behind them. Hardly had the blackout paper been pulled from windows when, in the view of the historian John Dower, millions of Japanese resolved "to create a private life free from the dictates of the state."[7] Above all, though, fear of the Soviets caused leaders in both countries, supported by their populations, to take shelter under the U.S. military umbrella.

In short, the real U.S. contribution was to take out the bad guys, set the ground rules for democratic reform, provide basic security—and otherwise get out of the limelight. The actual rehabilitation sprang from a combination of what General Clay called "the recuperative powers" of both the Japanese and Germans, "Soviet frightfulness", and patience while Japanese and Germans overcame their resentment of U.S. rule and internalized their democratization in the 1950s and 1960s.[8]

This is a far cry from what is now imagined to have happened. The common, historically untutored assumption now is that if vicious and amoral Axis populations, capable of ghastly cruelties and suicidal fanaticism on an unprecedented scale, could be transmogrified under direct and somewhat protracted American management into orderly, law-abiding, even humdrum societies, then why not semi-Ba'athified Iraq? After all, Saddam demoralized rather than fanaticized his people, so in a fundamental sense Iraq should be easier to democratize than was Japan or Germany. Doesn't Iraq merely have to

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recover the strong traditions of civil society and cultural pluralism, as Eric Davis has described them, submerged in 1968 by chauvinistic pan-Arabism and the despotism of the Ba'ath Party?[9]

Alas, it will not be so easy. Post-Saddam Iraq is a poor candidate to replicate the success of Japan and Germany—a realization that seems to have informed the initial reluctance of the Bush Administration to undertake a nation-building role there. Though once a relatively tolerant, pluralist society, Iraq has become a fractured, impoverished country, its people susceptible to hysteria and fanaticism. They are historically difficult to mobilize behind a common national vision, and no Yoshida Shigeru or Konrad Adenauer can be expected to emerge from a ruling class that inclines toward demagogy and corruption.

Nor is the political environment of the Middle East likely to induce Iraqi politicians, with the blessing of their population, to snuggle up to the United States as did Japanese and German leaders during the Cold War. Iran could be a problem but, unlike the Soviets, not a large enough one to inspire such useful fear. Instead, most Iraqis, taunted by *Al-Jazeera* images of Palestine and egged on by opportunistic clerics of several sorts, are far more likely to see America as their biggest problem. As for prewar experiences of Iraqi democracy, there are none.

Dilemmas of Nation-Building

AMERICA'S nation-builders in Iraq, then, have their work cut out for them. While the historical precedent of governing postwar Japan and Germany may supply inadequate blueprints for Iraq, nation-builders will face many of the same problems encountered by Douglas MacArthur and Lucius Clay after 1945, problems endemic to any nation-building enterprise. We ought to study the German and Japanese models so that we can avoid having to suffer through such nastiness all over again.

There are essentially four dilemmas that we will need to work through. The first concerns the transition from the Anglo-American occupation to a new Iraqi army and police force. The second is about collaborators and retribution. The third concerns the tension between the asymmetrical psychologies of defeat and liberation, and the fourth has to do with balancing the need for both stability and change.

WHOSE ARMY?

OUR FIRST dilemma is to decide the size of the desired military footprint and the duration of the Anglo-American military occupation before turning the store over to the locals. Clearly, Iraq has already paid a significant price in public order for the Pentagon's decision for a "light" invasion that jettisoned weight for tactical and operational speed. A significant military presence must remain long enough to ensure essential services and law and order. The docility of the Japanese and Germans, and the lack of an outside threat until the Cold War began to harden, allowed for a fairly rapid drawdown of U.S. forces. After all, Truman planned for the American occupation of Germany and Japan to last only two years.

While post-1945 occupiers planned to rule Japan and Germany directly—even for these two years—in practice the repatriation of U.S. forces swiftly turned over the task of running the country to the locals, with the U.S. military retaining vague supervisory powers over security, military government courts and de-nazification. MacArthur's GHQ, which the Japanese joked stood for "Go Home Quickly", offered a "super-government" to superintend the workings of the Japanese bureaucracy, whose powers were actually

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enhanced under American "indirect rule."

The fact of ongoing turmoil in Iraq, the need to police and administer the country, and the threat of a national breakup or civil war argue for a large U.S. garrison for the foreseeable future. A significant troop presence will also give Washington leverage with a new government as it is slowly forming. The costs of a heavy occupation, however, will undoubtedly be repaid in a currency of resentment, which will undercut the legitimacy of an emergent Iraqi leadership reliant on U.S. arms for its security. A large troop presence may actually *de*-stabilize other parts of the region as well, creating more security problems than it solves—especially if U.S. troops become targets for popular outrage and armed attacks.

In addition, soldiers are not particularly adept at "nation-building", which they do not regard as their primary mission. Those who have pointed out that U.S. troops have nevertheless done a lot of policing and nation-building over the years merely state a fact that has no real bearing on the essential point. If U.S. soldiers do police and administrative work in Iraq for a long while, Iraq will invariably come to look like a "second occupation", a resurrection of the deeply resented British colonial presence. It will also be associated in Middle Eastern minds with Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. A jostling of carpetbagger American businessmen armed with lucrative contracts to rebuild Iraq, backed by a massive military presence, will make Baghdad look like Scarlet O'Hara's Atlanta. It will further stoke Arab skepticism of U.S. motives, especially if Iraqis see their oil revenue diverted to defray the costs of the occupation.

WHOSE DEMOCRATS?

THE SECOND dilemma focuses on those Iraqis who would befriend and collaborate with us. In Japan and Germany, the help of genuine democrats prepared to look upon the American arrival as a true liberation was seldom accepted by officials on the *qui vive* for left-wingers or opportunists. Democrats soon came to resent the cultural arrogance and authoritarian methods of the American Military Government (AMG), as well as its preference for conservative politicians hostile to democratic innovations, many of whom had been close to the collapsed authoritarian regimes.

On the local level, the ability to speak English became the main selection criteria for employment, which brought in a motley collection of local AMG employees—some with criminal records—who proceeded to install their friends in government jobs. Because local U.S. Military Government personnel were inexperienced, frequently rotated and almost never spoke the local language, they relied on these people to inform de-nazification and "re-orientation" programs and to decide on property requisitions to house Americans. As a result, American occupiers who claimed to be democratizing Germany instead appeared arbitrary and hypocritical to most Germans. "There are your democratic friends from America", Germans who favored the American programs were told. "What have they brought you?"[10]

The same sort of thing is likely to happen in postwar Iraq. Of the hundreds of officials in Ambassador Bremer's entourage, only about twenty are active State Department employees with overseas experience. The rest are political appointees sent by the White House.[11] This is no way to run a Raj, as the Russians discovered in Afghanistan, where their presence between 1979 and 1988 was underpinned by Soviet Communist Party officials seconded from local duties to "state-building" activities abroad. Only three members of Bremer's staff reportedly speak fluent Arabic. There are a fair number of good English speakers

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among Iraqis, but that only makes the task of discerning who is invested in unsavory motives even harder. Not surprisingly, aspiring Iraqi politicians are cautious about associating too intimately with neophyte foreign proconsuls who depend on selected local collaborators for their knowledge of the country. "It is very difficult to participate in something that we have no control over", one insisted. "We don't want to be part of the blame committee when something goes wrong."[12]

In Japan, the American occupation was heavily laden with colonial and racial overtones and unburdened by self-doubt. And while the United States today is a much more multicultural, multiethnic and tolerant society than it was in 1945, the Iraqis will nevertheless characterize the American presence as a re-run of their imperial experience. German and Japanese politicians discovered that opposition to AMG policies, and claims that the Americans had allowed socialists and communists to infiltrate the government to prepare the revolution, were sure-fire formulas for election. Roughly analogous political platforms could develop in Iraq, even though U.S. administrators bend over backwards to be neutral in Iraqi political, ethnic and religious disputes.

DEFEAT AND LIBERATION

A THIRD, related dilemma is how to reconcile defeat and liberation. By 1945, both Japan and Germany had been made to feel the hard hand of conquest. Both countries were utterly devastated by Allied bombing. The occupiers took the view that Axis populations were incorrigibly vicious and immoral, indoctrinated to fanaticism by decades of chauvinistic propaganda. "Unconditional surrender", proposed by Franklin Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, expressed a determination to rebuild the Axis countries from the ground up, so that they would no longer threaten world peace.

For Japan and Germany, utter defeat became the entry to liberation. It was part and parcel of the logic of the war. Indeed, the two were inseparable. As Dower has noted, defeat and surrender liberated the survivors from the requirement to die.[13] Defeat also discredited militarists and Nazis and eradicated any residual desire in either country to reclaim world power or even dominant regional roles. In the ashes of their cities, Japanese and Germans were liberated from the grip of ideology and became pragmatists, unlike 1918, when defeat spawned violence and revolution. America's former enemies desired a democratic, free-market future, not because the occupiers wanted it, but because defeat caused a seismic attitude shift among the populations who now wanted to put the past behind them and rebuild their lives.

This is particularly clear in the Japanese case. MacArthur forced conservative Japanese politicians to pass groundbreaking social legislation—land and labor reform, decentralization of the police, female suffrage, education and judicial reform, and a new constitution—that they had every intention of revoking. But the politicians were unable to do so because the Japanese people became strongly attached to them. In Germany, Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties, sensing this mood shift, began before long to encourage moderation and cooperation with the occupiers rather than resistance to them.[14]

Unlike postwar Japanese and Germans, Iraqis are unlikely to recognize any such links between defeat and liberation. Their country has been spared physical destruction on the scale that was inflicted on the Axis powers. This should have made Iraqis well-disposed toward the occupiers. Yet coalition forces opened to very mixed reviews in Baghdad and

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surrounds. True, the weight of Ba'athi dictatorship having been lifted from the country ought to count in favor of the United States, but even that must be deemed a mixed blessing. This blessing is especially mixed for Sunnis whose ascendancy was guaranteed by Saddam, and also for those who regard with apprehension U.S. promises of democratic reforms, which might hand over power to the Shi'a. On top of it all, the failure of an Arab army, once again, to put up a respectable fight offers up yet another humiliation, and humiliation seldom metastasizes into gratitude. At least the Japanese and the Germans went down fighting, even if in defense of discredited causes, and could console themselves that they had succumbed to *force majeure*.

In contrast, Gulf War II has not discredited pan-Arabism along with Ba'athism, nor put to rest Saddam's promise to liberate Jerusalem like a modern-day Saladin. Saddam may be gone, but similar ideological incantations continue to cast a spell over the Arab imagination. As a result of all this, America cannot be easily viewed as a liberator. The Iraqi body politic sees itself as having been a victim of European colonialism, and it sees the Anglo-American occupation as its second coming.

So do most of Iraq's neighbors. After all, in 1945 the United States defeated and occupied not the colonized, but the colonizers. After 1945, the neighbors of both Japan and Germany were delighted to have Washington park its troops on and democratize two bullies who had disturbed the peace more or less continuously since the 1870s. But Iraq's neighbors, even those secretly grateful to Washington for having executed Saddam's regime, regard a prolonged U.S. presence in Iraq with dread—although not all for the same reasons. Turkey fears that the Americans have kicked over the anthill of Kurdish autonomy. The Gulf states fear that Saddam's demise will redound to Tehran's benefit. American troops bivouacked within a Scud's throw of Islam's holiest sites hoist a red flag in a place—Saudi Arabia—where religious toleration is an alien concept. Local and regional mistrust of American motives and the American presence will make it difficult to concentrate on the issue of democratizing Iraq, especially if resentment erupts into attacks that create security issues for coalition forces. Thus, rather than having a situation, like the Soviet threat, that drives Iraqis toward American protection and values, the external situation around postwar Iraq is precisely the reverse. It will feed Iraqi opposition to the occupation.

STABILITY AND PROGRESS

OUR FOURTH dilemma will be to reconcile the need for stability with that of "renewal" and "democratization." Unlike World War II, when the Allies viewed the defeated populations as accessories to a criminal regime, the Coalition views most Iraqis as Saddam's unenthusiastic victims. Nevertheless, criminals must be punished and the iron grip of the Ba'ath Party over Iraq's public life shattered.

The war crimes trials that took place at Nuremberg between 1945 and 1949 and in Tokyo from 1946 to 1948 aimed, in the words of Secretary of Defense Henry Stimson, to demonstrate "the ineradicable stain their leaders had put on their name among nations", and "to make it impossible for anyone ever to say in times to come, 'Oh, it never happened—just a lot of propaganda—a pack of lies.'"[15] Unfortunately, the post-1945 trials came to be seen by the German and Japanese populations not as the first step in a "re-education" process, but as "victor's justice" and "exercises in revenge."[16] A nation that had flattened German and Japanese cities, dropped the atom bomb

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(twice), and killed hundreds of thousands of women and children was in no position, the "liberated" argued, to accuse others of "crimes against humanity."

That was only the half of it. In the eyes of many Germans, Russian judges at Nuremberg represented a Soviet government whose troops had carried out systematic, mass rapes in eastern Germany, expelled millions of German nationals from East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary under horrendous conditions, and amputated approximately one-quarter of Germany's prewar territory. Their presence introduced a cynical and sour note of moral ambiguity into the proceedings.

In theory, the situation should be different in Iraq. Despite the images of innocents suffering death and chaos presented in the Arab media, the overthrow of Saddam was accomplished with a minimum of collateral damage, at least by World War II standards. Baghdad war crimes trials will be directed at Ba'athis accused of crimes against other Iraqis. Nevertheless, trials will be carried out against a backdrop of anger in the Arab world over UN sanctions that allegedly caused the deaths of thousands of Iraqi innocents. Questions about the motivation and legitimacy of Coalition intervention may pose legal conundrums, too. And Sunnis, who benefited most from Saddam's rule, may interpret war crimes trials as Kurdish and Shi'a revenge for their domination of Iraq (and well they might be).

The administration has wisely promised to allow Iraqis to judge their own leaders. But even this does not guarantee the justice or legitimacy that will allow Iraq to turn a new page. "Key leaders" will surely seek to portray themselves as victims, like those Japanese and German war criminals able to garner public sympathy by insisting that they had made the "patriotic choice" of defending their country. SS General "Panzer" Meyer, convicted by an American court of the murder of Canadian POWs, was given a torchlight parade and a telegram of congratulation from the West German head of state when a German court released him short of serving his full sentence. In order to prevent a permanently disaffected class of people, similar to the sort that had destabilized interwar Germany, from congealing around opposition to occupation policy—and also in order to build up a political constituency for a moderate Federal Republic—Adenauer re-integrated men into the government who had "very bad political records."[17] He even went so far as to restore the pension rights of former Nazi officials and SS men.

In Iraq, senior Ba'athi officials and Republican Guard officers will no doubt insist that, without their vigilance, Sunni domination of Iraq would have been compromised and Iraq dismembered by Iran. A "truth and reconciliation" process considered by the administration is presumably meant to avoid the "judicial chaos" produced by trials of "B-" and "C-class" criminals in Germany. These committees will replicate to a degree German *Spruchkammern*, an AMG version of magistrate's courts made up of citizens able to hand out small fines or days of "rubble clearing" to "lesser offenders" and "followers."

This sounds sensible, but as the German experience shows, the risk of this process is to transform criminals into "patriotic martyrs" and cause the procedure to rebound against those willing to collaborate with the international community. "In 1945 it was hard to find a German who admitted that he had been a devout Nazi", wrote Constantine FitzGibbon, an American officer who served in Germany's AMG. "In 1955, it was equally hard to find one who would admit that he had served on a de-nazification court, for many who had were socially ostracized or economically penalized in

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their own communities."[18] Post-Saddam Iraq can be expected to follow postwar Germany in this regard, producing "patriotic martyrs" on an industrial scale while staunch Ba'athists of Saddam's Iraq become as rare as hen's teeth—at least in the short term. That is precisely what is likely to become of some 30,000 Ba'ath Party officials and members now barred from public service: they will become a kinship of patriotic martyrs, at least for Iraq's Sunnis, a community skilled at both administration and the potential production of mayhem. Many suddenly unemployed army officers may join them.

The flawed assumption that underlay post-1945 nation-building was that democracy constitutes the natural reflex of peoples liberated from suffocating tyranny. However, "democratization" of the civil service, judicial and education systems in postwar Japan and Germany proved to be beyond American capacities. MacArthur's "top-down" nation-building style, the retention of Emperor Hirohito and the assumption by Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) that the Japanese were an "obedient herd" actually strengthened the grip of the Japanese bureaucracy and helped to socialize the Japanese to "the acceptance of authority."[19] A powerful bureaucratic culture, the requirement to enlist German jurists to serve the numerous postwar trials, an ingrained belief in the superiority of the German education system, and administrative sabotage of Allied-imposed reforms all combined to impair attempts to shatter the steel grip of German official attitudes and practices. In effect, stability came first, progress later.

Nor did demands for reform rise up from demoralized, apathetic populations accustomed to leaving government to their "betters." Expecting Coalition-induced winds of change to whistle through a bureaucratic Ba'athi state appears to replicate the naive assumptions of 1945. The good news is that, over thirty years, German and Japanese bureaucrats became loyal servants of their respective democracies. The lesson of 1945, therefore, is that reform emphasis should be placed on creating a better state rather than tinkering with civil service culture and personnel.

The benefit of de-Ba'athification will be that, like war crimes trials, it will put on record that to have served Saddam and his party was to have participated in a criminal enterprise. However, formal de-Ba'athification is likely to be so complex that it is probably not worth attempting. As in the 1945 cases, de-ideologization will take care of itself.

The de-nazification of Germany really began in 1943, as news of the fall of Stalingrad and Tunis and the defection of Italy served notice on the Germans that defeat was only a matter of time, seriously eroding the Hitler myth. "A widespread revulsion to the war and all things associated with it had sunk deep into the German psyche", conclude two historians of postwar Germany, who argue that Nazism was already extinguished by May 1945 even if nationalist fealty to Hitler was not.[20]

The same was true of Japan. By the time U.S. troops set foot in the home islands, the Japanese were fed up with the war, Japanese soldiers were deserting, and the military was generally loathed by the population. Many Germans and Japanese were eager to see those responsible for the war punished. But clumsy AMG/SCAP attempts to assign culpability for Axis aggression and crimes to entire populations, and to make them "work their passage" through forced labor, served in the short term to create a "community of opposition to anything imported by the occupation."[21] It seemed as if Germans especially had lost the war and yet kept the Nazis.[22]

Similarly, the disastrous wars against Iran and the Allied coalition, followed by

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ten years of sanctions and then the disappearance of Saddam, mean that Iraq is already psychologically de-Ba'athified, the population disillusioned, and the "Saddam myth" discredited. The Ba'ath Party was neither socially nor ideologically homogenous, and it had become a sanctuary for opportunists, the unscrupulous, the ambitious and the tremulous. Its defining ideology was hardly more than transparent propaganda. Its only binding principle was its collective culpability in assisting Saddam's human rights abuses. The Iraqi dictator found the party to be the weak reed of his regime after the Gulf War. He relied instead for support on his family, those from his village of Tikrit and other Sunni tribesmen. The Ba'ath Party served primarily to assist the secret police to control the population.

This suggests that de-Ba'athification without any edict proclaiming it would have been relatively easy. The party would have withered away without much effort.[23] The vast majority of the 1.5 million party members, therefore, should be left in peace so long as they have not committed crimes. De-nazification, after all, proved to be a misplaced policy. The goal should be to punish the regime's higher echelons and those who committed crimes against other Iraqis, not to set some arbitrary number and make proclamations about who is and is not entitled to serve the public.

Against this view, we are bound to hear the argument that Saddam could not have carried out his criminal activities without the collaboration of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi police, civil servants, teachers, soldiers, jurists and businessmen. Denunciations, for which the police and secret services offered bounties, lubricated the Ba'athi state. How many people disappeared into Saddam's prisons, how many deserters had their ears severed, because a neighbor sought revenge or looked to ingratiate himself with local authorities? There are plenty of scores to be settled on these and other grounds, so it remains to be seen whether pressure by vengeful émigrés, Kurds and Shi'a, and the demands of the U.S. Congress, for purges and trials of Saddam's Ba'athi supporters will prove irresistible. They very well may.

If such trials do take place *en masse*, it will leave the American occupiers with a dilemma. If we really launch into a wholesale purge of Ba'athi Iraq, we risk replicating the same confusion over defining behavior and attitudes, the same summary judgments, settling of scores and petty injustices as occurred in Germany. In that case, a cumbersome classification system for Nazi suspects was buttressed by the notorious *Fragenbogen*, lengthy questionnaires in which Germans had to prove that they had been neither party members nor accomplices in Nazi crimes. In this case, the impression that the American occupation is neither as "neutral" nor as "liberating" as claimed will be confirmed.

As in Germany, we also may find it difficult to purge Iraq's administration and simultaneously run the country. Hardly had World War II ended than the United States had interned 82,000 Nazi Party members and dismissed 100,000 civil servants in the U.S. zone of occupation alone. When questioned about his appointment of Friederich Schäfer, a conservative who had been close to the Nazis during the war, as governor of Bavaria, George Patton declared:

> more than half the German people were Nazis and we would be in a hell of a fix if we removed all Nazi party members from office. The way I see it, this Nazi thing is very much like a Democratic and Republican election fight.[24]

The press brouhaha that followed Patton's outburst caused Lucius Clay to intensify de-nazification. Roughly 13 million *Fragenbogen* were eventually complet-

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ed. Adenauer complained that, if he followed U.S. directives, only citizens over 65 and those under twenty would have the blemish-free records that qualified them for government service. Indeed, although only 58,000 of one million German civil servants eventually lost their jobs, many more were sent on leave without pay or even interned while their cases were being screened. So arbitrary and unjust was the U.S. de-nazification effort considered that it provoked the formation of a society called the "Victims of De-nazification", which counted 30,000 members in 1954. In this way, Clay managed to separate the concept of de-nazification from that of justice.[23] It may turn out that the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq will be forced to make so many exceptions among the barred 30,000 that the policy will be effectively neutered.

On the other hand, many Iraqis, especially among the more religious parts of the Shi'a community, believe that all Ba'athis are culpable and should be punished. The effects of this belief have already emerged, and the U.S. banning of the Ba'ath may be a response to them.[26] If justice is not seen to be done through official channels, a rampant "settling of scores", as occurred in France after 1945, may sweep through Iraq as aggrieved family members and non-Sunni populations take justice into their own hands. That is already happening, as perhaps hundreds of Ba'athi officials have been killed in vigilante and revenge murders.[27]

IN THE FINAL analysis, the United States should allow the Iraqis to carry out their own "de-Ba'athification lite", complete with war crimes trials of Saddam's top henchmen, the better to avoid the complications of the cumbersome post-1945 de-nazification of Germany. An invasive campaign of democratization and cultural engineering will probably spawn resentment and allow opposition politicians to make the U.S. presence *the* issue. The goal should be to "normalize" Iraq fairly quickly by putting a responsible leadership cadre in place while retaining a supervisory role with enough soldiers to back it up. This will ensure that Iraq does not slide into chaos. Then, with any luck, as in Germany, the next Iraqi generation will wonder why their parents ever allowed a tyrant like Saddam Hussein to come to power, and vow that it will not happen again in their country. □

Notes

[1]Garner quoted in the *New York Times*, April 24, 2003.

[2]Safire, "Jubilant V-I Day", *New York Times*, April 10, 2003.

[3]Clay quoted in Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *From Shadow to Substance 1945–1963* (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 79, 88.

[4]Montgomery, "Artificial Revolution Revisited—From Success to Excess", in Robert Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952* (Carbondale & Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p. 437.

[5]Michael Beschloss, *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany 1941–1945* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 279.

[6]John Gimbel, *A German Community Under American Occupation: Marburg 1945–1952* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 212.

[7]Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), p. 121.

[8]Constantine FitzGibbon, *Denazification* (London: W.W. Norton, 1969), pp. 138, 170.

[9]Davis, "Baghdad's Buried Treasure", *New York*

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Times, April 16, 2003.

[10]Gimbel, p. 151.

[11]Guy Raz, *All Things Considered*, National Public Radio, May 16, 2003.

[12]Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 17, 2003.

[13]Dower, p. 88.

[14]See Charles S. Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 161.

[15]Stimson quoted in Beschloss, p. 275.

[16]Dower, p. 453.

[17]FitzGibbon, pp. 181–2.

[18]*Ibid.*, pp. 161, 172.

[19]Dower, pp. 25, 439.

[20]Bark and Gress, pp. 44, 86.

[21]Gimbel, p. 210.

[22]FitzGibbon, p. 167.

[23]See Ofra Bengio, "Couldn't Be Worse? Iraq After Saddam", *The National Interest* (Winter 2001/02).

[24]Patton quoted in Beschloss, p. 273.

[25]FitzGibbon, p. 171.

[26]See the *Washington Post*, May 7, 2003.

[27]See the *Washington Post*, May 20, 2003.

Of Electoral Sport to Come

Owing to the general indifference and ignorance of the dominant country and the supreme government respecting the condition of a dependency, they do not think about its concerns in ordinary times and under ordinary circumstances. But if, on any extraordinary occasion, any question affecting a dependency should happen to excite the attention of the dominant country and the supreme government, it is rarely treated (especially if the form of the supreme government be popular) with reference to the true interests of the dependency itself, or even of the dominant country as regards the dependency; but it is commonly sacrificed to the temporary interests of the political parties in the dominant country which are contending for the possession of political power. In this manner the people of the dependency become the sport of questions and interests in which they are not concerned, and the nature of which they do not even understand.

—Sir George Cornewall Lewis
Government of Dependencies, 1901

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How to Stop the Iranian Bomb

Geoffrey Kemp

WITH THE fall of Ba'athi Iraq, there are only two targets left on the famous, or infamous, "axis of evil." And the tactfulness of the original locution aside, Iran is one of them. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorists who murder Americans and is building a very sophisticated, independent nuclear-technology infrastructure.

The Bush Administration has vowed to take pre-emptive action against regimes that pose such threats, so Iran's mullahs must be wondering if they are next in line for the application of U.S. force. After all, they more resemble Ba'athi Iraq's leadership—an elite seeking but still lacking an operational nuclear weapons capability—than they do the leadership of their missile trading partner in North Korea, which appears to have put itself beyond relatively risk-free U.S. military action. The mullahs know that the United States already has sufficient military power in the region to reduce most of Iran's budding nuclear infrastructure to rubble within 48 hours. They know, too, that all international efforts, including U.S. economic sanctions, to dissuade Iran from the nuclear course short of using force have failed. They have well earned the right to be worried.

So has the United States. Absent a fundamental change in the policy of the Iranian regime, especially its support for terrorism, or a change of the regime itself, the prospect of an Iranian bomb is very, very dangerous. The dangers fall into several categories. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the current regime would be regarded by its neighbors as a profound threat and would almost certainly stimulate interest in acquiring nuclear weapons in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The smaller Gulf Arab countries, meanwhile, are likely to call for a more explicit U.S. nuclear guarantee—and they might get it. Whether or not the United States agrees to a new iteration of nuclear guarantees, an Iranian nuclear capability, together with its missile program, will eventually threaten Europe, Russia and the United States itself. Such a capability would further harm the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whether Iran obtains the bomb legally by withdrawing from the Treaty, or illegally by violating it. And the bomb in the hands of the current Iranian regime could embolden it to provide more military and political support to the terrorist organizations Hizballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, all pledged to destroy the state of Israel. *In extremis*, Iran could provide nuclear or radiological material to these groups.

In light of all this, it may be satisfying

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to contemplate the expeditious destruction of Iran's nuclear facilities—and some Americans are arguing the case. But the use of force should be the very last resort in dealing with the problem of Iran's would-be bomb. There are three main reasons for this.

First, an attack would not end, but probably only delay the regime's ambition; and one can imagine political circumstances in which third countries would aid a post-attack Iran such that the delay would not be very significant. Even more important, however, some senior Iranian officials are mindful of the dynamics iterated just above and are not convinced that moving from a nuclear infrastructure to the actual fabrication and deployment of nuclear weapons is in Iran's national interest. The more likely a U.S. attack seems, the less influence such doubters are liable to have. A U.S. attack could also be counterproductive politically in Iran, where those opposed to the regime could be harmed by a welling up of Iranian nationalist fury.

Second, the broader political price the United States would pay for attacking Iran, almost certainly without allies and against the will of most major states, would be considerable. Unlike Ba'athi Iraq, Iran has yet to be found in serious breach of any of its legal commitments to existing non-proliferation agreements, nor does it have a record of invading its neighbors such that the United Nations Security Council has been moved to partially suspend its sovereignty.

The best reason, however, for avoiding the use of military force, at least for now, is that diplomatic means are available that can seriously slow and complicate, if not halt altogether, the Iranian program. Some of these means turn on technical vulnerabilities in the Iranian program, as we shall see just below. This is a case, moreover, where slowing the program may yield qualitative advantage. For if the regime in Tehran should change for the better, or change altogether, before Iran's bomb comes into being, then the problem, while not disappearing, becomes a good deal easier to manage. This possibility is not far-fetched.

There may also be an upside to U.S. restraint. If the present Iranian regime can be persuaded to abandon terrorism and, as a result, enter into a political dialogue with the U.S. government, the calculus of risks and incentives in Iran's contemplation of deploying nuclear weapons can perhaps be influenced for the better. Such an Iran could make possible the reconsideration of concepts for a regional security regime for the greater Middle East that could enfold the growing dangers of chemical and biological weapons proliferation as well as nuclear proliferation. If there is parallel progress on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli issue, a new dialogue on the sensitive subject of Israel's nuclear weapons might also be possible.

To stop, or significantly slow down, Iran's push for a bomb will require a multilateral, multi-tiered effort headed by the United States. It would have to involve carrots as well as threatened sticks, and much greater cooperation with Europe, Russia and China. It will, of course, also require a fundamental change in Iran's bilateral relations with the United States. However difficult both parts of this effort may be, it is worth pursuing. Otherwise, either hoping for relatively quick regime change in Tehran or a decision to use force made in Washington will remain the only options available to stop the Iranian bomb, with all the uncertainties of the former and all the dangers and costs of the latter.

The Iranian Program

IRAN'S NUCLEAR ambitions are the result of complex ideological and geopolitical circumstances. While the mullahs are clearly

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eager to build up their nuclear infrastructure, obviously to create an option to deploy a bomb, Iran's program began well before their tenure. The late Shah initiated it, and his motives were a fusion of Iranian national ambition and concern for the direction of the neighborhood. Some rather-too-casual observers have come to see Iranian strategic planning as if its planners had only one eye—facing westward, toward Iraq and Israel. But in the Shah's time, Iran also looked north toward the Soviet Union and east toward Pakistan and India. Over the past quarter century, the significance of an Iranian bomb as a sort of *force de frappe*-style insurance policy against the Soviet Union has lost much salience, but the United States has come to replace it as far as the present regime is concerned. More important, the strategic problem posed by India and especially Pakistan has risen dramatically. While the Islamic regime's anti-Israel posture is radical, uncompromising (so far) and worrisome, it would be a mistake to underplay Iranian concern with Pakistan, a mostly Sunni Muslim country with more than twice Iran's population and one facing long-term political instability.

As a result of such concerns, Iran has long been embarked on a serious and cleverly-structured project to develop a completely indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. The most advanced component is a 1,000 megawatt nuclear plant being built with Russian help at Bushehr on the northern Persian Gulf. When this and related fuel cycle projects are fully operational, Iran will be independent of foreign fuel suppliers for its nuclear power reactors and therefore capable of developing its own weapons-grade fuel. Since the procurement of weapons-grade material is one of the most difficult tasks for an aspiring nuclear weapons state, this capability would represent a major breakthrough for Iran.

Iran's desire for independence in the nuclear arena is not hard to explain. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was isolated by the international community and subject to a very effective arms embargo orchestrated by the United States. In contrast, Iraq was provided with ample arms by the Soviet Union, France and China with American concurrence, and huge financial support from the Gulf Arabs. Furthermore, the world ignored Iraq's frequent use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces. These memories continue to generate bitterness among Iranians and join with a strong anti-colonialist nationalism in support of the attainment of maximum national independence in all respects.

But achieving an independent nuclear fuel cycle is not an easy task, it cannot be completed quickly, and it is vulnerable to interference and delays from abroad. Iran, of course, does have other, less demanding choices. It could purchase weapons-grade material from international sources. This route has the obvious advantage that the material would be fairly cheap to obtain in comparison to other options. However, the quantities are likely to be limited, and it would be a highly illegal transaction which, if discovered, could trigger sanctions under the NPT. Furthermore, the quality of the material might be suspect (there have been many scams with front organizations from the former Soviet Union trying to make money pawning off supposed weapons-grade material to would-be buyers.) If Iran's aim were to have one or two token bombs in the basement, this might be the preferred route. But this is not its purpose, and it does not satisfy the desire for independent options.

Alternatively, once Bushehr is up and running, Iran could try to divert spent fuel and extract plutonium illegally. But the agreement Iran has with Russia includes a clause that Russia will provide

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the nuclear fuel for Bushehr and will subsequently retrieve it for reprocessing or disposal in Russia. The Bushehr reactor will be inspected by the IAEA because of Iran's NPT commitments. Hence, diverting fuel would be a very risky option.

That leaves the option of pursuing a completely self-contained fuel cycle. This is the most secure way of obtaining a steady supply of nuclear weapons material, but it is also by far the most expensive route. To be truly independent Iran must develop all the components that make up the fuel cycle, including so called "front end" and "back end" activities.

But this is, indeed, what Iran seems to be up to. Such suspicions were confirmed on February 9 when President Muhammad Khatami, in a remarkable public announcement, stated that Iran is developing facilities that will enable it to produce its own nuclear fuel. Khatami stated that Iran has mined uranium ore near the city of Yazd and was constructing a uranium conversion facility as well as fuel fabrication plants. Meanwhile, the IAEA concluded that Iran is also building a uranium enrichment plant at a site at Natanz. Another site at Arak is believed to be a heavy water plant. The uranium enrichment plant will be based on gaseous centrifuges and will provide Iran with the ability to produce both low-enriched uranium for use in light water nuclear power reactors and highly enriched weapons-grade uranium. According to IAEA inspectors, the gaseous centrifuges at Natanz are at least second generation. Iran has the skills and facilities to eventually make thousands of them. If Iran has used its pilot centrifuges to conduct uranium enrichment tests, it could already be in violation of the NPT. The heavy water plant has direct applications for plutonium production from natural uranium.

Iran does not admit, however, to having weapons ambitions. To the contrary; it has long claimed that it needs an independent fuel cycle to assure that it will always have access to low-enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear power reactors. Its government never ceases to point out that it is a state's party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is in good standing as far as the IAEA is concerned—although it has so far refused to sign the more intrusive additional protocol promulgated in 1993 to make inspections more rigorous.

Suspicion of Iran's weapons intentions, however, focuses on several points. First, Iran argues that the sole purpose of this massive investment is to insulate it from cutoffs in access to nuclear fuel for civilian nuclear power reactors. But Iran has access to nuclear fuel from Russia, and since this fuel will be safeguarded, stored and recycled by Russia, it will be much cheaper to purchase than any homegrown product. Moreover, since Iran has the world's second largest natural gas reserves and fifth largest oil reserves, it does not really need nuclear power projects for electricity generation. The Iranians reply that they are not the first country well endowed with oil and gas reserves to consider nuclear power as a source of energy; Russia, the United States and China come to mind. Iran's fossil fuels are key foreign exchange earners and should be kept for export. Most troubling, they claim, is that Iran's domestic consumption of oil and gas is growing at about 8 percent per year, and Iran faces horrendous pollution problems caused by fossil fuels in its big cities.

What this all adds up to is that, even under the most benign interpretation, Iran is embarked on a large-scale, long-term and very sophisticated project to become independent in the nuclear business. Even if their capabilities are all declared and inspected by the IAEA, and even if Iran signs the 1993 protocol, its scientific and engineering skills will be such that it would be able, fairly rapidly, to adapt its

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technology to produce nuclear weapons. If Pakistan, India, Israel and South Africa could undertake such projects, so can Iran. It has the money and the skills.

Iran cannot achieve these goals overnight, however, which gives the United States and like-minded countries a window to delay Iran's ambitions. This has become a matter of high priority not only because of the rapid progress Iran appears to be making toward a nuclear weapons infrastructure, but also because the regime continues to support terrorist groups hostile to the United States and its allies, including, some U.S. officials now claim, Al-Qaeda.

Iranian support for Hizballah, in particular, and its reported attempt to bolster fundamentalist forces in post-Ba'athi Iraq, puts Iran in four-square opposition to vital U.S. interests. The U.S. government considers Hizballah to be on the A-list of dangerous terrorist organizations, and there is no question that while Hizballah has so far concentrated its military activities against Israel, it does have a global reach, as illustrated by the July 1994 attack on a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that killed over 80 people—the worst act of anti-Semitic violence outside the Middle East since World War II. Hizballah is clearly capable of attacking U.S. targets both abroad and inside the United States. Some U.S. officials are particularly concerned about the activities of Imad Mughaniya, the mastermind of the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine compound in Lebanon and other deadly assaults, in making common cause between Sunni and Shi'a terrorist organizations from his redoubt in Lebanon's Beka Valley.

Hizballah is now considered one of the key groups the United States will likely take action against at some point in the future. As Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage put it on September 5, 2002:

> Hizballah's . . . on the list and their time will come. There is no question about it. They have a blood debt to us . . . and we're not going to forget it and it's all in good time. We're going to go after these problems just like a high school wrestler goes after a match: we're going to take them down one at a time.

The U.S. government is well aware that Iran provides by far the largest financial and military support to Hizballah, estimated at more than $100 million annually. Iran conducts paramilitary training for Hizballah at camps in Lebanon and Iran; it hosts conferences on "resistance" and has members of its own intelligence services and the IRNG operating out of camps in Lebanon. It provides large quantities of arms to Hizballah, including Katyusha rockets and longer range rockets that can reach Haifa from south Lebanon. It has allowed its embassies to facilitate Hizballah operations and has provided them with explosives for terrorist attacks. Hizballah has in turn provided assistance to both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Many Iranians regard their support for Hizballah to be one of the great successes of their foreign policy, at least with regard to their relations with the Muslim world. They are proud of their Islamic credentials and regard resistance to Israel as one of their prime calling cards in the Arab world, where they have considerable support among radicals. But if Iran does not end its support of terror directed against Israel and the United States, it will, sooner or later, be subject to further American action, including the use of force. This will become a matter of priority the closer Iran gets to having nuclear weapons.

Can the Regime Change Its Policies?

THE ABILITY of the Iranian regime to change its policy on terrorism and nuclear weapons is a function of its own intense

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internal conflicts and the evolving regional environment. Iran's leaders understand the price they pay for their anti-Israel and anti-American actions. Sophisticated Iranians, especially those involved with the economy and energy development, are aware that Israel is a "third rail" issue in terms of U.S. politics and that Iran's anti-Israeli behavior will continue to poison the relationship. They know they have to come to grips with this problem, but the domestic political turmoil now roiling the country makes it impossible for them to do so.

Since Muhammad Khatami was elected president in May 1997, day to day conditions for most Iranians have improved. The society is more open and pluralistic than at any time since the revolution. However, in parallel, frustration levels may well be at an all-time high precisely because rising expectations have been largely frustrated. The vast majority of Iran's educated youth are disillusioned with the government and their future opportunities in Iran; if they could afford to come to the West, most probably would.

Government leaders, conservatives and moderates alike, know this. But they do not know how to resolve the structural problems facing the country without touching off a severe and possibly lethal backlash. What is clear is that everybody involved with Iran—be they insiders, outsiders, monarchists, anarchists, communists, fundamentalists or pragmatists—all agree that the current system is headed for a crisis. The regime has become more repressive in the past year. The closure of newspapers has continued, right-wing thugs have been enforcing with greater vigor dress and social codes (no hand holding between the unmarried sexes), and the endless battle against satellite television continues. But absent some new catalytic event, conservatives can continue their reign of repression because they control the guns and the courts. The smarter ones know that in the long run their tactics will lead to the regime's demise. So they will likely compromise on a sufficient range of issues to assure their personal survival and keep their considerable wealth.

This leads some Iran-watchers to conclude that a subset, at the least, of pragmatic conservatives will adapt to new realities, including an accommodation with the United States on terrorism and Israel. When that time comes, it will be the end of the Islamic Republic as configured since 1979, but it will not necessarily herald a new era of broad reform. Indeed, many Iranian reformers worry that the conservatives will make a deal with the Americans, changing their foreign policy in return for Washington's silence about Iran's democracy and human rights deficits. Iranian reformers have reason to worry about such a scenario. They note that the U.S. government was able, after September 11, to rapidly shift policies toward Pakistan and Uzbekistan once it became clear these countries would support the U.S. war on terrorism.

It is also simply logical that conservatives would consider such a deal. They know it is a vital U.S. interest that the terror against Israel stop. If Iran, in effect, "walked away" from the Arab-Israeli conflict it would be easier for the Bush Administration to adopt a new policy of engagement. This would be a major breakthrough for the United States since the Iranian involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the most debilitating element of the relationship in recent years. But a less aggressive U.S. attitude toward Iran could also deflate pressures to weaponize its nuclear infrastructure—and here is where an additional positive payoff for the United States could materialize.

Of course, such a deal is a matter of speculation. It is easier for the U.S. gov-

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ernment to change its position on Iran than vice versa. If President Bush decided to make a new overture to the Islamic Republic, he would face some opposition within his administration and on Capitol Hill, but he would be able to proceed without fear of impeachment or worse. The situation in Tehran is very different, especially concerning the first moves toward an official dialogue. All the competing factions in Tehran know that the group which first establishes better relations with Washington will gain political advantage. They will be the ones praised for common sense and for doing what is best for Iran. Consequently, their opponents can be counted upon to do all they can to prevent such a thing from happening, including strategic leaks designed to undermine any diplomacy in prospect. This can only be prevented if the Supreme Leader and the President, together, decide to change policy, and do so in such a way that neither can easily renege on the effort.

It will be difficult for them to do this, except in an emergency. Perhaps such an emergency will be produced by U.S. reaction to Iranian meddling in post-Ba'athi Iraq. Perhaps some other unpredictable event may come to pass, or perhaps the emergency will be generated domestically. The point, however, is that the regime can and might change its policies, and the United States should be ready to take advantage of those changes if and when they occur.

Re-assessing U.S. Policy

SHORT OF invasion and occupation of Iran, there is no sure way to stop its terrorist activities or its bomb program. But both activities can be slowed down, and can *perhaps* be stopped. The Bush Administration should develop a practical plan to try to persuade Iran to change its behavior, and to convince the Iranian leadership that dialogue and mutual restraint are to their advantage. If it tries and fails, the eventual use of force may still be required, but at least everyone would know that the United States made a good faith effort to avoid such a course.

So far, however, no such effort is discernable. The administration's public statements about U.S.-Iranian relations have mixed threats and platitudes without saying anything practical about how the two sides might defuse a dangerous relationship. Iran has been designated "evil", with all the attendant threats implicit in the doctrine of "with us or against us", yet the President has also stated that "U.S. policy is not to impose change on Iran but to support the Iranian people in their quest to decide their own destiny." The President has further promised that "as Iran's people move forward towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they will have no better friend than the United States of America." Sounds nice, but as a practical guide, such remarks are not much use, and Iranians may be excused if they are confused as to what all this means.

It is not at all clear what the administration plans to do with respect to Iran now that Ba'athi Iraq is no more. What it will *not* do seems more evident: it will not invade Iran. Several administration officials and high-level supporters have stressed that there are no cookie-cutter solutions for "axis of evil" members and other countries whose behavior makes them problems in the war against terrorism. They have stressed that positive developments are taking place within Iranian society, and they know that U.S. pressure, especially military pressure, could be counterproductive. But knowing what not to do, while important, is not enough. Indeed, how the administration handles Iran in a post-Saddam environment will be of critical importance.

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A good place to start is to understand that the Iranian regime believes that on several previous occasions it has made important gestures that have been rejected by the United States. In his 1989 inaugural address, President George H.W. Bush urged Iran to help in the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon and said that "good will begets good will." When the hostages were released, Iran claims it received no good will. At the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, Iran expected to be consulted on the postwar political and security environment, in view of its quiescence during that conflict. It was not consulted. In 1996, President Rafsanjani agreed to offer an American oil company, Conoco, a major energy deal. This was rejected by the Clinton Administration and was abruptly followed by enhanced economic sanctions. During the Afghan campaign in the autumn of 2001, Iran believed it had cooperated, both during and after the war, only to be placed on the "axis of evil" the following January.

All of this suggests that the Iranians may be more flexible than we think. It does not mean that a policy bedecked with some carrots will not require sticks in readiness, as well. For example, the United States must face down Iranian attempts to hijack the post-Ba'athi political situation, if indeed any such serious attempt is afoot. It must also pursue both a unilateral and multilateral policy toward Iran. If the hardliners continue to promote violence against Israel and accelerate their bomb program, U.S. military options cannot be ruled out, and the U.S. government would not be remiss in saying so. Such options cover the gamut from air strikes against Hizballah targets in Lebanon, Syria and Iran to covert operations or a direct assault on Iran's nuclear facilities.

But it would be better if Iran's relations with Israel were to change, and if Iran curtails its support for the extremist groups. Clearly, the preferred U.S. option should be a new initiative to confront the Iranian terror campaign and its nuclear program on all fronts, using a mixture of political and economic carrots and sticks. This will require a much more nuanced American policy that, as a lodestone, accepts that Iran has genuine national security concerns.

In essence, the United States needs to pursue a concerted policy of cooperative containment of Iran. This will require working closely with Russia, China, the EU and the United Nations Security Council to ensure that if any further nuclear technology is to be provided to Iran it must be under the new IAEA safeguards as provided by the additional protocol. Of course, the United States has tried such an approach in the past, and the record has been mixed. The Clinton Administration made great efforts to stop China, Russia, North Korea and several European countries from providing Iran with nuclear-related technologies. There has been some success with China; with Russia, the record has been unsatisfactory.

While the Russians have agreed with the United States that an Iranian nuclear program would be in no one's interest, its own commercial interests have trumped any long-term security considerations. To persuade the Russians that they should change their policies will require compromise. Two former Clinton Administration officials have suggested a number of options. These include an acceptance of Russia's deal to build the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, provided it restricts assistance to building light water reactors and training. All other nuclear cooperation that could assist Iran with a fuel cycle would end. Russia would insist that all fuel for Bushehr be supplied by Russia and spent fuel be returned. In return, Russia would be offered a number of lucrative nuclear

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deals in the United States.[1] Other potential suppliers of specific equipment to Iran, such as the Czech Republic and Ukraine, continue to be subject to American pressure, and that is good. There can be no let up in this regard, and it may require strong arm-twisting by the United States to assure compliance.

At the multilateral level, the cooperation of the UN Security Council and the EU is essential. Since Iran is a party to the NPT, the Security Council has ultimate responsibility to determine whether Iran is in violation of it. If Iran refuses to sign the additional protocol, it will confirm suspicions about its intentions. Under its current agreement with the IAEA, Iran is only obliged to disclose new nuclear facilities three months before they become operational. At that point, the new declared facilities are open to IAEA inspections. Under the additional protocol, signatories are subject to surprise inspections of suspected undisclosed facilities. This makes it much more likely, but by no means certain, that illegal activity will be detected. To date Iran has put off signing the additional protocol, arguing that it will only do so when all restrictions on its purchase of civilian nuclear technology are lifted. Washington must insist that the IAEA take a tough line on this matter, if only to convince the IAEA hierarchy that if they fail with Iran following debacles in Iraq prior to 1990 and North Korea, they should look for a new line of employment.

The EU can play a more assertive role, as well. Until recently, U.S.-EU approaches to Iranian policy have differed on methods, if not objectives. However, a new EU-Iranian initiative to negotiate a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) has elements that should be welcomed in Washington. The EU has declared that the trade discussions with Iran are inextricably linked to progress on three non-trade items including the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

The TCA negotiations, however, will be carried out by the office of the European Commissioner responsible for external relations, Chris Patten. The TCA will cover trade and human rights. Its final approval rests with the Council of the EU, with the assent of the European Parliament. In parallel, a Declaration of the Council of the EU would be issued concerning benchmarks, to which Iran must agree, on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the Arab-Israeli peace process. EU officials have assured their American counterparts that the political agenda is critical to the overall package. They argue there will be *de facto*, if not *de jure*, linkage and that they are under pressure from their own governments to make sure this is the case. They insist that one requirement within the WMD package will be that Iran ratify the additional NPT protocol.

There will be European pressure groups that will strive to minimize the linkage between politics and economic transactions. This, of course, would be nothing new, as all former European efforts at "constructive engagement" have been mostly foils against which to sell things to the supposedly targeted countries. Iran obviously has every interest in de-linking the two sets of issues, and history provides them confidence they will succeed. They will focus on the economic component while hinting, not too subtly, that it is a "take it or leave it" proposition.

They must not succeed. How Europe handles these negotiations will be a critical test of its seriousness on the political agenda. If the Europeans wish to be genuine allies of the United States, they must

[1]Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore, "Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb", *Survival* (Summer 2002). See also Stephen Sestanovich, "Dual Frustration", *The National Interest* (Winter 2002/03).

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act seriously in those domains where they have the ability to do so. For its part, however, the United States must work closely with the EU to ensure that the political issues are kept on the front burner, and that the Iranians are made to understand that the linkages are real. This should not be difficult if the will is present. After all, it is in fact the EU—a vastly larger, richer and more powerful entity than Iran—that can more easily afford to walk away from the negotiations and take its trade elsewhere.

The United States and the EU also share a strong common interest in advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process and Iraqi reconstruction. Europe, as much as America, has a great deal at stake. However, it makes no sense for the EU to keep pressuring the United States and Israel to move toward a final settlement unless the EU itself is prepared to do much more to stop Palestinian terrorism. The EU should start by adopting the same criteria used by the U.S. government for penalizing countries and institutions that provide financial and military support for Hizballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This applies especially to Syria and Iran and should be an EU priority. Concerning Iraq, the United States will find it easier to solicit EU cooperation on Iran if the EU is encouraged to play a role in post-Ba'athi reconstruction.

IF IRANIAN leaders decide to begin a political dialogue with Washington, their most difficult task will be to persuade their colleagues that Iranian national security will be enhanced as a result of its abandonment of terrorism and its nuclear weapons program. Iran lives in a nuclear neighborhood, and Israel, Pakistan and India stand as evidence of the nuclear asymmetries it faces. So long as a U.S.-Iranian dialogue focuses on these asymmetries, little progress is likely. Israel will not negotiate about its bomb until at least a generation of peace between itself and its neighbors has passed. Likewise, Pakistan will not forsake the bomb so long as India is perceived as a threat, and India, always concerned about China, will not abandon its bomb until the United States, Russia, China, the UK and France do likewise. Here, of course, we verge on fantasy.

It is therefore unrealistic for Iran to expect a nuclear *quid pro quo* from others for its own restraint. That is why carrots are particularly important. If Iran ends military and financial support to terrorist groups, signs the additional NPT protocol and complies with the statutes of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the carrots Washington offers in response should be considerable. At the least, the United States should move to resolve bilateral issues, including the return of financial assets held since the revolution and the end of executive and legislative trade sanctions. More ambitiously, the U.S. government should be prepared to work with Iran in developing investment opportunities in the region, including energy projects.

In reality, progress will depend upon how the United States and Iran manage relations after the Iraq War. After the Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush presented his administration's vision for the world after war and offered four key challenges for the Middle East: to create shared security arrangements; to control weapons of mass destruction; to promote a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace; and to promote economic development. None of these challenges were met, although some progress was eventually made on steps toward a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran, however, was excluded from the multilateral aspects of the supportive arrangements then devised. Soon after the Clinton Administration came into office, Iran and Iraq were further isolated by the United States under a

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new doctrine of "dual containment."

This mistake should not be repeated. If there is to be regional cooperation in reconstructing Iraq, Iran must be given the opportunity to be helpful. Should its leaders choose confrontation, they can expect a tough U.S. response. Much will depend on how the new Iraqi regime comes to power, how representative it will be and how much residual control will rest with the U.S. occupation force. Iran's leaders will be inevitably suspicious of the United States and its role in post-war Iraq, especially given the presence of a formidable U.S. military force. To convince them that the United States seeks cooperative security arrangements rather than coercive dominance will not be easy, especially since the two key U.S. demands of Iran—abandon terrorism and stop the nuclear weapons program—are linked in Iranian eyes to their national security.

This is why the Bush Administration must eventually address Iran's security needs if Tehran's support for terrorism is to be stopped and its bomb is to be put on hold. It is unrealistic to expect Iran to stop its missile program or slow down the modernization of its conventional forces absent a new cooperative regional security environment. For it is not only weapons of mass destruction that determine security priorities. The future of the U.S. military presence in the Arab world and the size and configuration of Iraq's restructured armed forces will also influence Iranian perceptions.

If Iran continues to challenge the United States, the probabilities for dangerous encounters will increase. Iran will never publicly kowtow to American demands, but, if approached with respect, Iran's leaders might rethink their agenda in their own national and political interests. In turn, the United States should welcome rapprochement while continuing its tough message on terrorism and WMD. But U.S. talk of destabilizing the regime is dangerous. If the opportunity for cooperation is missed, the likelihood of an Iranian bomb will increase and, at an indeterminate time, a confrontation will materialize. This would be good for nothing and no one. It therefore would be an act of enlightened self-interest for the United States to engage in imaginative diplomacy to prevent it from happening. □

On Alliances

An alliance is like a chain. It is not made stronger by adding weak links to it. A great power like the United States gains no advantage and it loses prestige by offering, indeed, peddling, its alliances to all and sundry. An alliance should be hard diplomatic currency, valuable and hard to get, and not inflationary paper from the mimeograph machine in the State Department.

—Walter Lippmann

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The Old-New Anti-Semitism

Robert S. Wistrich

THE 20th century may well be seen by future historians as the age *par excellence* of ideological politics. Millions were slaughtered on the altar of false messianisms and their salvationist logic, and in some places the killing still continues unabated. In the totalitarian nightmare of the last century the secular political religions of Nazism and Marxist-Leninism undoubtedly occupy a special place. So, too, does the oldest and darkest of ideological obsessions—that of anti-Semitism—for which over a decade ago I coined the term, "the longest hatred."[1]

For Adolf Hitler, in particular, anti-Semitism was the axis and *raison d'être* of the Nazi movement he created. His dream of global hegemony was overcome only through the combined military might of the United States, the British Empire and the Soviet Union. Nazism as a vital force in world politics was indeed destroyed in the flames engulfing Berlin at the end of April 1945, but the anti-Jewish poison it spread to far-flung corners of the globe has yet to be eradicated. The legacy has proven to be especially potent in the former Soviet Union and the Arab-Islamic world, where anti-Semitism is once again acquiring a potentially lethal charge.

There is currently a culture of hatred that permeates books, magazines, newspapers, sermons, video-cassettes, the Internet, television and radio in the Arab Middle East, which has not been seen since the heyday of Nazi Germany. Indeed, the dehumanizing images of Jews and Israel that are penetrating the body politic of Islam are sufficiently radical in tone and content to constitute a new "warrant for genocide."[2] They combine the blood libel of medieval Christian Europe with Nazi conspiracy theories about the Jewish drive for "world domination" and slanderous Islamic quotations about Jews as the "sons of apes" and donkeys.

The Quranic motifs began to grow in importance after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, along with virulent anti-Americanism. In the Islamic demonology, both America and Israel are now bonded together as "Satanic forces" that threaten

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[1] Robert S. Wistrich, *Anti-Semitism: The Longest Hatred* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992).

[2] Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Antisemites* (New York: Norton, 1986). See also my *Muslim Anti-Semitism: A Clear and Present Danger* (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 2002) for examples of the scale that this dehumanization has assumed.

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the core-identity, values and existence of Islam. This has been especially the case since the beginning of the Palestinian Al-Aqsa *intifada* in the autumn of 2000 and the massacres of September 11, 2001. Not only did an astonishing number of Muslims seek to place the responsibility for this mass murder onto the Jews, but Israel, more than ever, was execrated as a dagger of the West poised to strike at the heart of the Muslim Arab world. In the anti-Semitic script, America itself is depicted as being run by Jews malevolently determined to subvert and destroy Islam.[3] This chorus of voices has grown even shriller with the American war on Iraq, a conflict that has led to an ever closer twinning of anti-American, anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic sentiment in western Europe, as well as the Islamic world.

Driven by this ideology, Islamists see the fingerprints of the all-powerful Zionist lobby everywhere, spreading its tentacles and deadly lies, draining the life-blood of Arabs and Muslims, gratuitously inciting war against Iraq, and carrying out its sinister plans for global control. The current popularity of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*—a forged Russian document from the beginning of the 20th century in which many Muslims appear to believe—is frightening testimony to the power of such myths.[4] The recent television series in Egypt dramatizing the "Protocols" and their fantasy of "Jewish world domination" is a mark of how deeply this anti-Semitic virus has already penetrated the thinking of political Islam.

Fundamentalist and oil-rich Saudi Arabia, the same soil from which Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda movement have sprung, is a major hotbed of the type of Muslim jihad that specifically calls for the terrorist murder of Jews and Christians. Government dailies even print gory nonsense about the "well-established fact" that "Jews spill human blood for their holiday pastries."[5] But a no less anti-Semitic outlook holds sway in more secular Arab societies such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. This hysteria cannot be adequately understood in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Certainly, the cause of Palestine has periodically been hijacked by radical Islamists and pan-Arabists in order to broaden their political support in the Muslim world. But the "Jewish Question" in radical Islam (as with its Western totalitarian predecessors) is not centered on Palestine, and certainly does not see Palestine as a purely territorial issue amenable to rational bargaining. The ideological anti-Semitism that characterizes Islamist thinking is driven by something else: an irrational belief that history itself is determined by the evil machinations of the Jewish people. In this respect the Islamists seem to be directly following the Nazi model, with its fixation on a mythical Jewish power that strives for global hegemony.

Of course, the two models and the two situations are not identical, and the context has changed as well. The "Jewish question" radically changed its contours with the establishment of a Jewish state and Israeli military power in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the creation of Israel could not, on its own, blunt the potential of anti-Semitism as a global phenomenon.

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[3]See, for example, the comments of the Imam of Shihab-a-Din Mosque in Nazareth, as reported in *Ha'aretz*, September 28, 2001.

[4]For one of countless examples, see "Israel—the Plague of Our Time and a Terrorist State", *Al-Ahram*, June 23, 2001, which elaborates at length on the Judeo-Masonic-Communist conspiracy, the Talmudic Jew and a "Protocols"-style narrative of Zionism as the key to understanding Israeli policy.

[5]*Al-Riyadh*, March 10, 2002. This Saudi paper purported to link the Jewish holiday of Purim with the blood libel, a monstrous fabrication that has now become an article of faith among many Muslims.

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It seems rather to have attenuated its force for about two decades, even while a new version of the problem metathesized. Zionism in effect has shifted the focus of postwar anti-Jewishness to an assault on the dominant collective representation of contemporary Jewish existence—the State of Israel itself. Since 1948, the major ideological and political threat to the survival of the Jewish nation gradually switched from Europe to the Arab Islamic world, fueled by a politicidal "anti-Zionist" ideology whose main thrust has always been the destruction of Israel as an independent state.

The European Legacy

TO GRASP THE origins of the demonology behind contemporary Islamist versions of anti-Semitism, one needs to be aware of its characteristics as they first crystallized at the end of the 19th century. *Fin de siècle* European anti-Semitism was deeply pessimistic. It was obsessed with the "decadence" of Christian and "Aryan" civilization, supposedly in thrall to a newly emancipated and "victorious" Jewry. From the radical journalist Wilhelm Marr's prophecy of *Finis Germaniae* (1879) to Edouard Drumont's *La Dernière Bataille* (1889) and the Teutonomaniac Houston S. Chamberlain's *Foundations of the 19th Century* (1899), we find the same specter of Jewish power and gentile demise invoked by a new class of best-selling publicists and populist intellectuals. The anti-Semites inhabited a murky fantasy-world imbued with quasi-apocalyptic visions of European decline, colored by occult sectarianism and permeated with notions of retributive punishment on a cosmic scale. They elaborated negative millenarianism in secular garb—a "reactionary modernism" that reluctantly adapted to democratic mass politics and class conflict while preaching a backward-looking utopia based on premodern feudal or even tribal models.

In this *fin de siècle* world of economic disorientation, rapid social change and eroding traditional values, populist anti-Semitic movements arose that became the seedplot of Nazism. They were especially powerful in the decaying Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the young Hitler acquired the "granite-like foundations", as he called them in *Mein Kampf*, of his *Weltanschauung*. The main elements of 20th-century ideological anti-Semitism were already in place by 1914, when Hitler was 25 years old. These elements included: the beliefs that nationalism was an irresistible force and that race was a secular equivalent of Destiny or Providence; the fear of pollution by alien, inferior races; the *angst* provoked by Marxist class struggle and the leveling tendencies of mass society; and the hatred, nourished by movements of the radical Right and Left, of capitalism, modern urban civilization and liberal democracy.

European anti-Semites usually shared a belief in occult, sinister forces working to undermine social hierarchy, order, authority and tradition. They were alarmed by the spiritual vacuum induced by the declining hold of Christianity, and especially by the working classes' attraction to apocalyptic, revolutionary Marxism. Above all, they shared an obsession with the mythological figure of the satanic, ubiquitous, immoral and all-powerful Jew. Here was, as Richard Wagner put it, the "plastic demon of modern civilization", whose unquenchable will to destroy gentile society lay behind all negative processes of change, providing a coherent explanation for the resulting anomie. "All comes from the Jew, all returns to the Jew." This classic formula of Edouard Drumont in 1886 exemplified the delirious causality embraced by modern anti-Semites. The principle of evil is not in ourselves; it comes from outside. It is the product of conspiracy and devilish forces

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whose incarnation is the mythical Jew.

The mass slaughter of World War I, with its destruction of traditional elites, collapse of established monarchies and sudden flurry of revolutionary coups in central Europe (above all the Bolshevik triumph in Russia, whose autocracy had been the fountainhead of the *ancien régime* in Europe), immeasurably envenomed and radicalized anti-Semitism. The massacres of Jews by the White Armies during the Russian Civil War (1918–20), the fierce anti-Semitic backlash against Jewish participation in the German and Hungarian revolutions, and the juxtaposition of the "Jewish" and "Red" perils in east-central Europe were all alarming signals of growing extremism.

These events greatly encouraged the mass dissemination of 19th-century anti-Semitic stereotypes and ideologies. The climate was ripe for a far more effective translation of conspiracy theories into political praxis than had been the case before World War I. German defeat in that war, crushing economic reparations imposed by the Allies, the resultant loathing for the democratic West, the devastating inflation of 1923, chronic political instability in the Weimar Republic, growing fear of communism, and the ravages of the Great Depression were so many milestones on the road to Nazism. From each one, the sense of helplessness grew, and the longing to blame someone or something for it grew with it. Nazi anti-Semitism thus sprang from popular fears, and at the same time stoked and organized them.

The Nazi-Arab Nexus

NAZI DOCTRINES exerted considerable fascination on the Arab world during these years. Both pan-Arabism and pan-Islamic ideologies in the Middle East looked to Hitler's Germany as a model for national unification, a counterweight to Western imperialism and a source of revolutionary dynamism. Anti-Semitic and anti-British feelings (which anticipated some of the anti-Americanism rampant today) created a powerful sense of affinity between German Nazis and Arab nationalists in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. A former Syrian Ba'athi leader, recalling the atmosphere of the late 1930s, wrote:

> We were fascinated by Nazism, reading its books and the sources of its thinking, particularly Nietzsche, Fichte and Chamberlain. And we were the first who thought about translating *Mein Kampf*. We, who lived in Damascus, could appreciate the tendency of the Arab people to Nazism which was the power which appealed to it. By nature, the vanquished admires the victorious.[6]

Arab nationalists, radicals and Islamic militants were clearly influenced by the anti-liberal and anti-Western spirit of fascism, its emphasis on youth, its pattern of organization and, above all, its cult of power. In Iraq, the Director-General of Education, Dr. Sami Shawkat, told students in Baghdad in the autumn of 1933:

> There is something more important than money and learning for preserving the honor of a nation and for keeping humiliation at bay. That is strength. . . . Strength, as I use the word here, means to excel in the Profession of Death.[7]

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[6]Quoted in Itamar Rabinovich, "Germany and the Syrian Political Scene in the Late 1930s", Jehuda L. Wallach, ed., *Germany and the Middle East 1835–1939* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Institut für Deutsche Geschichte, April 1975), p. 197.

[7]Quoted in Sylvia G. Haim, ed., *Arab Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 98–9. Shawkat regarded both Prussia and the Third Reich as models for Iraq not only to achieve its own independence but also to unite all Arab countries.

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Seventy years later, Saddam's Iraq provided a sinister confirmation of this outlook in its determination to develop weapons of mass destruction and its readiness to use them against internal as well as external enemies.

The idolization of power, together with the totalitarian mystique of the nation, was already developed by many Arab radicals in the 1930s and 1940s. Their visions of grandeur were exacerbated by a feeling of deep malaise, and even trauma, which the encounter with Western civilization had inflicted upon Arab society. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt, represented the pristine anti-Western and fundamentalist version of this backlash. From the outset, the jihadists around al-Banna developed the cult of the leader and preached fascist doctrines of "unity and discipline" and "martial strength and military preparedness." Like Ahmad Hussein's Young Egypt movement of the late 1930s, they were militantly anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic, supporting the boycott and harassment of the Jewish community in Egypt.[8]

The Muslim Brothers, with their vision of a *judenfrei* Palestine as a rallying-point for removing all Western influences from the Middle East, belonged to the first wave of Islamic fascism. The second wave, which swelled after the Six Day War, had as its leading ideologue one Sayyid Qutb, a revolutionary Egyptian intellectual executed by Nasser only a year before the Arab defeat. For Qutb and his followers, the invasion of Western culture had thrown Muslims back into a state of pre-Islamic barbarism (*jahiliyya*) dominated by social chaos, sexual permissiveness, polytheism, apostasy and idolatry. His notorious text of the early 1950s, *Our Struggle with the Jews*, portrayed the Jews as the "eternal enemies" of Muhammad and the Islamic community who used Christianity, capitalism and communism as weapons in their war to subvert the Muslim religion.[9] The Islamists of today have faithfully followed Qutb in attributing Marxism, psychoanalysis, sociology, materialism, sexual depravity, and the destruction of morals and the family to "Jewish" influence. In this cultural war, they see Zionism and Americanism as kindred expressions of an existential threat to Muslim identity.

Anti-Semitism Today

TODAY, the identity crisis affecting millions of Muslims is spawning its own brand of Islamic neo-fascism. That crisis is accentuated by accelerating urbanization, overpopulation and endemic poverty, as well as the prevalence of suffocating dictatorships throughout the Arab world. Without the bogeymen of America and Israel, however, Arab despots would be hard put to explain to their own peoples why the modern world is passing them by. Why is Cairo infinitely poorer than Tel Aviv? Why is heart surgery so much better in London than in Damascus? Why do Arab immigrants prefer Los Angeles or Detroit to Baghdad or Beirut?

The crushing of dissent, the repression of women, the scale of mass illiteracy and underdevelopment and the oil riches of corrupt ruling elites provide part of the answer. For decades, authoritarian Arab regimes turned the bitter feelings of humiliation and rage among the masses against the "colonialist" West. The Islamists have continued in this vein, adding their own paranoid suspicions of modern secular civilization. Fear of apostasy fuses with hatred of America, Jews

[8]See Matthias Küntzel, *Djihad und Judenhass: Über den neuen antijüdischen Krieg* (Freiburg: Ça Ira Verlag, 2002), pp. 31–3.

[9]See Adnan Musallam, *Sayyid Qutb: The Emergence of the Islamist 1939–1950* (Jerusalem: publisher not known, 1997), pp. 34, 52–60.

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and non-Muslims in general. Rank homophobia and a fiercely puritanical, repressive vision of veiled and enslaved womanhood are added to the mix. Indeed, European fascism, for all its male-oriented warrior barbarism, was almost liberating in its attitudes toward women compared with the Taliban or Saudi Wahhabism.

Militarism, the glorification of force and a nihilistic cult of death are, however, traits that Nazis, fascists and Islamists share completely in common. The morbid addiction to destruction and revenge drives them to paint the world red with blood in their mad rush to introduce utopia in the here-and-now. Added to this is the totalitarian belief, very much shared by Stalinists, in the all-encompassing power of propaganda, party organization and terror—a mystique reinforced by the seemingly limitless manipulative possibilities of modern technology joined to ideological dogma. The individual is considered totally malleable and subordinate to the revolutionary cause, whether it be "living space", "racial purity", the "Arab Renaissance", the "classless society" or the jihad. Promethean doctrines, to which human life is so eagerly sacrificed, can only be vindicated by the success of a global revolution that grants political hegemony to true believers in the cause. Whether millions die in the attempt is irrelevant in the light of either the eternal laws of nature and history or the will of God.

Totalitarian anti-Semitism reached its genocidal extreme with Hitler's ideology and a political praxis that, though it grew up on Christian soil, was ultimately determined to replace and supplant Christianity. National Socialism was racial politics carried out under the sign of the Apocalypse, in which the global struggle between the "Aryan" world and Jewry stood at the center of a closed system of thought. Anti-Semitism was transformed into a crucial lever in the restructuring not only of Nazi Germany but of the entire international order—initially as a weapon for undermining Hitler's domestic adversaries and then for subverting or neutralizing opposition to his policies abroad. Hitler emphasized that the destruction of world Jewry was a precondition for restoring the natural hierarchy within the nation and between the races. The Darwinian racism that he espoused was *not* the root of his anti-Semitism; it was simply the "scientific" language he employed to give more credibility to his eschatological political agenda. Its deeper sources lay in a pseudo-religious, Manichean vision of a world in which "the Jew" was the negative wellspring and dark side of history driving mankind relentlessly toward the abyss.

Nazi ideology led to acts of murderous race-cleansing of varying kinds during World War II, but only the Jews were singled out for total extermination. The war against them was conceived as an apocalyptic *Vernichtungskrieg* for global hegemony. What Hitler did was to transform the demonological fantasies of both Christian and anti-Christian anti-Semitism into a practical political program on a universal scale. The choice of the target grew out of centuries of Christian teaching that had singled out the Jews as a deicidal people. But the *Shoah* was a modernized high-tech version of "Holy War" carried out by totalitarian atheists. These atheists consciously sought to eradicate both the Enlightenment legacy of reason and the entire Judeo-Christian tradition of ethics.

The topography and lexicography of post-Holocaust anti-Semitism changed dramatically after 1945, yet the essential elements of ideological continuity have been remarkably tenacious. Today, the geographical center of gravity is neither Germany nor the European continent (despite the alarming revival of old prejudices) but the Arab-Muslim world and its diasporic offshoots. Anti-Jewish rhetoric

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in the new millennium tends to be Islamic, anti-globalist and neo-Marxist far more than it is Christian, conservative or neo-fascist. Whether the assault comes from the far Left or Right, from liberals or fundamentalists, its focus now is above all the collective Jew embodied in the State of Israel. Despite the incessant hair-splitting over the need to separate anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, this has in recent decades become a distinction without a meaningful difference. Whatever theoretical contortions one may indulge in, the State of Israel is a Jewish state. Whoever wants to defame or destroy it, openly or through policies that entail nothing else but such destruction, is in effect practicing the Jew-hatred of yesteryear, whatever their self-proclaimed intentions.

The Soviet Legacy

THE CASE of Soviet communism is particularly interesting in this regard. In 1931, Josef Stalin officially denounced anti-Semitism as "zoological", a form of cannibalism. This was formally consistent with the original internationalist policy of Marxist-Leninism and the older communist view of anti-Semitism as a reactionary tool of the ruling classes to divert attention away from the class struggle. By 1949, however, Stalin was beginning to sound like Adolf Hitler when it came to "the Jewish question." He adopted the classic Nazi mythology of "rootless cosmopolitanism" and applied it to Soviet Jews. Stalinist accusations which developed out of this slogan followed the pattern of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. This had an obvious propaganda value in Soviet Russia, as it did in all of the East European satellite countries that fell under communist control in the late 1940s, where anti-Semitism already enjoyed great popularity. The fictitious "world conspiracy" invented by the Stalinists offered a suitable backdrop for totalitarian claims to world rule alongside the crusade against Wall Street, capitalism and imperialism.

Stalin's shift toward the Nazi paradigm became transparent in the Slansky show trial in Czechoslovakia (1952–53), which proceeded as if all Jews were potentially Zionists and all Zionist groups were "agents" of American imperialism. This was followed by the extinction of Soviet Jewish culture and a planned "final solution" of the "Jewish question" by mass expulsion to Siberia.[10] This disaster was only averted by Stalin's sudden death (on Purim, incidentally) fifty years ago.

Under Nikita Khrushchev's somewhat erratic but bold de-Stalinization policy, there was a temporary respite, though Soviet adventurism in the Third World and domestic campaigns against religion ensured that prejudices against Israel, the Jews and Judaism continued to fester. After the Israeli victory in the Six Day War, a new Soviet-style version of the *Protocols* emerged behind a thin veneer of Marxist-Leninist verbiage. Relentless Communist Party propaganda unleashed a massive campaign portraying Zionism as "Fascist", "Nazi", "racist", driven by "hatred toward all peoples" and a "chosen people" superiority complex. It was no accident that Moscow played such a major role in masterminding the infamous UN resolution equating Zionism with racism.[11]

These ideological fictions had little to do with the actual policies of the Jewish state. They assumed the existence of a dark Jewish conspiracy, linked to America and

[10]Arkady Vaksberg, *Stalin Against the Jews* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), pp. 183–257.

[11]William Korey, *Russian Anti-Semitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism* (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 30–59.

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freemasonry, that sought planetary domination. The Zionist goals were allegedly to overthrow the communist systems in the USSR and Eastern Europe, to dominate the economy of the largest capitalist states, and to liquidate national-liberation movements throughout the Third World. The so-called Zionist "bourgeoisie" aimed to reduce the Arabs and the Third World to servitude. The "socialist" camp, led by the USSR, saw itself as the main obstacle to this perfidious design.

By the 1970s, Zionism was considered one of the darkest forces of world reaction, an ideology and an organization no less dangerous than Hitlerism and "Aryan" racism. History was rewritten by Soviet propagandists to make Zionism the source of inspiration for the Nazis! It was even branded as an active agent of "collaboration" in the German implementation of the Holocaust. In the Brezhnev era of Soviet expansion, "anti-Zionist" anti-Semitism became a cardinal feature of the official chauvinist ideology. This was the first major political campaign to totally defame Zionism as the incarnation of evil and to discredit the Torah as a book of hatred, preaching genocide. The Jewish religion was systematically slandered as a teaching of racial exclusion and its messianic ideals smeared as a justification for *Lebensraum*. As in contemporary Islamic and Arab literature, the grand sweep of Jewish and Zionist history was twisted into a narrative of pure criminality, sadism and immorality.

The Soviet anti-Semitic demonology of Zionism did not immediately collapse with the fall of communism. In the early 1990s, the so-called "Red-Brown" alliance of neo-Stalinists and Russian ultra-nationalists, animated by their belief in the international Zionist conspiracy, continued to preach anti-Jewish doctrines of hate. The alliance claimed that Jews controlled the channels of mass communication throughout the world, insisted that they had deliberately ruined Russia through the Communist Revolution, and proclaimed that Jewish oligarchs were now delivering the nation into the hands of a rapacious cosmopolitan clique working on behalf of American imperialist designs.[12] This was the credo of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who, ten years ago, won a quarter of all ballots cast in the Russian elections. Depicted in the media as the Russian Hitler, he specialized in ethnic slurs against Balts, Armenians, Caucasians and blacks as well as Jews; he established close ties with the German and Austrian radical Right (including neo-Nazis) and talked openly of restoring a Greater Russian dominion. Just as he execrated Jews and Zionists, so he identified strongly with Arab nationalist dictators like Saddam Hussein.

Pan-Arabist and Islamist Versions

THE RUSSIAN communist model, like that of German Nazism, was an important formative influence in Saddam's version of Ba'athism.[13] The Iraqi leader grew up in the framework of this dogmatic ideology, which not only glorified the Arabs as a "master race" but also emphasized the need for relentless struggle and perpetual revolution in the name of the pan-Arab cause. Saddam imbibed his radical nationalism from Michel Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox Christian born in Damascus who had turned his back on all Western ideas to create the Arab Renaissance in the 1940s. In the Aflaqian concept, the Arab nation was the culmination of spiritual perfection, far superior in its traditions and culture to the superficiality of

[12] Korey, pp. 223–30.

[13] See Kanan Makiya, *Republic of Fear* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), and Saïd K. Aburish, *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge* (London: Bloomsbury, 2001).

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Western civilization. But Arab unity would remain a dream without sacrifice, conflict, martyrdom and bloodshed.

Saddam adopted Aflaq's highly charged ideological style while accentuating the Leninist party structures of Ba'athism in order to consolidate his grip on power. He embraced a quasi-mystical view of the Arabs which assumed that an exalted eschatological mission had been assigned to them by God himself. Saddam added to this belief a tremendous emphasis on the will to power, the need to crush a world of enemies, to prepare for endless war and perpetuate the revolution as a sacred task of the Ba'ath Party.[14] For the Iraqi leader there was never any question about his right to murder "inferior" groups such as the Kurds or anyone defined as an internal "enemy" of the regime. It was also an axiom that America and its civilization must be humiliated. It was no less self-evident to him that the "Zionist entity" must be eradicated.

For the Ba'athis, Israel was always an artificial "implant" in the Middle East, a multi-tentacled "octopus", a "deadly cancer" or an "AIDS virus" to be burned up, as Saddam Hussein publicly threatened to do shortly before the first Gulf War. Only two years ago he declared on Iraqi television: "Palestine is Arab and must be liberated from the river to the sea and all the Zionists who emigrated to the land of Palestine must leave."[15] The fact that Saddam filled his speeches with references to Nebuchadnezzar (the Babylonian ruler who destroyed the first Jewish Temple) and Saladin, demonstrated not only megalomania but also his determination to destroy the Jewish State and teach the Western "Christian" Crusaders a lesson they would never forget. In Saddam's totalitarian version of pan-Arabism, Jews were by definition "outsiders", "aliens" and enemies of the Arab nation. Hence it is no surprise to find that Israelis are completely dehumanized as murderers, criminals and the scum of the earth in Iraqi (as well as in Syrian) Ba'athi literature. Wiping out Israel meant expelling or killing a collection of "rootless nomads" who stole a land that was not their own.

For Islamic fundamentalists, the "liberation of Palestine" is no less of an ideological and political imperative than it is for the Ba'athis, but it is also a "war of civilizations" in a more far-reaching and even apocalyptic sense. In their confrontation with Israel and Zionism, the Islamists appeal to a 1,400 year-old history and repeatedly invoke Quranic precedents. Muhammad's war with the Jews in 7th-century Arabia is for them a vitally important guideline for the present. But this return to the distant past has not prevented Islamists from borrowing extensively from the much execrated Western culture's most extreme anti-Semitic motifs. Thus, fundamentalist Muslims have enthusiastically revived the blood libel of medieval Christianity and adopted the scenario of a "final struggle" with the Jews as part of their Islamic *Heilsgeschichte*.

The September 11, 2001 attack on America escalated such trends to new heights of defamation. The Al-Qaeda assault on the World Trade Center in New York was not only a declaration of war against the greatest metropolis of international capitalism. It was also seen by its perpetrators as a blow against the nerve-center of "world Jewry." There is a line of continuity running from Hitler to Ramzi Yousef, who planned the World Trade Center bombings of 1993, and Mohamed Atta, who masterminded the 9/11 atrocity. The Islamo-fascists, like the

[14]David Brooks, "Saddam's Brain", *The Weekly Standard* (November 11, 2002).

[15]Hussein, speaking to an Algerian delegation, May 30, 2001, quoted in Reuven Ehrlich, ed., *Incitement and Propaganda Against Israel, the Jewish People and the West* (Herzliya: Hamercaz LeMoreshet Hamodi'in, 2002), p. 32.

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Nazis before them, are genuinely convinced that a corrupt America is in Jewish hands. Hence, the jihad to liberate Muslims across the world from oppression and injustice is simultaneously anti-American and anti-Jewish. It is also viscerally opposed to liberalism, individualism and modernity as such. It goes without saying that the Islamists reject *laissez-faire* principles in economics, politics and culture. It is axiomatic that they deeply despise the political liberties of the West, such as freedom of speech, freedom of thought and freedom of association and assembly. In these respects they often find common ground with anti-globalist leftists and right-wing radicals in the West today, who concentrate all their spleen on the "sins" of America and Israel while dismissing the threat posed by international terrorism.

In its attitude toward the Jews, Islamic fundamentalism displays many parallels with Nazism and Stalinist communism as well. The identification of Judaism with threatening forces of modernity such as secularism, capitalism, liberalism and moral lassitude is a pattern that applies to each of these ideologies. There is the same obsession with Jews as a revolutionary, subversive and corrosive force; with their hidden, occult, manipulative activities; with their boundless "materialism" and abstract rationalism and its imagined undermining of "sacred values" like family, nation and state. Global conspiracy theories reappear in fundamentalist Islam in apocalyptic colors reminiscent of those favored by its Christian and post-Christian totalitarian predecessors. In the Manichean struggle of the Forces of Light, Goodness and Truth against those of darkness, evil and falsehood, it is clear that the Jews are a spearhead of the Devil's legions.

Sixty years ago, Haj Amin al-Husseini, the leader of the Palestinian Arab national movement (who spent much of World War II in Berlin), insisted that there were strong ideological parallels between Islam and National Socialism. By way of example, he pointed to a common authoritarianism, anti-communism, Anglophobia and hatred of the Jews. His speeches would often begin with anti-Jewish quotations from the Quran. In March 1944, speaking on Radio Berlin, he called on the Arabs to rise up: "Kill the Jews, wherever you find them. This pleases God, history and religion." A few months earlier, celebrating the friendship and ideological links between the German Nazis and Arabs, Haj Amin expressed his admiration for the way "they [the Germans] have definitively solved the Jewish problem."

In the light of what has been happening in the past two years, one has to ask if anything fundamental has changed. Neither Yasir Arafat, the Fatah Al-Aqsa Brigades, Hamas, Islamic Jihad nor Hizballah differ from Haj Amin in their desire to see the eradication of Israel and its replacement by a "liberated" Palestine. Like the global jihadists of Al-Qaeda, Palestinian Islamists are driven by a violently anti-Western and anti-Jewish religious fanaticism. Israel and the Jews are perceived as an existential threat to Muslim culture and collective identity. The Jewish state is theologically and ontologically intolerable because no "protected people" (*dhimmis*) can exercise state sovereignty on what is defined as "sacred Muslim territory." This is understood as an affront to the "God-given right" of Muslims to enjoy exclusive political hegemony in *dar al-Islam* (The House of Islam).

This outlook is shared by millions of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, conservative Wahhabi Saudis, Iranian Ayatollahs, Al-Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad and many secular Arab nationalists, despite the many differences among these groups. But the

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Islamist ideology remains the most intransigent of all the totalitarian options since it insists that permanent war—the jihad—must be waged against "infidels" until the Day of Judgment. No strategic compromise is possible with the American or Israeli "devils", let alone with Muslim "heretics" (i.e., normal, pious Muslims). There can certainly be no "normalization" with a Jewish state, since its very existence is the symptom of the malaise, decadence and corruption in Islam as it is practiced today.

As was the case with Nazism, only the comprehensive and decisive defeat of these dark and irrational forces in the Islamic world can clear the road for peace in the Middle East and a genuine "dialogue of civilizations." Saddam's defeat will undoubtedly be a powerful blow in that cause, not only by eliminating the specter of deadly weapons in the hands of a ruthless dictator and stopping bonuses for the suicide-killers in the Palestinian territories and Israel, but by destroying one of the historic patrons of global terrorism. But this is also a war of ideas as much as it is a military and political confrontation. Its long-term success will depend on a dramatic awakening of the moderate and rational forces within the Arab-Muslim world, forces that have hitherto been strangled by the terrible legacies of totalitarianism, jihad and anti-Semitism. Hopefully, that long-term reformation of Islam will begin in the aftermath of the Iraq War, even if its fruits may take time to mature.

WE SEE that Nazism, communism, radical pan-Arab nationalism and Islamism share a remarkably similar demonology of the Jew. Each of these modern ideologies declared war in different ways on Judeo-Christian and Enlightenment values and sought, or are seeking, the downfall of Western liberal democracy. They all share the same penchant for conspiracy theories of history, society and civilization, as well as the same closed system of beliefs, addiction to mystical or salvationist politics and will to power.

In the case of the jihadist, the return of anti-Semitism also needs to be seen as a powerful backlash against Western and Israeli visions of a "new Middle East", as well as the rejection of a new world order, a global economy, "normalization" with the Jewish state and the idea of a negotiated peace. Indeed, "world Zionism" is today perceived as the driving-force behind globalization ("Americanization") much as a century ago "international Jewry" was depicted by European anti-Semites as the satanic engine of finance capitalism and supranational cosmopolitanism. The new anti-Semitism eagerly scavenges this arsenal of older images which, since the onset of modernity, have stereotyped the Jews as a dangerously mobile, rootless, abstract and transnational mafia uniquely tuned to exploit capitalist economy and culture. The protean caricature of the Jew has been given a new lease on life by the contemporary Islamist apostles of jihad. Israel and Jewry have become their great surrogate in the holy war against America and the corrupt modern world of *jahiliyya*. Uncle Sam, so to speak, has coalesced with Shylock into a terrifying specter of globalization that threatens to swamp the world of Islam.

One can see this syndrome clearly at work in the ongoing radicalization of Pakistan, where obscurantist, intolerant and misogynist Islamist parties were the biggest winners in the October 2002 elections. This Sunni Muslim nuclear-armed state has become increasingly Islamicized in the past two decades. Its Wahhabi influenced and funded private Islamic educational system has been thoroughly penetrated by a fundamentalist creed in which hatred of Western civilization, Jews and Hindus is matched only by loathing

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for Shi'a Muslims.[16] Such fanaticism produced the murder of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl in January 2002 (both a Jew and an American). It stokes the fantastic conspiracy theories, so widely believed in Pakistan, that the Mossad engineered the 9/11 massacre, and it carries with it the danger of a nuclear confrontation with India. Pakistani "anti-Semitism" has no connection to the empirical world or Israelis and Jews as real people.[17] It is a pure ideological product of totalitarian Islam—paid for and nurtured by the House of Saud.

A century ago, partisans of the radical Right and Left first began to converge in a common hatred of "materialist" values represented by international capitalism. They discovered in political anti-Semitism a powerful new weapon against the liberal, democratic order. The German Social Democrat August Bebel once called this kind of bigotry the "socialism of fools." However, like so many others on the Left and in the liberal center, he hugely underestimated the genocidal potential of this ideology once it was harnessed by ruthless totalitarian parties or movements. The simplistic belief that, thanks to technological and scientific progress, the 21st century would usher in universal peace across the globe has proven to be no less naive. Today, in the context of a far more media-saturated and globalized village, anti-Semitism (often masquerading as anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism) has recharged its batteries with a vengeance.

In the Islamic world (and increasingly in western Europe), it has become a dangerous form of auto-intoxication and self-destruction—the intellectual equivalent of the suicide bomb. In the first half of the 20th century, many good-hearted rational people refused to accept that such highly irrational beliefs could be taken seriously by many people. They were wrong. This is an error well worth avoiding in the first half of the 21st century. □

[16]Alex Alexiev, "The Pakistani Time Bomb", *Commentary* (March 2003), pp. 46–52.

[17]Bernard-Henri Levy, *Qui a tué Daniel Pearl?* (Paris: Grasset, 2003).

> And [Balaam] took up his parable, and said: "From Aram Balak bringeth me, the King of Moab from the mountains of the East: 'Come, curse me Jacob, and come, execrate Israel.' How shall I curse whom God hath not cursed? And how shall I execrate whom the Lord hath not execrated? For from the top of the rocks I see him, and from the hill I behold him: Lo, it is a people that shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned among the nations. Who hath counted the dust of Jacob, or numbered the stock of Israel? Let me die the death of the righteous, and let mine end be like his!"
>
> —Numbers 23:7–10

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Rooms and Borders

The West's Variable Experience with Islam

Russell Seitz

IT TAKES TWO to make a border, even a bloody one. Samuel Huntington's trope about Islam's sanguinary cyclical history of confrontation and expansion was adduced when hot embers still glowed in the residue of the Cold War—and when the idea of "the West" still rang true as intellectual currency.

Today, European borders are dissolving faster than metaphysical or emotional attachments to the new trans-national polity can form. On this side of the Atlantic, we too are at sea. As our old European alliances are being de- and re-natured by Europe's self-transformation, our conception of the interface of East and West must shift as well.

Once we considered the Hellespont as the interface of Europe and the Islamic world, but as Eastern Europe has returned to the fold, and Russia's cultural center of gravity has shifted westward from the Urals, America's imaginary interface with Islam is drifting away from its imagined *locus classicus*. This is no cause for alarm, for the West's Islamic frontier, like the earth's wandering magnetic poles, was never at rest to begin with.

This frontier has meant many things to many different imaginations, European and American, and our different experiences of this border's past cartographic meanderings may explain why our attitudes toward Islam vary so greatly today.

THE WEST'S 19th-century frontiers with Islam were less civilizational than denominational. Continuing the Byzantine status quo, Orthodox communions stood vigil on the long eastern flank of Islam, from Tomsk to Tashkent and on to Tatarstan and the Turkish frontier into the Balkans. Across the top of Africa, Roman Catholics confronted the inheritors of the imperial victors that had carried Islam to—and just a tad beyond—the apex of its 8th-century expansion at the battle of Tours. In the Levant, a complex gerrymander of sects and territorial relics of the several Crusades simmered under the unenthusiastic administration of the enfeebled Ottoman Empire.

The Holy Land, meanwhile, was still more an object of pilgrimage than a polity, and Judaism, like Protestantism, was less a political presence or demographic force than that even of the Armenian, Coptic, Chaldean and Maronite churches, or the sectaries of Druze and Alawi Islam. Zeal was in relatively short supply close to the coast, but Mahdiism in the Sudan, the Chechen insurgency in the northern Caucasus and the Wahhabi ascendancy in

Russell Seitz is investigating the space shuttle *Columbia* disaster and writing a book on the rediscovery of the jade mines of the Olmecs.

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east-central Arabia provided it in copious amounts farther inland. These were products of the local equivalent of the wild American West, as were the Berber and Uzbek rebellions that followed the Great War and the Russian Revolution.

The early American experience of Islam was that of Lepanto writ small—a series of Mediterranean raids and skirmishes that even over decades never amounted to the sum of one Napoleonic naval battle. The Barbary pirates, for all their buckle and swash, were far less of an historical force than their slave-trading co-religionists south of the Sahara. Far from inspiring fear and loathing, Islam in the American mind's eye lost much in translation, becoming the substrate of such Victorian phenomena as the Moorish Corner, the Shriners, the expurgated works of Richard Burton, Fitzgerald's *Rubaiyat* and that nadir of the saccharine, Turkish delight.

This contrasts so sharply with the European experience of collision and total colonial immersion that the echoes of the disparity reverberate still today. The French *mission civilitrice* saw a million colonists dispatched to put down roots in North Africa, an episode whose success must have been regarded with interest by everyone from early Zionists to the younger sons of Calabrian farmers. It was tempting some decades ago for Europeans to presume that they had a right to reoccupy the suburbs of abandoned Roman cities. If the Jews should not forget Jerusalem, why should the Italians forget who won the Punic War, or the Franks write off Krak des Chevaliers and centuries of hegemony and a horde of sandy-haired descendants in the Lebanon?

But, of course, the national experiences of different European countries with the Muslim world have varied enormously. The Venetians were up to their necks in Islamic gore for a millennium, while northern Europe scarcely suspected the successive Caliphates' existence or the Ottoman ascendency. Along the Baltic shore, until a century before Columbus, the only fit object for a crusade was the axis of infidels consisting of tree-worshiping Letts, Wends and Sorbs.

Islam has always been to a degree autochonous, and hence of a mixed mind about the emigration of its faithful. Despite the relative proximity of Morocco to the shores of the New World, the first wave of modern emigration to America from Islamic lands was in large measure one of Ottoman subjects mostly Christian and Jewish. The diaspora of Lebanese and Armenian traders carried them throughout Latin America as well. So while America is richly leavened with cultural threads intertwined with Islam, there is little here of its whole cloth. The first mosque was not built on American soil until 1934 (in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, of all places).

Where Islam has excelled best in its modern expansion is the Indo-Pacific. It proceeded directly from Arabia, whose Omani and Yemeni sea traders are both Sinbad's descendants and ancient forebears. Their seamanship made possible that Hellenistic precursor of Bowditch, *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*. Their entrepots along monsoonal trading routes were already doing business when word of Islam arrived from the home offices in the 8th century. Trade then carried the Green Banner before it, soon producing thriving clones of the mother culture from East Africa and Mughal India to the Straits of Sumatra and the Sulu Sea. Colonies and sultanates with blood relatives back in *Arabia Felix* flourished and wed Arabian brides, and still do so to this day. It is no coincidence that conflict has manifested itself, as in the Bali bombing of October 2002, where extra-peninsular Islam finds itself face to face with the descendants of an earlier Hindu diaspora hosting hedonistic Europeans with a thirst for disco music and cold beer.

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While the violence in such triple junctions is hardly surprising, the internal confrontations of Islam in Central Asia and North Africa are harder to understand—harder, at least, for Western outsiders. There are islands of Ismaili enlightenment scattered across an arc of mountains from the Himalaya to the high Caucasus, where the clash among Islamic cultures can be as desperate as any intercivilizational ones. On late Victorian maps tracking Czarist expansion, this area is either minutely subdivided or glossed over as a pale green swath legended "The Independent Khanates of Chinese Turkestan." There today a single range of high peaks can divide a statelet committed to universal female literacy from a valley where the Taliban are viewed as dangerous radicals who are soft on adultery. These divides may not exactly be borders, but they are there, and they hemorrhage disproportionately. These divisions exist in the heart of the Atlas as well as in deep Asia, and the sum of internecine violence in Asian and Algerian Islamic communities thus far dwarfs the death toll of the first and second *intifadas* and Al-Qaeda combined.

Past differences in Western experiences of Islam clearly do shape present attitudes. While America and the old states of western Europe may share a cultural home, when it comes to matters Arab and Muslim they inhabit different rooms. Thus nations relatively innocent of colonial confrontation, or with a past history of mere skirmishing with the Ottomans, have soldiered on to the gates of Baghdad. Others who have experienced the recessional trauma of resorbing millions of citizens did not volunteer to repeat the experience of a clash of civilizations. To them the paramount fact is that in living memory even Islam divided has expelled an infidel power. Jacques Chirac may not play in the same league as Charles "the Hammer" Martel, but another Charles comes to mind who was not exactly the *beau idéal* of a surrender monkey—and even Charles de Gaulle did not long hesitate to leave Algeria to itself.

DURING de Gaulle's presidency, a foreign office wall in the Quai D'Orsay bore a map of one of France's African possessions with an annotation defining its major strategic divisions, rather along lines that seem eerily relevant to how Iraq breaks down today (and may break up tomorrow). From south to north its three parts were *Tchad Utile*, *Tchad Inutile* and *Tchad Futile*. But it is futile to look for this laconic marvel today. It was taken down when Elf started finding oil in Chad in quantities that even Libya might find useful.

Cynicism is not a Gallic monopoly. Our relationship with France is so old, and so special, that we have a positive duty to refresh her historical memory whenever she forgets herself. There is no imprudence in reminding M. Chirac that the language of diplomacy might read from right to left had Charles Martel foresworn the sword and waved Abd Ar-Rahman's Saracens on to the White Cliffs of Dover. Today, France's main borders with Islam may be in the less fashionable arrondissements of Paris. But however much the Quai D'Orsay may hector Secretary Powell about America's imagined dreams of empire, from Guyana to New Caledonia, the sun never sets on the French Foreign Legion. □

> If realism is to be truly realistic, it must acknowledge human beings' romantic and heroic impulses, in all their healthy and perverse forms.
>
> —Robert D. Kaplan, "Euphorias of Hatred", *Atlantic Monthly* (May 2003)

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Published quarterly by The MIT Press for the Center for Strategic and International Studies / ISSN 0613-660X / E-ISSN 1530-9177

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Scoring the War on Terrorism

Daniel Byman

JUDGING FROM recent headlines, things are going pretty well in the war on terrorism. In his State of the Union address, President Bush declared, "We have the terrorists on the run. We're keeping them on the run. One by one, the terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice." Several months later, Attorney General John Ashcroft unabashedly claimed, "We are winning the war on terrorism." Praise is also flowing from outside the government. Writing in the *Washington Post*, David Ignatius portrays an Al-Qaeda that is intimidated, divided, demoralized and reduced in both capacity and morale.[1] Apparently, even the long-term looks bright. Max Boot contends that "the prospect of spending the rest of their lives in Guantanamo Bay may even dissuade some of the more faint-hearted Islamists from taking up arms."[2] Highlighting this progress was the March arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed—the latest, and perhaps most devastating, of a series of deaths, detentions and disruptions that Al-Qaeda has suffered.

A closer look, however, leaves room for skepticism, or at least caution. The United States has made considerable—even surprising—progress in defeating a skilled and vast enemy. Nevertheless, the job is far from complete. The May 2003 terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco provide painful proof that Al-Qaeda remains a lethal threat. More importantly, Al-Qaeda and the ideology it promulgates remain strong, and the Middle East in particular will remain fertile ground for anti-U.S. radicalism for many years to come. As a result, for years and perhaps decades Americans must live with the risk of large-scale terrorist violence.

The Perils of Measuring Success

SUCCESSFUL counter-terrorism is notoriously difficult to measure. Unlike a conventional military campaign, there is no enemy capital to capture or industrial base to destroy. Even a divided and demoralized terrorist organization still has the capability to lash out and kill many innocents.

To gauge success, it is tempting to rely on a "body count" approach. In their public statements to Congress on February 11, 2003, FBI Director Robert Mueller III, CIA Director George Tenet and other senior

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[1]Ignatius, "What the Enemy Sees", *Washington Post*, January 10, 2003.

[2]Boot, "Key Qaeda Capture", *New York Post*, March 1, 2003.

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officials emphasized the number of arrests and disruptions. Mueller testified that "We have charged over 200 suspected terrorists with crimes", while Tenet noted that "more than one-third of the top Al-Qaeda leadership identified before the war has been captured or killed." President Bush himself reportedly keeps a "scorecard" that notes which Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders are dead or in custody.[3]

A body count approach is appealing because it provides a concrete measure of success and failure. Yet this approach is deeply flawed—and it is not, by the way, something new in the annals of American thinking. A body count can be misleading because the size of the terrorist cadre is often unknown, and many of those killed or captured are low-level recruits who can easily be replaced. More importantly, it fails to reflect the impact on the adversary's morale, recruitment, fundraising, and residual ability to conduct sophisticated attacks.

Serious data problems, however, put a more comprehensive and sophisticated approach to measuring success nearly beyond reach. It is difficult to gauge precisely the morale or skill of Western military forces, let alone those of shadowy terrorist organizations. Most of Al-Qaeda's money comes from private sources—and some of the donors do not know that they are supporting terrorism, believing that their contributions are for charity. Even recruitment is difficult to measure. There is no easy way to determine the size of Al-Qaeda, the number and scale of its affiliates and proxies; or who its donors, active supporters and potential sympathizers are. Local governments often do not know, deliberately conceal, or may at times exaggerate the Al-Qaeda presence in their countries.

Despite these limits, it is still better to struggle with less precise categories and poor data than to rely exclusively on a body count approach to the problem. Five genuine measures of success stand out.

One concerns the freedom terrorists have to operate. If terrorists have secure areas in which they can organize and plan with little fear, they can wait to strike at their pleasure. Counter-terrorism officials can at best stop an individual operation, but they will not be able to shut down the network as a whole. Curtailing terrorists' freedom of operation requires both ending obvious havens and working with allies to prevent terrorist activity in their countries (as well, of course, as in our own).

Second, a high level of domestic support for counter-terrorism is also vital. The fight against Al-Qaeda and similar radicals may last a generation. The American people must sign on for the long haul to pay for intelligence budgets and security assistance to allied regimes. They must themselves also contribute to fighting terrorism. In Israel, local police, bus drivers and other ordinary citizens are often the first to notice suspicious activity, helping to prevent numerous attacks or minimize their lethality. This fight is not restricted to soldiers and government officials.

The third measure consists of taking stock of the status of an adversary's leadership and command structure. Some terrorist groups have quickly folded when their top command was compromised: the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey and the Sendero Luminoso in Peru both essentially collapsed when their leaders were captured. Groups such as Al-Qaeda, however, have a much deeper and more diffuse leadership structure that reaches far beyond even a charismatic and skilled leader like Osama bin Laden. Like Hizballah, which has lost numerous leaders to Israeli attacks and infighting in Lebanon, Al-Qaeda's bench is deep.

This is why, for a group like Al-Qaeda, disrupting recruitment is a vital fourth measure of success. It is not enough

[3] *Daily Telegraph* (London), February 4, 2002.

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to stop the current group of terrorists if they will simply be replaced by another generation of eager and skilled recruits. It is even plausible that if Al-Qaeda itself is destroyed as an organization, similar groups will rise in its place. Leftist groups in Europe collapsed not only because of good police and intelligence work, but also because Marxism in general became discredited, reducing the allure of that particular sort of radical ideology. It is essential to win the hearts and minds of would-be radicals to the point that they do not support or join the cause. But if hearts and minds cannot be won, deterrence is essential: both radicals and their would-be followers must be convinced that the costs of warring against the United States and its allies are too high.

The fifth measure of success—the one that matters most to U.S. citizens—is whether a terrorist adversary is committing attacks. Indeed, this measure not only reflects the overall threat the group poses, but also the group's very viability. To continue to attract recruits and raise money, terrorist organizations (like political causes of all types) need to demonstrate that they are active and relevant. If an organization goes too long without any action, potential supporters will look to others to carry the banner—or will go looking for something else to do with their lives. Yet all attacks are not equal. A group capable of orchestrating simultaneous hijackings is far more menacing than one that is only able to shoot a tourist or a missionary. With these five measures in mind, let us review how well we are really doing in the war on terror.

Less Freedom to Operate

WITH REGARD to the first measure of success—Al-Qaeda's freedom to operate—the first six months after September 11 witnessed several major U.S. victories. Most obviously, the United States and its Afghan allies ended Al-Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Although it appears that Osama bin Laden sought to draw the United States into a debilitating and bloody conflict there, the United States and its Afghan allies quickly routed the Taliban with few losses and killed or dispersed much of Al-Qaeda's cadres.

Some skeptics contend that such dispersal has little impact, since in the information age Al-Qaeda can still use computers and cell phones to plan and organize attacks from anywhere in the world. This misses the point. Afghanistan was a haven for training and recruitment as well as for planning. Al-Qaeda and its supporters sent thousands of radicals to Afghanistan, allowing the group to choose the most skilled and dedicated to help with operations. In addition, in Afghanistan Al-Qaeda members enjoyed relative immunity from attack, reducing the stress inherent in the life of a radical revolutionary.

In short, the United States and its allies now have the initiative. Before the fall of the Taliban, a senior Al-Qaeda planner or organizer could quickly flee to Afghanistan whenever the heat grew unbearable. Eight senior Al-Qaeda members charged with plotting the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa (including bin Laden) were believed to be in Afghanistan, outside the reach of justice. Similarly, Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader 'Ayman Zawahiri went to Afghanistan to avoid arrest and detention in Egypt. The Congressional September 11 Inquiry quoted one counter-terrorism official as stating that Al-Qaeda's haven in Afghanistan gave it the initiative and prevented the intelligence community from doing more than reacting to its constant plots. In this official's eyes, the United States was "trying to chop down a tree by picking the fruit." Now Al-Qaeda members must be constantly on the run, unable to relax or to vet new recruits with

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the same thoroughness.

A second, less noticeable, advance is the worldwide police and intelligence campaign against Al-Qaeda. Before the attacks, counter-terrorism was often low on the list of U.S. priorities in talks with European and Asian allies. Even when senior U.S. officials did raise the issue, many foreign governments did not see the same degree of danger as did the United States. This produced tremendous benefits for Al-Qaeda. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified, "even worse than the training camps [in Afghanistan], was the training that took place here in the United States and the planning that took place in Germany."[4] In essence, many governments around the world, including ours, provided Al-Qaeda a permissive environment in which to operate. Although these governments in no way supported Islamic radicalism, their own indifference or legal restrictions allowed Al-Qaeda operatives to recruit, train and plan with relative impunity.

No more. Although allied governments' police and intelligence services have different degrees of skill and face different political pressures, they have unquestionably made Al-Qaeda a priority. In Europe and in Asia, security services are far more willing to monitor and act against suspected radicals. In addition, several countries have scrutinized their legal codes to ensure that terrorists do not exploit various loopholes. DCI Tenet testified on February 11, 2003 that more than a hundred countries have been involved in the capture and arrest of Al-Qaeda members.[5]

An Incomplete Body Count

THE UNITED States has also killed or arrested numerous Al-Qaeda leaders. Although the total number of those arrested comes to more than 3,000, according to Tenet, these arrests often receive little notice, appearing in media coverage as just another unknown person sent to an undisclosed facility where it is unclear what may be revealed. Yet such measures are the indispensible ingredients of counter-terrorism success. These arrests do more than take dangerous individuals off the street and bring them to justice. Each individual arrested brings with him the potential to reveal more of the broader network, helping U.S. and allied intelligence focus more effectively on stopping the next attack and making it harder for Al-Qaeda to train and vet troops.

In March, the United States and its allies scored perhaps their biggest success yet: the capture in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, the mastermind of 9/11 and a key Al-Qaeda planner and facilitator. His capture is only the latest in an impressive series of victories. As the war in Afghanistan commenced, U.S. bombing killed Al-Qaeda's military chief, Mohamed Atef. Numerous other Al-Qaeda members were killed in Afghanistan, along with members of affiliated groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Abu Zubayda, Al-Qaeda's chief recruiter and thus an individual who could detail the full extent of the organization, was taken prisoner in Pakistan. Ramzi bin al-Shibh, another 9/11 planner, was also captured. Numerous regional and local leaders, such as Abdel-Rahim al-Nashiri, the Al-Qaeda chief of operations for the

[4]Wolfowitz quoted in Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, "Hearings on the Intelligence Community's Response to Past Terrorist Attacks against the United States from February 1993 to September 2001", October 8, 2002.

[5]Some problems, however, remain. For example, U.S. officials have not been able to convince many of our allies that fundraisers and forgers should be taken off the street as readily as those prepared personally to commit acts of violence.

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Persian Gulf, have also been captured or killed. So, too, have financiers, logisticians and leading trainers.

This considerable progress should not obscure remaining tasks, however. Much of Al-Qaeda's senior leadership apparently remains alive, including of course bin Laden himself and his deputy, Zawahiri. So too is Saif al-Adel, Al-Qaeda's long-time security chief, and Abu Hafs, nicknamed "The Mauritanian", who led religious education efforts and was involved in many operations. Not only can these leaders continue to organize and plan, as the mid-May atrocities in Riyadh and Casablanca clearly show, but the failure to kill or capture them bolsters their cause. As terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman explains, "for bin Laden—like guerrillas and terrorists everywhere—not losing is winning."[6] As long as these leaders remain alive in the face of a massive worldwide manhunt, they build stature for their movement simply by their successful defiance. (In the Middle East, in particular, leaders have often "won" politically by losing militarily. No one expected Egyptian President Nasser to defeat Britain in 1956, his successor Anwar Sadat to defeat Israel in 1973, or Saddam Hussein to defeat the United States in 1991. Rather, all three leaders gained admiration for successful defiance against an acknowledged superior foe, not outright victory.)

Focusing on a body count of the pre-September 11 Al-Qaeda leadership also misses several of its most frightening characteristics, including its tremendous ability to regenerate, rather like demonic plenaria. An anonymous intelligence officer, in the superb book *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, notes that in the years before September 11 police and security forces worldwide disrupted Al-Qaeda cells and arrested many members. In mid-1996, Al-Qaeda's senior military commander, Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri, drowned in Lake Victoria. Al-Qaeda also lost Ali Muhammad, its leading trainer, when he was arrested in September 1998. Another huge blow came the next month when German authorities arrested Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a key logistician. Sidi al-Madani al-Tayyib, Al-Qaeda's chief financial officer, was captured by or surrendered to the Saudi government in 1997, and the Saudi regime also arrested 300 bin Laden supporters in early 1999. As with the arrests and disruptions today, these efforts probably saved hundreds if not thousands of lives—but they did not stop the growth of the movement. As the anonymous officer argues, Al-Qaeda's ability to recover from detentions, deaths and other disruptions make claims of its demise by officials "sound like nothing so much as an arrogant ninny whistling past the graveyard."[7]

Al-Qaeda also regenerates entire lost cells. For example, in August 1997 the home of an Al-Qaeda lieutenant, Wadih el-Hage, was raided in Sudan, and he fled the country (disturbingly, to a "haven" in the United States). Although this would be a permanent setback for many organizations, a year later Al-Qaeda successfully destroyed the U.S. Embassy in neighboring Kenya. Again, even after several of the bombers were arrested and the FBI combed through Kenya looking for suspects, Al-Qaeda launched another attack in Kenya in November 2002 on a hotel frequented by Israelis. The Kenya experience suggests that cells wrapped up today may reappear tomorrow. So do the May 2003 attacks, and the evidence that Saif al-Adel has taken the place of Mohamed Atef as military commander.

In addition to its regenerative powers, the body count approach fails to capture the plain fact that Al-Qaeda is not just a

[6]Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 25 (2002), p. 311.

[7]Anonymous, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes* (Washington, DC: Brassey, 2002), p. 220.

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distinct terrorist organization: it is a movement that seeks to inspire and coordinate other groups and individuals. Even if Al-Qaeda is taking losses beyond its ability to recuperate, there is still a much broader Islamist movement that is hostile to the United States, seeks to overthrow U.S. allies and is committed to mass-casualty terrorist violence. A proper listing of the Al-Qaeda roster should also include, at the very least, senior officials of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, and al-Ittihad al-Islamiyah in Somalia. A more comprehensive list would add Kashmiri groups, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Armed Islamic Group, the Al-Jama Al-Islamiyya and other organizations with strong institutional and personal ties to Al-Qaeda. It probably should include, at least potentially, the Hizb ut-Tahrir organization worldwide, which, despite its claims to be against terrorism, is an extremely radical group.

The conceptual key is this: Al-Qaeda is not a single terrorist group but a global insurgency. Unlike the November 17 organization in Greece, Al-Qaeda cannot be crushed with a few key arrests. It requires instead a painstaking and lengthy struggle to dismantle not only the current leadership, but also the broader organizational structure. In addition, the recruiting environment also must be addressed, or today's victories will be short-lived.

Declining Domestic Engagement?

ANOTHER ADVANCE—one that is in jeopardy—is an increased U.S. public concern about foreign affairs. President Bush's successful mobilization of domestic opinion to confront Iraq, for example, would have been impossible had the American public not been sensitized to the risks of neglecting problems until they become truly dangerous. The administration has faced little criticism for its various counter-terrorism initiatives despite recent killings of Americans in Kuwait, Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere—all because the public now understands the continued danger of terrorism and the need for the United States to be active abroad in fighting it.

In addition, the American public is more vigilant at home. Too easily this vigilance can slip over into racism or undue suspicion. Vague electronic messages on our highways to "report suspicious activities" certainly fall into this latter category. But in general, police and the FBI have acted circumspectly, and predictions that America would become a xenophobic police state have not materialized. Instead, Americans again trust their police and government to protect them, and most are willing to assist rather than to merely watch from the sidelines.

The risk of complacency, however, is growing. As Americans return to business as usual, the urgency that characterized the months after September 11, 2001 has dissipated. In October 2002, a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force led by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman declared that "America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil." Although the appointment of Governor Tom Ridge to head a Homeland Security Department is an important step forward, the fact that it took well over a year to do so—and that it will take at least several years to streamline the chaotic grouping of agencies dumped into the new Department—is dispiriting.

A Surprising Calm

ALTHOUGH incomplete, the impressive advances achieved by the United States and its allies may explain perhaps the biggest sur-

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prise since the September 11 attacks: the absence of another mass casualty attack involving Americans. In 2002, Al-Qaeda and its allies killed 200 people, 19 of whom were American. But this low American body count was a close-run thing. Richard Reid, the so-called "shoe-bomber", was thwarted from killing hundreds only by an alert stewardess—and by his own abundant incompetence.

Nevertheless, the predictions of many informed observers (including me) that another major attack was imminent have proven false. Success may be due to disruptions of Al-Qaeda's command structure, the organization's temporary suspension of operations until police and intelligence pressures let up, or just good fortune. Trumpeting this success would be foolish, however; for all any of us knows, tomorrow may witness massive bloodshed. But even a year and a half of only limited violence—and violence confined to targets overseas—is clearly a success.

Even the Bali attack of October 2002 and killings of Americans in Pakistan, Kuwait and Yemen can even be portrayed as a sort of progress, albeit grim, in the effort against Al-Qaeda. In the past, Al-Qaeda focused its attacks on symbolic targets linked to the United States, particularly diplomatic and military facilities. The 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa and the 2000 attack on U.S.S. *Cole* both indicated an adversary that sought to confront American power head on—and was admired for it. The September 11 attacks were against notably symbolic targets, and the attackers' daring is unquestionable. The Bali attack, in contrast, was not the sort of gesture that draws admiration from potential sympathizers. To all but the most zealous or deluded, young Australian tourists are a far lesser foe than American soldiers, diplomats and financiers. Similarly, the attacks on missionary doctors in Yemen—people who had devoted their lives to helping poor Yemenis and had gained the respect of the local community—discredit the militants' cause. The same may be said of the May 2003 attacks in Riyadh and Casablanca: low-tech and likely counterproductive overall.

An apt comparison can be made to the 1997 Al-Jama Al-Islamiyya attack on the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt where 58 tourists and four Egyptians were murdered. The attack was roundly condemned, not only by Western governments but by other radical Islamists who viewed it as discrediting their cause. Support for Al-Jama Al-Islamiyya plummeted in Egypt. Similarly, the Armed Islamic Group grew so brutal in its campaign against the Algerian government that it disgusted many Muslims who sympathized initially with its ideals. These groups remain active, but their brutality has alienated the people they most wanted to attract and, over time, has seriously hindered their efforts.[8]

In any event, the lack of a major attack against Americans so far should not obscure the fact that Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups probably remain capable of another major attack. Numerous senior U.S. officials have publicly and repeatedly warned that the United States is at risk of another attack from Al-Qaeda, and that this attack could occur with little warning. They are right.

Losing Hearts, Losing Minds

ALTHOUGH IN the short-term the war goes well, the long-term outlook is more troubling. Al-Qaeda continues to draw numerous recruits throughout the Middle East and the Islamic world more broadly. The September 11 attacks built on Al-Qaeda's past successes, making it clearly the leading anti-American movement in

[8]See Ray Takeyh, "Islamism: R.I.P.", *The National Interest* (Spring 2001).

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the world. Although it is difficult to get more than an anecdotal sense of Al-Qaeda's recruitment, bin Laden himself gloated about his successes in a videotape shot before the overthrow of the Taliban. A UN report released in December 2002 also noted that Al-Qaeda continued to attract recruits and raise money successfully.[9]

Al-Qaeda's worldwide stature as America's number one enemy may have also allowed it to globalize what were in essence local conflicts. Before September 11, Al-Qaeda constantly strove to turn local movements into ones that shared its global anti-U.S. agenda. It had mixed success. In the future, however, radicals fighting Egypt, Israel, Russia, China, Algeria and other countries may focus more of their attention on America. The jihadi movement in general appears increasingly anti-American in its focus.

Indeed, American successes in shutting down terrorism in Afghanistan and dispersing Al-Qaeda's fighters may help turn local groups against the United States. Although organizations like Hamas and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have no love for the United States, they have not as of yet actively focused on American targets. This may change. Al-Qaeda-linked militants, most of whom will enjoy considerable prestige because of their ties to the group's past glories, may reshape the local groups they rejoin. In Algeria in the 1990s, returning fighters from Afghanistan radicalized local groups, and a similar effect could be felt in Kashmir, Chechnya and among Palestinians. Given that these groups have recruiting and fundraising networks in Europe and elsewhere, a shift in targeting by these organizations could prove very deadly.

Even as Al-Qaeda remains attractive, the United States appears to be failing to win support in the Muslim world. Polls taken before the war with Iraq became imminent suggest that the United States is positively regarded (though not uncritically supported) in all regions of the world except for the Middle East. In Jordan, Pakistan and Egypt—all of which have governments that are strongly supportive of the war on terror—popular dislike of the United States is particularly intense. In Egypt, the second largest recipient of American aid, only 6 percent of the population has a favorable opinion of the United States.

Much-touted U.S. efforts at public diplomacy have so far made little progress. Indeed, the most egregious and ridiculous conspiracy theories appear to gain more credence in the Muslim world than do patient U.S. efforts to gain support for its policies or attempts to demonstrate "even-handedness" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the Arab world in particular, the poverty of alternatives to the region's authoritarian governments further burnish the Islamists' credentials to would-be recruits.

More generally, the legitimacy of U.S. power in the world is suffering, including among the populations of many of our (formerly?) closest allies. As Robert Satloff contends,

> For nations liberated by America in our parents' lifetime to tell pollsters they believe . . . that Americans have somehow sacrificed their moral compass while waging the war on terror bespeaks a thundering failure to deliver the message of our policies abroad.[10]

Ironically, too, U.S. efforts to fight terrorism have sometimes fostered rather than diminished anti-U.S. perceptions. Washington's embrace of sordid governments such as the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan, its silence regarding Russian brutality in Chechnya and other distasteful concessions offered to ensure these gov-

[9]Noted in the *Washington Post*, December 18, 2002.
[10]Satloff, "Re-Engage the World", *Baltimore Sun*, March 9, 2003.

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ernments' cooperation against Al-Qaeda are bolstering claims that the United States supports the oppression of Muslims and props up brutal governments.

The U.S.-Iraq conflict, too, is likely to increase hostility among even moderate Islamists, particularly in the near-term. Richard Clarke, the senior counter-terrorism official in both the Clinton and (until recently) the George W. Bush administrations, contends:

> The war as seen on television in Islamic countries has dangerously increased the level of frustration, anger, and hatred directed at the United States. It has given radical Islamic terrorists another target, U.S. personnel in Iraq. The seeds of future terrorism have been sown.[11]

There is plenty of evidence for this statement. Two moderate Indonesian clerics (one of whom holds a degree from the University of Chicago), for example, criticized U.S. policy toward Iraq and immigration restrictions on Indonesians going to the United States and refused to attend meetings in Washington.[12] Scholars at Egypt's Al-Azhar University, the leading institution of Islamic learning in the Arab world, declared a U.S. attack on Iraq to be a "crusade" and called for jihad in response.[13] These are not voices in the wilderness, but rather the core of the Sunni Muslim religious establishment.

Such problems are perhaps inevitable. Although public diplomacy efforts should be both reviewed and renewed, making progress in a region where most hearts and minds appear firmly set against America is exceptionally difficult. At best, perhaps, we can strive for neutrality or distaste rather than set our sights on a warm embrace.

Similarly, when possible the United States should distance itself from brutal Middle Eastern regimes—but this is seldom possible and never uncomplicated. This is because Al-Qaeda cannot be allowed another sanctuary, or even another permissive environment, which is precisely what such distancing could produce. Washington should try to make its allies' own campaigns against their local militants less brutal, and try to encourage efforts that will gain the goodwill of the population in general. But the imperative of stopping another attack will force the United States to embrace some dictators, even knowing that this may contribute to problems in the long run.

Little Progress on Deterrence

DETERRING terrorists is exceptionally difficult even under the best of circumstances. In general, many terrorists are highly committed and willing to take considerable personal risks. Potential followers are easier to dissuade, but even they may be highly motivated.

So far, U.S. successes probably have had little deterrent effect. Bin Laden and Zawahiri remain alive, defying a worldwide manhunt. Operations against the West continue, even if they are less dramatic than those of September 11. The U.S. failure to trap much of the Al-Qaeda cadre at Tora Bora, and the reluctance to commit American ground troops in large numbers, have validated for many bin Laden's rhetoric that Americans are afraid to get their hands dirty in a fight and will thus collapse if hit hard. The video bin Laden released on February 11, on the occasion of the Id al-Adha, urging Iraqis to take up arms against American invaders, also contained taunts that Americans were cowards in Afghanistan, as they were not willing to fight hard on

[11]Clarke quoted in *Congressional Quarterly*, April 22, 2003.

[12]Noted in the *New York Times*, January 29, 2003.

[13]*Washington Post*, March 12, 2003.

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the ground. Taken together, these weaknesses may convince potential recruits and supporters that Al-Qaeda remains a horse worth wagering on.

As to new sanctuaries, there may arise new Afghanistans where would-be radicals can congregate and form lasting ties. Numerous jihads continue without letup. Chechnya remains a bloody standoff, attracting militant Islamists as well as homegrown radicals. Kashmir has died down but may soon re-ignite. Xinjiang remains turbulent, and Indonesia may flare up as well despite, or maybe because of the government's late-April crackdown on Jemaah Islamiyah and its military approach in Aceh.

An even more troubling phenomenon is the discovery of possible cells in the United States itself. In essence, the September 11 hijackers were infiltrators in the United States, taking advantage of permeable U.S. borders to plot their attacks. The arrests of alleged militants in Lackawanna, Seattle, Detroit, Chicago, Florida and Portland also indicate that Islamic radicalism is appealing to individuals rooted in American communities. The FBI estimates that several hundred militants linked to Al-Qaeda are in the United States.[14] This challenge is distinct from protecting borders and ensuring proper visa issuance. But it is certainly no less daunting.

But Today the Struggle

THERE ARE few easy choices in the war against terrorism, and no silver bullets. Anti-U.S. sentiment will remain strong, and it may even grow as the United States aggressively disrupts existing militant networks. Conflicts in Chechnya, Kashmir and elsewhere will rise or decline largely on their own accord, with the United States having at best marginal influence. As a result, radicals will continue to enjoy success in recruiting and fundraising. Even if Al-Qaeda's current leadership cadre is killed or arrested, its ideals and legend will remain strong, inspiring the next generation of radicals—who may well manage to get hold of truly dangerous biological or radiological substances.

As a result, current operations against existing cadres remain necessary. At times, killing the right leader may dishearten a movement or a cell, and his arrest may produce valuable information that can wrap up a much broader network. Such benefits, even if ephemeral, are worth the effort, and even if they may create problems over the long-term. This is because failure to act would not only allow current operations to succeed, but would also enable existing terrorist networks to deepen and expand, making attacks deadlier and more frequent.

There is no easy long-term strategy that guarantees success. Instead, the United States and its allies must accept the inevitability of a large, global movement bent on murder as a form of political expression. With skill and energy, we can beat it back. Outright defeat will be far harder. That may depend ultimately on the proverbial draining of the political swamp. But by any measure it is a very large swamp. □

[14]Mueller testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003.

> Yes, absolutely, I worry about a democracy having nuclear weapons as much as a dictatorship having nuclear weapons.
>
> —Mohamed ElBaradei, *New York Times Magazine*, March 2, 2003

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*Agri*vation

The Farm Bill from Hell

C. Ford Runge

UNITED States agricultural and trade policies have huge impacts on world markets. Indeed, as a leading agricultural exporter, American actions set the tone for much of international food policy. The United States has done much good in this role; for example, it helped lead agriculture toward more open markets in the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986–93). But the centerpiece of current U.S. agricultural policy, the 2002 Farm Bill, is an outright disaster in four acts. First, it upends U.S. commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to more open agricultural trade, from which U.S. farmers would be the largest beneficiaries. The failure of the latest Doha Round negotiations to make any real progress is testimony to the fact. Second, it sends exactly the wrong message to our trading partners in Europe and the developing countries. Third, less obviously but not less importantly, it undermines the long-term competitiveness of U.S. agriculture itself. Fourth, it is contrary to conserving American agricultural resources and the sustainability of U.S. agricultural production systems.

On all four fronts, recent U.S. actions represent backsliding toward protectionist policies that will materially harm U.S. trading partners, especially developing countries, as well as U.S. farmers themselves. How could such a disaster have happened?

Paying the Bill

IN DOMESTIC political terms, the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill that now reigns over U.S. agriculture policy represents an inversion of Dr. Johnson's comment on a second marriage: "a triumph of hope over experience." The Farm Bill is rather a triumph of experience over hope. U.S. farm interest groups are experienced at securing subsidies from compliant and parochial members of Congress. By focusing intense pressure on the House and Senate subcommittees (and their staffs) responsible for setting farm subsidy levels, these commodity groups can extract major transfers of wealth for their producers. Because these subsidies are generally based on per acre or per unit "base" production, the bigger the farm, the bigger the subsidy. Payment threshold limits are set so high, and enforced so poorly, that they affect no more than a handful of large farms.

Farm subsidies have been subjected to

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overall limits under the terms of the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement (URA) of 1993. But these limits have led, unfortunately if not inevitably, to various maneuvers to slip around them. One such maneuver is to define subsidies as "non-product specific"—described just below—allowing the U.S. government to maintain that its grossly expanded farm payments are "GATT-legal." The reality is that the new subsidies, even though they do not generally restrict imports (apart from peanuts, dairy and sugar), nonetheless insulate U.S. producers from global competition and world markets. They do so in ways that are substantially equivalent to the EU's grossly inflated border protections, and the international distortions they create will erode the base of American production by artificially inflating domestic U.S. land values, raising costs of production and harming U.S. competitiveness. While a small number of large operations will profit handsomely, the subsidies thus represent a form of domestic self-injury to the country as a whole.

The greatest injury, however, will be visited upon poor farmers in developing countries, and to farmers in developed countries without comparable levels of largesse, such as Australia and to a lesser extent Canada. We know this because we have examples of such phenomena from years past plainly before us. Consider cotton.

Cotton prices have fallen by two-thirds since 1995, to around 40 cents a pound. The reason for this is simple enough: there was excess supply at the same time that demand was falling. The fall in demand was mostly the consequence of the collapse of Russia's textile industry. The excess demand was abetted by the $3.4 billion in subsidy checks that U.S. cotton farmers received under the last year of the 1996 Farm Bill, which encouraged surplus production. There are approximately 25,000 U.S. cotton farmers, with average assets of $800,000. Under the 2002 program, cotton farmers will receive direct payments of 66 cents a pound, a loan rate of 52 cents and a target price of 72 cents—all well above global prices. (Across the ocean in Africa, meanwhile, cotton farmers in Mali will receive about 11 cents a pound this year.) U.S. cotton farmers are not required to leave any acres idle to receive these subsidies. In effect, U.S. farmers are insulated from global competition by individual payments averaging hundreds of thousands of dollars. The World Bank and IMF estimate that eliminating U.S. cotton subsidies would raise revenues to west and central African countries by $250 million—not much money by some standards, but significant in many African economies.

If cotton were the only problem! To grasp the scale and breadth of the disaster the Farm Bill represents requires a review of the Bill itself. Even a cursory summary is complicated, however. The bill, whose lifespan is seven years, has ten titles, totaling more than 1,000 pages. For our purposes, the three most important are Titles I (Commodity Programs), II (Conservation) and III (Trade).

The Commodity Programs span a wide range, but give most of the subsidies to growers of feed grains (mainly corn), wheat, rice, soybeans and cotton. The 2002 legislation has three categories of subsidy under Title I. The first are "fixed payments", which are carried over from the 1996 legislation, but generally at higher levels. The second are non-recourse marketing assistance "loans", which provide funds to lock in minimum price guarantees.[1] These are also carry-overs from previous policies. The third

[1]Marketing assistance loans are really price guarantees in the form of a "loan" to the farmer. They work by providing farmers a price floor, and by giving them the right to surrender their crop to the government if prices fail to exceed those at which the "loan" could be fully repaid. The commodity is the collateral.

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category of subsidy, new in the 2002 Farm Bill, is the "counter-cyclical income payment." In essence, these payments represent the new subsidy levels resulting from the "emergency assistance" and supplementary payments that were added under the 1996 legislation by year-to-year Congressional action during 1998–2001. These "topping off" subsidies are institutionalized in the 2002 bill as counter-cyclical payments, but will ebb and flow as prices rise and fall.

To get a sense of the magnitude of these payments, consider the record from 1996–2001 under the 1996 Farm Bill. U.S. agricultural production is accounted for by about 2.1 million farms. But this includes a multitude of hobbyists, part-timers and absentee landlords who have placed acreage in conservation easements. In reality, about 85 percent of U.S. production is accounted for by no more than 400,000 producers, who are technologically and politically sophisticated by any standard. It is these 400,000 who receive nearly 90 percent of all subsidy payments. Under the 1996 legislation, total direct subsidy payments totaled $7.3 billion in 1996, $7.5 billion in 1997, rose to $12.4 billion in 1998, $21.5 billion in 1999, $22.9 billion in 2000 and $20.0 billion in 2001. That amounts to a whopping $91.58 billion over six years, an average of $15.3 billion a year. The reason that subsidy payments rose almost three-fold from 1996 to 1999 and stayed at or above $20 billion through 2001 was that Congress topped off the fixed payments mandated under the 1996 Farm Bill with "emergency assistance" and "loan deficiency payments", adding $13.7 billion in these two categories in 1999, $14.9 billion in 2000, and $13 billion in 2001.

As noted just above, under the new farm bill, what used to be "emergency" funding has become the new status quo. Fixed subsidy payments, the first category, mandate an increase in direct payment rates per bushel of corn from 26 cents in 2002 to 28 cents. Wheat rises from 46 cents to 52 cents. Soybeans are granted a direct payment of 44 cents for the first time. The price floor established by the marketing assistance loans also increases from $1.89 per bushel to $1.98 in 2002-2003 for corn, from $2.58 to $2.80 for wheat, and decreases from $5.26 to $5.00 for soybeans, which were thought to be getting too far out ahead of corn. The loans can be repaid by giving the crop to the government, repaying the loan at the stated price if prices are below the loan rate, or by accepting a loan deficiency payment if the local price is below the loan rate.

The third category of subsidy, the counter-cyclical income support payment, is to be made whenever the "effective" price is less than the target price. Counter-cyclical payments, together with marketing assistance loans, will vary inversely and unpredictably with market prices (while direct payments will not). Therefore, since no one knows for sure what future prices will be, the total levels and costs of this subsidy can only be guessed. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in 2002 that total direct spending would come to $45 billion under all provisions of the bill (including food stamps) in 2002, and would total $293 billion from 2002–07, or somewhat over a quarter of a *trillion* dollars. Another estimate, by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) weights these numbers by probabilities of price movements, and concludes that total spending will be about 6 percent higher than the CBO numbers.

Using the lower CBO estimates, how much more in subsidies will likely be paid out under the 2002 bill compared with the 1996 bill, including the emergency assistance from 1998–2002? Comparing the figures for direct government payments for the six years 1996–2001 with

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projected payments from 2002–07, the six-year average from 1996 to 2001 is approximately $15.27 billion, compared with $19.53 billion from 2002–07, an increase of 22 percent. If the FAPRI estimates are used, this increase could be 23 or 24 percent.

Inside Agricultural Trade Baseball

"INSIDE BASEBALL" conveys the idea that experts worry about different things from the average guy in the bleachers. The Minnesota Twins and the Montréal Expos know all about inside baseball, and how it can deal some teams in and some out of baseball's fortunes. These are the issues that experts—baseball bankers, lawyers and owners—deal with everyday. In agriculture and trade policy, there is a corresponding group of insiders—commodity groups, lobbyists, investment bankers, trade lawyers and trade bureaucrats in ministries and at the WTO. Many of these insiders are now busy trying to rationalize U.S. and European agricultural subsidies, which threaten to scuttle entirely the Doha Round of global trade negotiations at the WTO.

From the U.S. side, two seemingly incompatible arguments are now heard about agricultural subsidies. The first is that the Farm Bill will give the U.S. "leverage" in the trade negotiations because it can bargain away the most egregious provisions as the negotiation proceeds. And in truth, the United States has tabled proposals in Geneva to end many of its subsidies, proposals that are inconveniently totally at variance with the current farm bill. The second argument is that these subsidies are "GATT-legal" anyway.

There are a number of problems with both of these arguments. First, the subsidy payments under the 2002 bill are largely set in stone; they are entitlements most of which can be bargained away only with congressional action. To bargain them away, Congress and the President will need to deal with the likes of Kenneth Hood, chairman of the National Cotton Council. Mr. Hood, whose Mississippi farm received $750,000 in subsidies last year, will get even more under the 2002 bill. Costs of cotton production in the Mississippi Delta average $600 an acre. As Mr. Hood said in the June 26, 2002 *Wall Street Journal*: "Maybe farmers in Africa should be the ones not raising cotton. . . . The Delta needs cotton farmers, and they can't exist without subsidies." Even if the subsidies are rolled back in future years, for at least the next seven years they amount to legal contracts with commodity growers. This destroys the credibility of claims that they can be bargained away—as what we have already seen in the Doha Round shows.

And if the subsidies are GATT-legal, why bargain them away at all? Unfortunately, their supposed GATT-legality turns on claims and language that also defy credulity. The issues (which are very inside baseball) revolve around whether the subsidies are "decoupled" and therefore "non-trade distorting", but more fundamentally whether they are "product specific." While no generally recognized definition of a non-trade distorting or "decoupled" measure exists in trade law, the basic idea is that a decoupled subsidy does not induce greater production at an individual level—that is, does not artificially inflate supply.

But all three of the bill's subsidy components are likely to affect production incentives and to distort trade.[2] While the United States argues that these are decoupled payments, they nevertheless encour-

[2]Vernon Eidman, "The 2002 Farm Bill: A Step Forward or a Step Backward?", Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Minnesota, Working Paper WP02-9 (2002).

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age farmers to maintain and increase the acreage of subsidized crops in anticipation of opportunities to update their eligibility for crop subsidies in the future. Marketing assistance loans, especially during periods of low prices, create incentives to produce crops eligible for the loan payments. By raising loan rates for wheat and corn, the 2002 Farm Bill will shift plantings in their direction. Finally, counter-cyclical income payments linked to updated production over 2002–07 will affect current production decisions.

While all three forms of subsidy under the 2002 bill are neither production nor trade neutral, whether the Bill literally violates U.S. GATT obligations under the Uruguay Round turns on an even more arcane issue: whether the subsidies are "product specific." Under the 1993 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, subsidies (called the Aggregate Measure of Support, or AMS) are limited for the United States to $19.1 billion. The question is: what subsidies count toward the $19.1 billion limit? Subsidy payments that are 5 percent or less of the value of a specific product are not counted against the AMS. And any subsidy payments that are *not* product specific are also not counted if their overall value is 5 percent or less of total agricultural production per year. If these requirements are met, the subsidies are not subject to the AMS binding.

Even at first inspection, all three types of U.S. farm subsidies under the 2002 Farm Bill are based on acreages and yields in bushels per acre of *specific products*: corn, wheat, soybeans, grain sorghum, barley, oats, cotton and rice. This is true of all three subsidy categories: direct payments, marketing assistance loans and counter-cyclical income payments. Furthermore, certain specific products such as fruits and vegetables are not allowed to be planted, implying that other specific products *not* in these categories *are* allowed. Within the class of these "program" commodities (such as corn), farmers are free to choose what to produce. The subsidies, in other words, are product specific in motivation and specific to a narrow class of program crops in application.

The most intense debate surrounds the product specificity of the counter-cyclical income support payments. With low prices, these payments will balloon. Since the counter-cyclical payments replace and institutionalize the "emergency" spending and market loss payments during the last four years of the 1996 bill, the USDA acknowledges that they related to (then) current prices, but it calls them "non-product specific" because they were not tied to current production. This claim, if sustained in relation to the 2002 bill, would allow the new payments to be exempted from counting toward the $19.1 billion AMS binding unless they amounted to more than 5 percent of "total value", equal to about $10 billion.

But since the counter-cyclical payments are triggered by a gap between market prices or loan rates and target prices (less direct payments), there is no question that they relate to the current prices of program commodities such as corn and wheat. When the USDA reasons that this is not "product specific", in effect it argues that the quantity of corn produced or demanded is unrelated to its effective price, a claim that would surprise even most first-year students of economics. The basis on which they make this claim is that the payment does not require planting corn to receive a corn payment. If this subsidy is not "product specific", we have entered an Orwellian world in which the putative basis for calling a subsidy "non-product specific" is that farmers *might* just plant another crop in the restricted class of program commodities.

All three forms of U.S. subsidy pay-

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ments are therefore subject to challenge as product specific, and if the WTO recognizes them as such it could put the United States well over the top of its AMS binding and in violation of its Uruguay Round commitments. This is the inside baseball game. But the real significance of the issues lie in its wider implications for multilateral trade liberalization.

The Future of Trade Liberalization

PLAYERS OF the farm subsidy game described above may find myriad excuses to subsidize large landowners, just as the commissioner of baseball may defend collusion and monopoly and nevertheless characterize it as competition. But to the outside world, rich countries struggling to rationalize financial transfers to large landowners are as transparent as the collusion, venality and just downright corruption of some baseball owners. Two distinctive messages are sent by U.S. actions that belie its commitment to trade liberalization—one to the EU, the other to developing countries.

To the EU, U.S. actions say that, despite a carefully constructed U.S. negotiating strategy during the Uruguay Round that paired reduced levels of domestic support through lower loan rates and planting flexibility with pressure on the EU to move in a similar direction, all bets are now off. In effect, we have rewarded those in the EU (notably the French, of all people...) who have steadfastly resisted internal reforms of the bloated Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). We have also convinced many in the EU that this is yet another form of U.S. unilateralism in which no account is taken of the negative impacts of U.S. policy on the rest of the world. The French historically termed the English "perfidious Albion." Perfidious America is now an easy charge, helping the EU justify a continuation of its own wildly excessive export subsidies.

To the developing countries, there is a double message. The first is stark. For families in Africa, Asia and Latin America struggling to survive on a dollar or two a day, the insulation offered from market competition to U.S. producers may be literally lethal to them. Returning again to the example of cotton, U.S. overproduction, driven by expanded subsidies, has driven global cotton prices into the subbasement. In Mali, one of the poorest African states, cotton prices have declined 10 percent in the last year alone. Mali is a Muslim country where, despite U.S. foreign aid spending of $40 million on education and health, the decline in cotton prices has imposed a $30 million deficit on the state cotton company, effectively wiping out three-quarters of the value of U.S. aid. What the United States gives to rich cotton farmers in the Mississippi Delta thus takes away from the poor in a country like Mali. To these disaffected Muslim farmers, the words of a farm union leader ring true: "The Americans know that with their subsidies they are killing so many economies in the developing world."

The second message is to developing country trade negotiators, who six months before passage of the 2002 Farm Bill were told by U.S. trade officials that the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations would focus on developing country issues, including agriculture. The reasons for this were not driven by any sense of U.S. and European *noblesse oblige*, but the realization that the developing countries now hold the keys to a successful round. Therefore, the excuses proffered for protectionist backsliding in the form of U.S. steel tariffs and the Farm Bill, which revolved around the need to round up votes for fast-track authority, have been overtaken by a sense that domestic U.S. concerns will always trump cooperative multilateral trade liberalization. Over the

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next two decades, this is likely to be a far more serious blow to U.S. agriculture and to the overall U.S. economy than many people realize, because growth in developing countries is a key to American export growth itself.

U.S. Agricultural Competitiveness: Ready, Fire, Aim

A VARIETY OF recent studies have reconfirmed that whenever domestic farm subsidies are raised, they are quickly capitalized into farmland prices. In a 2002 study for the USDA, agricultural economists Terry Roe and his colleagues concluded:

> Since direct payments are targeted to land formerly planted to program crops, the cash rental rate that a tenant is willing to pay for an acre of land is affected by the payment, and consequently, so is the price of land.[3]

The result of this insidious capitalization process is that a 20–25 percent expansion in domestic subsidy spending will only insulate U.S. producers from global competition in the short run. Within a few years, by bidding up land rents, it will raise production costs and actually injure U.S. farm competitiveness. As the cost structure of farming rises, profit margins will fall, spurring farmers to demand yet higher subsidies. In other words, we will witness a vicious cycle of cost-escalation and public spending that will push U.S. farmers further and further away from the competitive edge.

The age distribution of these same farmers is rapidly changing. U.S. farmers on average are old and getting older. The last solid data available (comparing 1992 and 1997) shows that for all farms, the number of farmers 65 and older rose from 478,000 to 497,000 and the number who were 25–35 years old fell from 179,000 to 128,000. This demographic shift will be aggravated by the cost barriers to entry created by the capitalization process. Younger and poorer farmers will be bid out of purchasing land and equipment at the entry level. More ominously, farming will become ever more divided between those who own the land and receive the subsidies and those who must rent, often without any prospect of ownership. The landowning class will increasingly be absentee owners who live off the farm (including many widows or urban heirs), while those who do the actual work will be tenants. The process of capitalization thus reinforces a farm ownership structure in which land entitlements to subsidies flow to a favored few, who then employ tenants to till their soil.

A third instance of self-injury resulting from trade restrictions under 2002 agricultural policies arises from their many other unintended side-effects. Consider one obscure but important provision, introduced by members of Congress who *thought* they were slowing up competitive imports of meat and other products from Canada. On page 875 of the Senate version of the 2002 Bill, requirements were imposed on imports of agrifood products sold at retail—including beef, pork, lamb and fish, which stipulate "country of origin" labels. The provision (Title X, section 10816) says that by 2004, only meat from animals and fish born, raised and slaughtered or harvested in the United States can be labeled "Product of USA." The idea was to discourage feeder cattle or weanling pigs raised in Canada or other countries from competing with the U.S. variety. Hundreds of thousands of these animals are now born and reared for the first

[3] Terry Roe, A. Somwaru and X. Diao, "Do Direct Payments Have Intemporal Effects on U.S. Agriculture?" Paper presented at the USDA Conference on Decoupling (July 2002).

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months of their lives north of the border, and then raised, fattened and processed in the United States. Under the new provisions, any such products would become a "Product of Canada."

Ironically, whether or not a Canadian label is considered inferior by U.S. consumers (the opposite may be true), these requirements have bitten back hard. They have turned into a nightmare for U.S. producers, especially packers and wholesalers, who realized too late that they had imposed even greater burdens on themselves than on Canadians. U.S. retailers must now validate and attest to the origin of all of their products, proving that they originate in the United States. These requirements shift costs up the supply chain from retailers to wholesalers, processors to packers, and handlers to producers, all of whom must verify U.S. origins. The American Meat Institute's president, J. Patrick Boyle, called the provisions "the most costly, cumbersome and complex labeling proposal in history." There is also another phrase that comes to mind to describe Title X, section 10816: thinking from the wrong end of a horse.

So it now appears that Canadian meat imports to the United States will be treated under pre-existing country-of-origin laws, and that the main hit will be taken by U.S. farmers and food firms. A calf-rearing association, R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America, noted that the provision will

> impose a greater burden on domestic producers than it does on importers. U.S. producers must maintain records from birth to retail while imported products are not subject to the same verification requirements. It is nonsensical for the USDA to saddle U.S. producers with a more burdensome and complicated verification system than is required of beef imports.

Indeed, because the provisions tilt the playing field *against* U.S. meat production, multinational firms operating on both sides of the border, such as Cargill's Excel Beef, may actually find it easier not only to raise Canadian feeder cattle, but to fatten and process them there, too, drawing investment and value-added meat processing jobs out of the United States and into Canada. This provision was inserted into the 2002 bill by a group of senators who promoted themselves as defenders of the American family farmer. Nice work, fellas.

Conservation and Sustainability Issues

ONE OF THE leading questions during the 2002 Farm Bill debate was over increased funding for conservation programs. Such programs were championed by both Democrats, such as Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, and Republicans, such as Richard Lugar of Indiana. In the final bill, baseline funding for conservation was expanded, especially to include conservation payments for land already in production and livestock facilities. The bill also expanded lands eligible for Conservation Reserves and Wetlands Reserves. Total increases in authorized spending for these and other conservation programs rose from $10.4 billion in 1996–2001 to $18.8 billion in 2002–07, an increase of over 80 percent.

Despite this apparent victory, many questions remain over whether these programs will be effectively implemented. In a letter to the administration in late 2001, Senators Harkin and Lugar pointedly criticized the Office of Management and Budget for failing to implement spending already authorized for technical assistance under the Farmland Protection Program and the Wetlands Reserve Program. "[W]e are concerned", they wrote, "that further delays in releasing funding for conservation programs will hurt the ability of America's farmers and ranchers to

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obtain the assistance they need to carry out practices to conserve natural resources for future generations."

More broadly, there are serious questions as to whether these conservation measures will be overwhelmed by the incentives created by high subsidy payments to plant fencerow-to-fencerow. Since the richest subsidies are paid to row crops such as corn, soybeans and cotton, which are known to be highly erosive and consumptive of higher levels of pesticides, the net result may be to aggravate soil loss and water pollution problems. In the face of massive crop subsidies, conservation will take second place. Subsidies to large row crop producers don't follow a "polluter pays principle", but a principle of paying the polluter.

AMERICA'S farm trade policy has become a four-dimensional disaster. It attempts to hide huge subsidy increases behind semantic claims of "non-product specificity" in order to keep them GATT-legal, effectively insulating U.S. producers from global markets. It sends exactly the wrong signal to those in Europe and developing countries who have struggled for trade liberalization, undercutting progress made in the Uruguay Round to reduce protectionism and expand agricultural markets for all farmers—notably U.S. farmers. Because these huge subsidies will quickly be capitalized into farmland values, U.S. producers will face higher costs, and younger and less landed farmers will be denied entry, aggravating disturbing trends toward an aging farm population and fueling division between a landed elite and their tenants. And despite increases in authorized funding for conservation, the massive infusions of subsidies to row crop production are likely seriously to aggravate soil and water degradation as the United States continues to pay the agricultural polluter.

Best perhaps, in such depressing circumstances, to recall the hallowed words of that 20th-century American philosopher who many times said: "Well, it's a fine mess you've gotten us into this time." Oliver Hardy please come home; you're needed on the farm. □

Food...and Drink

What are these that from the outer murk
Of dense mephitic vapours creeping lurk
To breathe foul airs from that corrupted well
Which oozes slime along the floor of Hell?
These are the stricken palsied brood of sin
In whose vile veins, poor, poisonous and thin,
Decoctions of embittered hatreds crawl:
These are the Water-Drinkers, cursed all!

—Hillaire Belloc,
Heroic Poem in Praise of Wine

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Dragon in Paradise

China's Rising Star in Oceania

John Henderson & Benjamin Reilly

STILL PREOCCUPIED with the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government risks overlooking important developments in peripheral regions. One such development is the growing role of China in Oceania—a vast Pacific Ocean area that covers nearly a third of the globe. Oceania includes 14 independent island states and related territories that, along with Australia and New Zealand, make up the Pacific Islands Forum, the main regional body. Since the Cold War's end, as the United States has downgraded its involvement in Oceania, China has increased its own investment. In an evolving relationship between the mighty and the micro states of the world, this shift of great power valence may bear important long-term consequences for the changing balance of international security.

Changing Partners

DURING THE Cold War, the United States engaged the Pacific island nations through a policy of "strategic denial" aimed at thwarting Soviet efforts to establish a regional naval presence. But in the post-Cold War period, U.S. links to the region have been significantly downgraded. This has been accompanied by the departure of former colonial powers like Britain, and an increasing focus on Asia at the expense of the Pacific by regional allies such as Australia and New Zealand. Japan has become the region's largest aid donor, South Korea is showing increasing interest in the region, and Taiwan effectively "buys" diplomatic recognition from some of the smallest island states. But most significant by far among these new players is China.

China, however, is not just filling a political vacuum created by Western neglect. It is incorporating the Pacific islands into its broader quest to become a major Asia-Pacific power. The result may be a new and unwelcome role for Oceania from the U.S. perspective. While the region is unlikely ever to become the center of superpower competition, it may well become an important arena for China to establish footholds of influence, recruit new allies and to test its growing strength and ability to command allegiance in a region hitherto dominated by the Western powers.

At a broad level, China's expanding Pacific role is an inevitable by-product of its rising power. But there is also a particular congruence between China's broader

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foreign policy objectives and the interests of many Pacific island states. China's long-term goal is to ultimately replace the United States as the pre-eminent power in the Pacific Ocean. For the island states themselves, by contrast, the objective is partly to play the "China card"—to flirt with a potential U.S. adversary in an attempt to revive declining post-Cold War Western interest and aid payments. The net result is a strong complementarity of divergent interests in China's growing relationship with Oceania. As a result, it can no longer be taken for granted that Oceania will remain a relatively benign "American lake."

It has taken two to dance this tango. The Pacific is now clearly an area of low U.S. priority. In recent years Washington has closed embassies in the Solomon Islands and Samoa, pulled out aid posts in Fiji and Papua New Guinea, and cut back on scholarships and other assistance. Meanwhile, China's expanding influence in Oceania has gone almost unremarked in Washington. This is partly because most Pacific island states have viewed China's growing role in Oceania with favor rather than fear. Their leaders and diplomats have not tried to focus American attention on what they deem to be unproblematic. Faced with increased political instability and a precarious economic future, even the relatively small involvement of a large power can have a major impact on domestic developments in many Pacific states. Moreover, the generous assistance they get from benefactors such as China and Taiwan, which (unlike their Western counterparts) do not set pre-conditions of "good" (that is, democratic) governance for receiving development aid, is particularly welcome in the region.

The trend of recent years has therefore been for Pacific island states to "look north", and China has encouraged this process through the extensive use of "visit" diplomacy. Over the past two years, China has hosted the leaders of Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga, Kiribati and East Timor. It is now accepted routine that the first official overseas visit by a new head of government from the region is made to Beijing, not to Canberra, Washington or Wellington. The extensive range of these visits means that most Pacific island leaders have had much closer personal contact with and a greater knowledge of the Chinese leadership than they do of senior politicians and officials in the United States. For China, such "visit" diplomacy provides a lucrative return on a modest investment. It stands as an example of how skillful diplomacy can enable a state to gain influence over vast areas through the acquiescence of very few people.

Trouble in Paradise

OCEANIA IS rightfully named, for with the exception of the world's second largest island, New Guinea, most of the region is comprised of small island states separated by vast stretches of ocean waters. But while most of the island states are tiny in terms of population and land area, they lay claim to vast maritime resources by virtue of their exclusive economic zones, some of the largest in the world. The 14 island states also constitute a significant voting bloc in international forums, particularly the United Nations.

Oceania is made up of three subregions—Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia—that reflect both different cultures and colonial experiences. Melanesia contains the overwhelming majority of the region's population and land area. The largest Melanesian state, Papua New Guinea, has a population of 5.1 million people—bigger than New Zealand (four million) and much larger than all the other Pacific island states combined. Its

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

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western border with the disputed Indonesian province of West Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) is the region's only land border with Asia. Papua New Guinea is heavily dependent on Australia, its former colonial ruler, for aid. Australia has also been a traditional aid donor and supporter of the other independent Melanesian states: Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

Polynesia contains some of the region's smallest micro-states—including the world's tiniest independent state, Tuvalu, with a population of just 10,000. Other micro-states include the Kingdom of Tonga (100,000) and Samoa (170,000). Two of the smallest Polynesian countries, the Cook Islands (15,000) and Niue (1,500), retain constitutional links with New Zealand as "freely-associated" states. (New Zealand has traditionally played a major role in Polynesian affairs.)

In the Central Pacific, Micronesia's historical links are mainly with the United States. Three independent states—the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau—remain freely associated with the United States under a "compact relationship", the economic aspects of which have recently been negotiated to extend for a further twenty years. In essence, the compact gives the United States extensive military concessions in return for generous economic assistance. Two other Micronesian states originally under British influence, Kiribati and Nauru, have in more recent times looked to Australia for assistance. Oceania also includes the French territories of New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia, and the American dependencies of American Samoa, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands—the latter two of which also happen to be the closest Pacific islands to the Chinese mainland.

Oceania's idyllic reputation for peace and harmony is a myth best confined to tourism posters. Many of its states are weak, internally-divided and increasingly impoverished, problems that flow in part from the artificial nature of many Pacific states themselves. The conflict-prone Melanesian countries of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, for example, are agglomerations of hundreds of small stateless societies into one overarching state structure. Even the more hierarchically-organized island "kingdoms" of Polynesia, such as Tonga, face increasing internal conflicts and political instability, as does nearly every country in Oceania. Over the past decade the region has become increasingly unstable. One of its most developed states, Fiji, experienced military coups in 1987 and 2000 following the election of governments perceived as too close to the country's Indo-Fijian minority. Papua New Guinea has suffered a decade of civil war on its eastern island of Bougainville and—along with Vanuatu and Fiji—has endured army mutinies in recent years. The elected government of the Solomon Islands, one of the poorest Pacific states, was overthrown in a violent uprising in 2000. Democratic government was restored in the December 2001 election, but the country still teeters on the brink of state collapse.

Elsewhere in Melanesia, both East Timor and West Papua have been convulsed by their struggle for independence from Indonesia. In different ways, both remain unsettled. In July 2001, the former independence leader and now the foreign minister of East Timor, José Ramos Horta, described China—in his very first foreign policy statement, no less—as the new nation's "closest possible friend"—this despite the fact that China played no role in the Australia-led intervention that assured East Timor's independence. West Papua, which has strong cultural links with Papua New Guinea and the rest of the Melanesian Pacific, also seeks independence from rule by Indonesia, but faces

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seemingly insurmountable obstacles to achieving it. Jakarta continues to resist what it sees as pressure for "Balkanization" coming from its Melanesian extremities.

These conflicts have together created an "arc of instability" stretching across Australia's north, from Aceh and Timor in the west to the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji in the east. Despite the United Nations-led reconstruction of East Timor, Indonesian promises of greater autonomy for Aceh and West Papua, and recent peace settlements in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, a lasting solution to any of these conflicts is unlikely. Most of Melanesia is inherently unstable and, given its ethnic fragmentation, it is likely to remain that way indefinitely. Conflict, corruption, political violence and instability are also endemic elsewhere in the region. Very poor governance has been a major problem, along with weakened respect for both democracy and central authority. Other causes of conflict include growing economic inequalities and the challenges to traditional lifestyles and authorities posed by the inexorable forces of modernization and urbanization.

While the causes of regional instability and conflict in Oceania are mostly internal, it is no accident that China's increased involvement coincides with growing regional instability. The very weakness of Pacific island states makes them valuable as a strategic resource for China. Their financial and other problems make the support of Pacific states cheap for Beijing to buy. At the same time, their utility as a source of diplomatic recognition (particularly in the China and Taiwan tussle examined below), voting blocs in international forums, fishing and other maritime resources, and as possible sites for port facilities or even military bases, means that relatively small investments in these countries can have major longer-term payoffs for countries such as China.

China's Links with Oceania

CHINA's connections with Oceania have deep cultural and historical roots. The first settlers in Oceania were part of a wider proto-Austronesian culture, which encompassed a group of languages that had a common origin in Taiwan some 5,000 years ago. Recent research links the indigenous people of Taiwan to the Polynesian, Micronesian and eastern Melanesian people of the Pacific. A more recent and direct link dates from the 1700s when European traders found markets for Pacific island produce in China. This link expanded during the 19th century, when Chinese labor was recruited to work in Pacific island plantations and phosphate mines. As a result of all this, there are today small but usually prominent Chinese communities in most Pacific island states.

These immigrant Chinese populations have never challenged the political dominance of indigenous peoples, as the Indian population did in Fiji, but Chinese commercial success has often been a source of resentment. In Fiji recently, the trade union movement condemned the hiring of 900 Chinese garment workers, with union leaders complaining that the influx of Chinese immigrants had depressed wages, work conditions and employment opportunities. In 1998, a leading figure in the Tongan pro-democracy movement, Akilisi Pohiva, claimed that Chinese immigrants were costing Tongans work opportunities and causing "economic, political, social and moral problems." In late 2000, several hundred Chinese shopkeepers and their families were ordered out of Tonga "for their own protection."

Such tensions between Chinese and indigenous population groups are unlikely to dissipate, especially as more Chinese nationals venture into the Central Pacific with unclear or dubious immigration sta-

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tus. Ethnic Chinese, particularly from Taiwan, have been the main purchasers of passports sold by a number of island states, including Nauru, Tonga, Samoa, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati. In most cases the "passports" do not allow permanent settlement; the island states are being used instead as stepping stones for access to the United States, Australia and New Zealand. In extreme cases, some Chinese have resorted to the more desperate status of "boat people." With the United States as their preferred destination, many have been apprehended near U.S. Pacific territories. In July 1999 alone, 800 (mainly Chinese) illegal immigrants were arrested on boats around Guam. Others have ventured farther south, mainly to Papua New Guinea but some as far as New Caledonia. Some locals believe that the Chinese government has encouraged emigration to the Pacific islands as a means of increasing their influence in the region, but this is unlikely. Nevertheless, China can be a vocal advocate of the rights of ethnic Chinese in the Pacific, particularly when they are under threat—such as in 1998's bloody anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia.

The establishment of international shelf banks heavily engaged in money laundering, shipping flags of convenience and passports sales has brought these islands into contact with a range of shady organizations, including terrorist groups. Earlier this year, three vessels flying the Tongan flag were caught in the Mediterranean moving weapons, explosives and men for Al-Qaeda. In April 2003, U.S. authorities reported that six alleged terrorists, including two alleged Al-Qaeda operatives, had been arrested in Southeast Asia carrying Nauruan passports. Under U.S. pressure, Nauru has agreed to end its passport sales and shelf banks in return for U.S. assistance. The money, it was claimed by Nauru, was to be used in opening a new Nauruan embassy in, you guessed it, Beijing.

Despite these problems, long-established Chinese settlers are held in high regard in a number of Pacific island states. Chinese heritage is increasingly a source of pride, and growing numbers of Pacific Chinese are developing political networks and entering politics. The most prominent of these is Sir Julius Chan, who served several terms as Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea. The son of a Chinese trader, Chan is a successful businessman and a strong supporter of Beijing. In Fiji, another part-Chinese businessman, James Ah Koy, was a leading figure in politics—but lost his place in parliament in the August 2001 election after allegations that he was linked with George Speight, the front man for the May 2000 coup. The Solomon Islands and Samoan parliaments also contain prominent ethnic Chinese members. In Kiribati, an ethnic Chinese, Harry Tong, ran a credible contest for the presidency, and may well be president one day. His brother also serves in parliament.

China's Investment in Oceania

SINCE 1975, when diplomatic relations were first established with Samoa, China has built a comprehensive network of diplomatic posts in Oceania. While the United States has been closing diplomatic posts, China has opened embassies in Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati and Vanuatu. The Cook Islands has established diplomatic relations with China, and Niue would like to follow but has been blocked by New Zealand. China has more diplomats (although not more diplomatic posts) in the region than any other country.

China has generally adopted a low-keyed approach to its strategic relationship with Oceania. In 1980, China's ballistic missile tests in the Central Pacific provoked strong protests from Pacific islands

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governments, prompting a Chinese apology and reassurances of benign intentions. In 1985, Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang visited the region and stressed that China fully respected the sovereign rights of the Pacific island countries, and their existing relationships with outside states. China also moved quickly in 1987 to sign the protocols of the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and has played a cautious hand in regional disputes. In May 2001, for instance, Beijing quickly denied claims by West Papuan dissidents from Indonesia's disputed eastern province that they had China's support—although the dissidents' leaders admitted that they had visited Beijing to put their case to Chinese officials.

China's military assistance to the few Pacific island states that maintain military forces—Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Tonga—has also been modest. It has consisted of training and logistical support rather than weaponry, but military assistance has increased sharply in recent years. Ministerial visits have stressed supposedly "common interests" between Chinese and Pacific defense forces. Following the May 2000 coup in Fiji, China volunteered to fill the gap left by the suspension of Australian and New Zealand military assistance. Present contacts between the Chinese and Pacific island military forces could easily be expanded in the future.

China's strategic interests in Oceania are anyway long term, best understood in the wider Pacific and global context. China's ambition to develop a blue water navy will inevitably increase its Pacific sphere of influence—particularly in the region that some Chinese naval strategists refer to as the Pacific's "second island chain"—running from west of the Aleutians down through the Marianas to the eastern extremities of Papua New Guinea. Japan's use of these islands in its World War II effort to establish a Pacific empire has not been forgotten, but there is no evidence that China will seek to expand its influence by waging war. Technology, too, has diminished the strategic significance of the islands. But China may one day use the islands to deploy land-based anti-ship missiles to compensate for its naval weakness.

The present strategic value of the Pacific islands for China is demonstrated by the presence of what is officially described as a "satellite space-tracking station" established by China in 1997 on Tarawa Atoll in the Republic of Kiribati. The station is the only one of its type outside Chinese territory. The Kiribati government claims the facility has no military significance and exists only to track Chinese space vehicles. It rejects suggestions that it could make Kiribati a potential target if China became involved in a conflict. This is disingenuous. The facility is run by the Chinese military and plays an important role in the development of China's space warfare program.

Of even more immediate concern is the base's convenient location for monitoring United States missile tests at nearby Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The Kwajalein base is vital for the development of the United States missile defense system, which China strongly opposes.

In late 2002, the status of the Chinese base became a controversial issue in Kiribati domestic politics. Opposition leaders claimed that China had funded the government's re-election, and vowed to close the base if they won. Nonetheless, Kiribati receives rent payments for the facility and has been given considerable aid by China. Some of these aid projects also have strategic implications. For example, China has redeveloped Kiribati's main airport. While this helps local tourism, it could also one day benefit China. Whatever the real purpose of the space-tracking sta-

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tion, the fact that China operates a military facility on the territory of a Pacific Island Forum member stands as a reminder that the potential strategic significance of the Pacific islands may be exploited by non-Western powers.

Rivalries

IN RECENT years, the United States and China have appeared willing to manage their bilateral relationship to avoid crisis and conflict. As long as the United States avoids a policy of militarized containment, and as long as nothing serious goes wrong across the Taiwan Strait, Chinese influence in Oceania triggers no alarms in Washington. This is despite the broader context, in which the U.S. Pacific Fleet has been reduced by half since the end of the Cold War, and the United States has given up key bases in the Philippines.

U.S. attention to Oceania under current circumstances will probably continue to diminish—with one partial exception. Only in Micronesia does the United States possess special equities. The Compact of Free Association relationship between the United States and the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and Palau gives the United States control over defense issues in return for generous economic assistance (over $3 billion to the Marshall Islands and the FSM during the first 15 years of the Compact.) Such economic largesse gives the United States a veto over the compact states' foreign policies. A rare example of the use of this veto occurred in early 2001 when the United States nixed the visit of Taiwanese warships to the Marshall Islands in order to avoid a dispute with China. As to Taiwan, while rivalry between Washington and Beijing is not likely to froth over in Oceania, rivalry between Beijing and Taipei is active and ongoing.

Taiwan has worked hard and paid small Pacific island states generously to win their diplomatic recognition and support to regain UN membership. Of the 28 countries worldwide that currently support Taiwan, four—Palau, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands—are Pacific island states. It is significant that these are among the region's smallest, poorest and weakest counties. For Taiwan, a relatively small outlay can buy significant political influence. For instance, Tuvalu's support for Taiwan was gained for an annual payment of just $250,000 over ten years. The Marshall Islands' 1998 decision to recognize Taiwan, and maintain this recognition after a change of government the following year, illuminates further the power of Taiwanese money. In 1997, too, the Samoan government, which recognizes China, accused Taiwan of helping to fund anti-government marches organized by traditional political leaders. Taipei denied making the payments, and accused the Samoan government of seeking to divert attention from its domestic problems.

Then, in 1998, Taiwan withdrew its ambassador to the Solomon Islands after reports that he had "lured" two opposition MPs to support the government. The Taiwanese government had special reason to worry about its position in the Solomons. It had provided considerable financial support to the deposed government, and in return received diplomatic support. Following an earlier, May 2000 overthrow of the elected government, the foreign minister of the new militia-backed regime traveled to China in an unsuccessful attempt to profit from a bidding war between Beijing and Taipei. But the Solomon Islands remained in the Taiwanese camp in return for an upgraded aid package, and is now considering a proposal that it become a dumping site for Taiwan's nuclear and industrial waste.

Three years earlier, in mid-1997, a financial crisis in Papua New Guinea bought about a similar attempt to play off

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the two Chinas. Papua New Guinea's then Prime Minister, Bill Skate, sought to switch diplomatic support from China to Taiwan in return for an economic package reportedly worth $3.2 billion in grants, loans and business deals. But his government collapsed and its successor—pressured by the Australian government, whose annual $160 million aid package is crucial to the country's survival—decided to stick with China. The Chinese ambassador in Port Moresby took the opportunity to warn against Taiwan's willingness to take advantage of countries in financial crises. Such moves, he said, constituted "a serious infringement of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity." Papua New Guinea is now the largest recipient of Chinese aid of any Pacific country.

China has been reluctant to move beyond rhetoric in countering Taiwanese overtures to Pacific island states. It used its position on the UN Security Council to delay, but not veto, Nauru's and Tuvalu's applications to join the United Nations in 1999 and 2000 respectively, despite both countries having bestowed diplomatic recognition on Taiwan (Nauru has since switched sides and now recognizes China). But China has undertaken reprisals, as in 1997 when it threatened to end preferential treatment for Fijian sugar imports in response to Fiji's strengthened ties with Taiwan.

Aid Diplomacy

ALL PACIFIC island states are heavily aid dependent. As the United States and former colonial powers like Britain have reduced their largesse to the Pacific, Japan has emerged as the region's main bilateral donor. However, Japanese aid is heavily influenced by commercial interests, particularly access to the region's rich tuna resources. Japan has also been careful to use its aid to complement its alliance relationship with the United States.

China, by contrast, uses its aid to underline its strategic competition in the region with the United States and its allies in general, and with Taiwan in particular—and the locals have been increasingly receptive of it. The tendency for island states to look to Asia rather than to traditional Western supporters has been particularly encouraged by two recent developments—resentment at growing criticism from traditional aid donors, and the inability or unwillingness of these donors to respond to the island states' needs. Whatever the reasons for it, Chinese aid disbursements have moved from near zero to one of the largest in the region in only a few years. Chinese aid to the Pacific's largest state, Papua New Guinea, for example, is now second only to that of Australia.

Aid from China is generally given for political rather than economic purposes. Indeed, much of the assistance to date has been for highly visible prestige projects, including the construction of a new parliamentary complex in Vanuatu, a multistory government office in Samoa, the new foreign ministry headquarters in Papua New Guinea, as well as hotel developments in Tonga and the provision of a ferry for Kiribati. China also built the sports stadium in Fiji for the 2003 South Pacific games, and has made a practice of donating a fleet of VIP cars to the island state hosting the annual Forum meeting. These projects have added little or nothing to the recipients' economic development, however, because China provides all the materials and labor for the construction of aid projects.

Meanwhile, since the end of the Cold War, Western aid donors have increasingly attached governance conditions of accountability, transparency, human rights and democracy to aid arrangements. When democracy is overthrown by a coup, as happened in Fiji and the

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Solomon Islands, the curtailment of Western aid disbursements has created resentment. By contrast, China has been widely praised for its policy of "non-interference", which contrasts sharply, as the locals see it, to the "bullying" tactics of Australia and New Zealand.

AP photo

Tonga's King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV, in Los Angeles, January 26, 1985

An interesting window on the "governance-and-aid" issue is Tonga's 1998 decision to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. Tonga is ruled by a feudal political system with King Tupou IV holding near-absolute powers. Several reasons have been advanced as to why the king decided to recognize China. He may have wished to assist his daughter Princess Pilolevu's profitable satellite company, which had developed strong ties with China (this despite the multi-millionaire Princess's claim that she was moved not by money but by a desire to spread Christianity). The king was perhaps impressed by the larger-than-life bronze statue of himself presented by Beijing. Recognizing China also cleared the way for Tonga's entry to the UN. But most important, the king—who has resisted Tonga's pro-democracy movement—was "unimpressed" by Taiwan's adoption of democracy. As he sees it, governance is his business—in both senses of the word.

While China's interests in Oceania are mainly political and strategic, there is also an important economic dimension. China is an increasingly important trading partner for Pacific island states, with the trade balance heavily in China's favor. Over 3,000 Chinese state and private entities have established themselves in the region, with investment worth some $800 million. China has also agreed to fund the establishment of a Pacific Trade Office in Beijing to promote trade and investment between China and Pacific island states, with proposals for another trade post in Hong Kong.

Within Oceania, only Melanesia contains extensive mineral and forestry resources, but political instability has hindered any significant development of them. Micronesia and Polynesia have little to offer investors beyond fish and tourism, although sea-bed minerals remain a possible future source of potential wealth given the vastness of the island states maritime exclusive economic zones. China has carried out extensive oceanographic research, including the analysis of the region's seabed minerals. Along with Taiwan, China has extensive interests in Oceania's fishing resources, so much so that in September 2001 New Zealand expressed concern about a one hundred-strong Chinese fishing fleet establishing a base in

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Fiji. Observers feared that the fleet might undermine recently agreed conventions on highly migratory fish species, especially tuna. A Chinese spokesman denied that China was establishing a new base, maintaining that Fiji had invited the fleet to help develop its own fishing infrastructure. This, too, was disingenuous.

DURING THE early part of this century China is likely to overtake Japan as the leading Asian power influencing the Pacific region. While China's immediate attention in the Pacific is concentrated on the Taiwan issue, it is fast developing wider and longer-term interests. It sees itself as an emerging major power and expects the respect, recognition and influence that its enhanced status entails. In time, this may bring increased strains in U.S.-China relations, which in turn will increase the strategic significance of the Pacific island region. By then, however, many Pacific island states will be looking to China to provide regional leadership and security.

This could change if the United States joined with Australia, New Zealand and Japan to re-engage in Oceania. The question really comes down to whether the U.S. government can effectively manage peripheral issues in any mode but an exclusively reactive one. Oceania might be a prudent place to find out. □

In the Fullness of Time

International decisions are valid and effective only if taken in time. Wars are made from ten to twenty years before they begin. They cannot be prevented the moment before they begin. There is a law of momentum in international relations; beyond a certain point forces cannot be stemmed. The war in the Far East, especially in so far as America is involved, must be prevented now or it will be too late. Whatever we may now think are our motives for building this navy, if and when we have built it, if and when we have the means of effectuating policy in the Far East, we shall use the means. We shall be in a war in the Pacific whether we originally wanted to or not.

—Nathaniel Peffer,
"America's Choice in the Far East",
The Annals (July1936)

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The Opening of Japan, 1853–2003

Cause...

Commerce has become very extensive since the invention of steam, and the countries of the West have in consequence become rich. The nations of the West hope that by means of steam communication all the world will become as one family. Any nation that refuses to hold intercourse with other nations must expect to be excluded from this family. No nation has the right to refuse to hold intercourse with others. . . .

The President is of the opinion that if Japan makes a treaty with the United States, all other foreign countries will make the same kind of a treaty, and Japan will be safe thereafter. The President wants to make a treaty that will be honorable to Japan, without war, in a peaceable manner, after deliberate consultation. If Japan should make a treaty with the ambassador of the United States, who has come unattended by military force, her honor will not be impaired. There will be a great difference between a treaty made with a single individual, unattended, and one made with a person who should bring fifty men-of-war to these shores. We were sent to this country by the President, who desires to promote the welfare of Japan, and are quite different from the ambassadors of other countries. We do not wish to open your ports to foreign trade all at once. It will be quite satisfactory if you open them gradually, as the circumstances may require; but the President assures you that this will not be the case if you make a treaty with England first.

—Townsend Harris, first U.S. Consul in Japan,
addressing Grand Councillor Hotta Masayoshi

...and Effect

We must construct new steamships, especially powerful warships, and these we will load with goods not needed in Japan. For a time we will have to employ Dutchmen as masters and mariners, but we will put on board with them Japanese of ability and integrity who must study the use of large guns, the handling of ships and the rules of navigation. Openly these will be called merchant vessels, but they will in fact have the secret purpose of training a navy. As we increase the number of ships and our mastery of technique, Japanese will be able to sail the oceans freely and gain direct knowledge of conditions abroad without relying on the secret reports of the Dutch. Thus we will eventually complete the organization of a navy.

Moreover, we must shake off the panic and apprehensions that have beset us and abandon our habits of luxury and wasteful spending. Our defenses thus strengthened, and all being arranged at home, we can act so as to make our courage and prestige resound beyond the seas. By so doing, we will not in the future be imprisoning ourselves; indeed, we will be able, I believe, so to accomplish matters at home and abroad as to achieve national security. Forestalling the foreigners in this way, I believe, is the best method of ensuring that the *bakufu* will at some future time find opportunity to reimpose its ban and forbid foreigners to come to Japan, as was done in [the early 17th century and before]. And since I understand that the Americans and Russians themselves have only recently become skilled in navigation, I do not see how the people of our country, who are clever and quick-witted, should prove inferior to Westerners if we begin training at once.

—observations of Ii Naosuke, Lord (daimyo) of Hakone

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

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The Boldness of Charles Evans Hughes

Margot Louria

WITH THE current high drama in our national life, commenced on September 11, 2001, it may seem odd to suggest an interest in the life and diplomacy of Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State from 1921 to 1925 under Presidents Harding and Coolidge. At first glance, his times seem much less daunting than ours: a period of peace, burgeoning prosperity and, flappers and Prohibition aside, what President Harding called "normalcy." But, in truth, Hughes became Secretary of State at a critical juncture. The United States had been tested by a horrific world war and had emerged divided over its proper international role. The awesome mortality rate of that war (more than 50,000 American soldiers were killed in action), and the use of poison gas as a method in it, alarmed many Americans. Just beneath the surface, too, many feared exposure to the historic vulnerabilities of the Old World, as if America's exceptional circumstance in history—having enjoyed sanctuary from attack by two surrounding oceans and two unthreatening neighbors—was melting away before a prospective devastation so frightening as to virtually paralyze imagination and response. And with Woodrow Wilson incapacitated by a stroke and Theodore Roosevelt deceased, America was without prominent statesmen to guide it.

In other ways, too, Hughes encountered a turbulent international scene for which few precedents existed to guide him. As the major creditor nation after the Great War and a leading world power, the United States was destined to assume a major role in international affairs. The war, however, had left the nation so mired in dissension and disillusionment that most Americans rejected any overseas political or military commitments. Hughes was keenly aware of the dangerous gap between what America was required to do in its own interest and what American public opinion would tolerate.

Despite such obstacles, Hughes revealed himself to be a determined activist once in office. He frequently offended those who differed from him, as well as those who resented his blunt and overbearing manner. He broke with the conventional diplomatic etiquette of the times in which patience and decorum were central; he opted instead for boldness and results, and so managed to guide an ambivalent nation away from "rank isolationism." As we shall see, Hughes was not without his character flaws, and he made mistakes; but he met unprecedented times with unprecedented creativity and energy.

Margot Louria is the author of *Triumph and Downfall: America's Pursuit of Peace and Prosperity, 1921–1933* (2001).

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

AP Photo

Hughes as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 1933

A Judge's Journey

CHARLES Evans Hughes was born on April 11, 1862, the son of a Baptist minister from Wales. He was raised in upstate New York State in strict observance of the classic virtues of frugality, honesty and hard work. Graduating with honors at 19 from Brown University, he then received a law degree from Columbia while simultaneously attaining a Master of Arts from Brown. His brilliance in law was aptly demonstrated in his first public assignment, when he was chosen by the New York State legislature in 1905 to investigate corrupt gas and insurance companies. Hughes went from success to success in his public career, serving as the governor of New York State (1907–10), an associate justice to the U.S. Supreme Court (1910–16) and Republican candidate for the presidency in 1916. (Despite lingering divisions in the Republican Party from Theodore Roosevelt's 1912 "Bull Moose" adventure and Hughes' own ineptness as a campaigner, he lost to the incumbent Wilson by only 23 electoral votes.)

In 1921, Warren Harding named Hughes his Secretary of State. As a condition of accepting the post, Hughes insisted on "free rein" to run the State Department and to set the nation's foreign policy agenda. Harding and his successor Coolidge, who both admitted their meager knowledge of foreign matters and were primarily concerned with domestic problems, granted Hughes' request. (Both men also knew that, had Hughes not withdrawn from the 1920 presidential contest over the death of his daughter, Helen, he would most likely have been elected the 29th president.) At a February 19, 1921 press conference, President-elect Harding reiterated that his administration's style of operation in foreign policy would be more open than that of the outgoing Wilson Administration.[1] Declining to comment on foreign policy issues himself, Harding stressed that Hughes was to be the State Department's only spokesman: "You must ask Mr. Hughes that", he told the assembled reporters.

Dignified in appearance and nationally known, Hughes carried an aura of respectability and authority that no other statesman of his day could match—or that a president could deny. Whereas Wilson had overshadowed his secretaries of

[1]See Robert W. Tucker, "An Inner Circle of One: Wilson and His Advisors", *The National Interest* (Spring 1998).

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state—William Jennings Bryan with some difficulty and then Robert Lansing with greater ease—Hughes overshadowed his presidents.

He faced an entirely different situation with regard to the Senate, however. Accustomed to asserting their right to intervene at will in foreign policy matters, many Senators viewed the Hughes nomination as a threat to their prerogatives. Others feared the resumption of debate over the League of Nations; indeed, the irreconcilables and isolationists in the Senate bristled at the thought of "a whiskered Wilson" in an influential position. This was an inaccurate characterization. Like Wilson, Hughes was imbued with strong moral principles that he believed committed a society to the rule of law. Like Wilson, too, Hughes held that international society would do well to abide by the law to the extent possible, and that international institutions could play a constructive role in ensuring peace, progress and prosperity. But Hughes was not an idealist. He recognized the irreplaceable role of power standing behind principle and the more than occasionally base proclivities of human nature. Hughes was a moral*ist* as befitted the temper of his times, but he loathed the kind of moral*ism* that sacrificed consequences to high-sounding intentions. Wilson, after all, was a college president, but Hughes was a judge.

Whatever its sources, the Senate's attitude warned Hughes to proceed with care if his foreign policy program was to win congressional approval. He avoided controversial issues such as relations with the League of Nations that might antagonize those Senators who possessed the power to block other important initiatives. Thanks to his adroit planning, more treaties and agreements won congressional approval on Hughes' watch than in any previous administration.

An astute politician in many but not all respects, Hughes not only managed to influence the Senate, but the Fourth Estate as well. He recognized the immense power of the media to sway public opinion and utilized fully the services of the press to present his case. To dispel misconceptions and plain ignorance about current events, as well as to satisfy the country's demands for prompt disclosure, Hughes briefed journalists daily, circumstances permitting. Unlike Wilson's hamstrung secretaries of state, Hughes provided detailed answers to questions and often gave comprehensive reviews of current issues. Far from some initial portrayals depicting him as austere and cold, the press corps soon found Hughes witty and forthright. Innumerable anecdotes were reported regarding Hughes' amazing intellectual talents. At a glance Hughes could run down a printed page and remember it verbatim. One instance concerned a three-page typewritten memo prepared for public announcement. It arrived late; nevertheless, Hughes quickly read it, put it in his pocket, and then delivered the contents from memory. When reporters' transcripts were later compared with the original version, only one minor discrepancy was discovered.

Setting Up Shop

WHEN HUGHES arrived at the State Department in March 1921, a demanding agenda inherited from the Wilson Administration awaited him. Hughes lamented that "a worse tangle" of unattended issues on multiple fronts had yet to be found. The United States was technically still at war with the Central Powers. Bitter arguments among the Allies over Germany's reparations delayed a return to stability and prosperity in Europe. Relations with Mexico were in chaos, and American interventions in

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Santo Domingo, Nicaragua and Haiti were accompanied by full-throated cries of Yankee imperialism. In the Far East, instability in China and a restless Japan threatened the "Open Door" policy designed to protect China's territorial integrity and guarantee equal trading opportunities. Japan, though an ally during the recent war, distrusted American intentions in the Pacific and had embarked on a costly naval armament program that was attracting anxious attention.

Establishing order out of chaos was Hughes' strongest suit. Upon becoming Secretary of State, he exercised his talents in concentric circles, first tending to his own office, then to the department, then to the Foreign Service, and finally to Congress and the world at large. He knew that before he could launch his foreign policies, he had to address a sobering reality: his personal office was short of competent staff and the State Department as a whole was a mess.

Hughes started with his own staff, quickly assembling a talented group of career diplomats, many of whom were brought in from overseas positions. The staff was restructured into regional bureaus, allowing members to specialize in a particular field. Within easy reach of his senior officers, Hughes would call on them at a moment's notice, making requests and expecting instant responses. William Phillips, his undersecretary in 1922, recalled:

> At odd and often inconvenient moments during the day, my buzzer would resound with devastating insistence, commanding my immediate attendance on the Secretary. If I delayed a moment, I would detect a certain impatience on the Secretary's part, so eager was he to get on with the day's agenda.[2]

Hughes then turned his attention to the department itself. In 1921, the State Department had only 13 embassies and 35 legations abroad, along with some 400 consulates varying in size and importance. Its staff was divided into two branches, the Diplomatic and the Consular, that performed independently of each other. The Washington office of about 100 political appointees and civil service professionals had been allowed to function informally with little attention to specialized expertise or regional knowledge. It was clearly too small and poorly resourced to handle the tough tasks ahead. The overseas and Washington staffs were dispirited as well; after the war, work loads had increased while low wages and poor working conditions went unredressed. Hughes recognized the singular importance of management as a function of departmental leadership and urged reform. The Rogers Act of 1924 was a personal victory for Hughes. It fundamentally restructured the Foreign Service by merging the Diplomatic and Consular branches, creating a merit-based recruitment and promotion system, and improving salaries and benefits.

The Treaty of Berlin

IN ASSESSING the numerous foreign policy problems in need of prompt solution, Hughes believed that peace treaties with Germany, Hungary and Austria were paramount. Two years and four months had elapsed since the signing of the Armistice, yet, since the Senate had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles, the United States remained technically in a state of war with its former enemies. Without prior consultation with the State Department, Congress passed a broad measure, the Knox-Porter joint resolution of July 2, 1921, unilaterally declaring an end to the war and reserving to the

[2]William Phillips, *Ventures in Democracy* (privately published, 1952), p. 113.

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United States "all rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations, or advantages" as stipulated in the Versailles Treaty (to which the United States was entitled as one of the five Allied and Associated Powers). Although the United States was not a party to the Versailles Treaty, Congress nevertheless wanted the country to benefit from its provisions. However, the joint resolution was only a unilateral declaration; it could not become a binding legal document until a treaty was negotiated with the defeated nations and ratified by all parties.

Hughes was furious at Congress for meddling in his domain and significantly limiting his future options without informing him. He also wished to preserve certain rights guaranteed in the Versailles Treaty: a voice in the allocation of Germany's overseas possessions; reimbursement for the costs of maintaining American troops stationed in Germany; and especially the settlement of claims against Germany by American citizens. But Congress had not helped. The Senate had rejected the Versailles Treaty—meaning that Germany was technically free to negotiate new terms with the United States—but the Knox-Porter joint resolution mandated Hughes to secure a settlement that would not diverge from the provisions laid out at Versailles.

Scrupulous and exact, Hughes therefore carefully crafted a document that included almost all the parts of the Versailles Treaty, with the significant exception of the League Covenant, and attached it to the July 2 Senate resolution. This strategy obviated the need to start from scratch in negotiations with the German government, and a treaty—called the Treaty of Berlin—was approved by the Senate on October 18, 1921. For those who believe that the United States was not a party in any manner to the Versailles Treaty, the final text of the Treaty of Berlin is proof to the contrary; it committed the United States to uphold virtually all the terms of that treaty except the League Covenant. Treaties with Germany's allies were quickly concluded based on the same format.

Hughes' inventive strategy, however, drew fire from the League faithful who chastised him for betraying their trust and abandoning the Geneva-based institution. Like many internationally-minded Americans, Hughes had supported the creation of a league of nations, and had suggested several amendments to the 1919 draft of the covenant to render it acceptable to the Senate. He had also advocated America's entry into the Permanent Court of International Justice (the World Court), which was authorized under Article 14 of the League Covenant but created by a separate protocol. Hughes saw the World Court as a major advance because it provided a permanent mechanism for the settlement of disputes through adjudication—a mechanism that was, in his view, fully consistent with America's tradition of promoting the rule of law worldwide.

Meanwhile, several irate Senators accused him of demeaning the authority of Congress. Suspicious of Hughes' resourcefulness, they deliberately sought to limit his freedom of action by adding a reservation to the Berlin Treaty forbidding American participation in any meetings linked with the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations without explicit Congressional authorization. Hughes managed to evade the restriction by sending "unofficial" observers to international meetings, but this caused some confusion about their precise role. Joseph Grew, Minister to Switzerland, described his discomfort on being an unofficial observer at the Temporary Mixed Commission sessions on traffic in arms held in Geneva in February 1924: "The Department's instructions are often open to various interpretations: one may guess right, but

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one may also guess wrong, and a wrong guess may be very serious indeed, particularly when publicity is involved."[3]

The Washington Naval Conference

WITH THE United States a non-participant in the League of Nations, Hughes sought, through the sponsorship of the 1921–22 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, to establish a means for the United States to initiate proposals to ensure international security and peace, and thus to display world leadership. From conception to conclusion, the much heralded multinational meeting was a Hughesian production down to its most minute detail. It was also a star-studded media event attended by world statesmen and covered fully by the press, upon whom Hughes depended to publicize America's willingness to be an active player on the international scene. Originally conceived as a meeting on Far Eastern and Pacific issues because of the pending renewal of the Anglo-Japanese military pact, the agenda was expanded under public and Congressional pressure to include the reduction of armaments. While remembered chiefly for introducing the celebrated 5-5-3 ratios for capital ships, the conference produced a network of agreements that provided a framework for resolving political disputes in the Far East and Pacific.

The background to the Washington Naval Conference is quite complex. There was, first and foremost, a widespread belief among the public, both in the United States and abroad, that armaments races had abetted the Great War. A costly naval race in the Pacific appeared imminent in 1919–20, prompting Senator William Borah, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to propose a disarmament conference involving Japan, Britain and the United States to limit their naval construction programs. President Harding had initially favored a major naval buildup to gain a competitive edge before the convening of such a conference, but Hughes understood that this would further incite naval building and lead to a potentially disastrous rivalry among the former Allies of the Great War. It was clear in any case that Japan, having acquired former German territories in the Pacific—the Marianas, the Caroline Islands and the Marshall Islands—would gain the geopolitical advantage in Northeast Asia if a major naval race were to ensue. The agreements reached in 1921–22, however, made it harder for Japan to leverage that advantage. Under multilateral diplomatic pressure, Japan withdrew from Russian Siberia, from the northern half of Sakhalin Island and from Shantung province—the former German concession—in China. Tokyo also supported a greatly diluted four-power pact (United States, Great Britain, France and Japan) based solely on consultation to replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

While the arrangements made in 1921–22 were criticized after December 7, 1941 as having given unfair advantage to Japan—not least by Dean Acheson in his memoirs[4]—Hughes' strategy was no

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[3]Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era, A Diplomatic History of Forty Years, 1904-1943*, vol. I, Walter Johnson, ed., (Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 608.

[4]"Charles Evans Hughes was a gifted man, but his reputation as a Justice and Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court is likely to be rated higher than as a Secretary of State. At the Washington Conference of 1921, in his eagerness to terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance, he agreed to a limitation of naval armaments and to prohibitions against fortifying Pacific islands, which gave the Japanese military supremacy in the northwestern Pacific." Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the*

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utopian disarmament fantasy, but one based on realist calculations. (Whether those calculations were made wisely remains a topic of debate among historians.) Hughes aimed at a great power concert that addressed the interests of every power, and that gave each something of value that could not be had unilaterally.[5]

In his opening address to the Conference on November 12, 1921, Hughes stunned the audience with his consummate presentation calling for a ten-year ban on capital ship construction and citing the particulars of naval limits based on relative equivalencies for Great Britain, United States, Japan, France and Italy. Hughes thus took an enormous risk, for he had not invited any prior consultation with the affected states, violating traditional diplomatic practice to the extreme. But he never wavered from the 5–5–3 ratio principle as the best option for implementing a naval reduction plan. In stressing that all other methods lacked credibility, Hughes put to the conferees a stark choice: accept the Hughes formula or face a costly and accelerating naval race. Since the United States bore the brunt of the naval sacrifices by forfeiting the greater part of its 1916 capital ship construction program, Hughes was able to reach an accord by making only marginal additional concessions to the other four parties.

The five-power naval treaty was a major achievement: For the first time in history, nations were committed to a common standard of measurement for naval armaments and legally bound to limiting the total tonnage of their capital ships. As important, Hughes believed that he had broken the inexorable momentum of an arms race that could lead to a Pacific war in which America would be at an inherent disadvantage, not least because of its exposed position in the Philippines. At the same time, Hughes understood the need for the United States to maintain its relative naval strength in the interest of peace and security.

Hughes' dictatorial manner did not sit well with those adversely affected by his actions. In determining the appropriate tonnage and ratios, Hughes resorted to a stringent formula that overrode the recommendations of the General Board, the policy arm of the U.S. Navy Department, which had counted on the completion of the 1916 naval construction plan. He enraged the admirals who believed that such drastic cuts jeopardized national security and naval defense. They also protested treaty prohibitions against fortifying American islands in the Pacific. The British admiralty was equally furious at Hughes for forcing it to revise its naval blueprints to conform with the weight restrictions. The French delegates were irate over the secret rendezvous of the spokesmen of the Big Three (the United States, Great Britain and Japan) who were empowered by their governments to make decisions on the spot. The French hissed, accusing Hughes of engaging in an Anglo-American conspiracy to assign their nation a parity with Italy, a country they considered to be of lesser nobility. (Some things never change.)

While progress in naval disarmament captured worldwide attention, redressing the imbalance in the power structure in the Far East and Pacific, where many vested commercial interests were directly affected, required a more subtle diplomacy. Hughes identified a debilitated China as the main source of turbulence in the region. The primary task of the follow-on negotiations was to render "the greatest

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State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 5.

[5]A proposal in this same spirit for handling the problem posed by North Korea's October 2002 nuclear breakout is Adam Garfinkle, "Power Play", *The New Republic*, November 4, 2002.

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help possible to the Chinese people in developing a stable and effective government really representative of the people of China."[6] Hughes justified American intrusion into Chinese affairs on the basis of the Open Door policy, which had acquired a strategic import well beyond its initial aim of creating equal opportunity for trade. Hughes saw the Open Door doctrine, broadened in 1900 to include the recognition of the territorial integrity of China, as consistent with both a strong American role in the Far East and its anti-imperialist code of conduct.

These broader Open Door principles were fully embodied in a nine-power treaty drafted by former Secretary of State Elihu Root, a delegate to the conference. Its declaration of intent, acclaimed as the "Magna Carta for China", reflected a moral pledge to guarantee its territorial integrity, but it relied only on the good faith of the signatories to honor their legal commitments. Other more concrete achievements are worth noting, however. Through the good offices of Hughes and the chief British delegate, Lord Balfour, Japan returned Shantung to China—as noted above—which it had taken from Germany during the Great War, while Great Britain and France relinquished some of their holdings on China's coastline. Additional specific steps were taken to strengthen China's political and economic structures.

The 1921–22 Washington Conference changed the course of U.S. foreign policy in the Far East. Britain wisely conceded the inevitability of sharing power with the United States in East Asia and came to strongly support American positions. Japan, then governed by a liberal regime, was also amenable to moderating its policies and looked forward to improving trade relations with China. While the agreements and resolutions lacked provisions for enforcement, relying on consultation if disputes in the area should arise, they did manage to quell the roiling waters of the Far East and Pacific for a decade. To Secretary of State Henry Stimson's later dismay, the measures assiduously put in place at the conference fell apart in September 1931 when Japan disregarded its treaty commitments and invaded Manchuria. After the Japanese attack on Shanghai in January 1932, Stimson wrote a letter to Senator Borah that released the United States, and by implication the other signatories of the Washington Conference as well, from their pledges to uphold the 1921–22 covenants. Japan's flagrant violation of Chinese sovereignty, and the unwillingness of the United States to stand against it, represented the final unraveling of Hughes' efforts to provide stability and security in the region. Hughes, by then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, felt obliged to abjure public comment on the matter.

The Dawes Plan

A PRIME illustration of Hughes' special talents for developing pragmatic solutions to problems was his adroit management of intergovernmental indebtedness following the Great War. A unique initiative, the Dawes Plan, rescued Germany from an economic crisis that threatened to disrupt the flow of reparations to the victors and, in turn, Allied loan repayments to the United States. The task was not a simple one: Hughes had to balance the need for the cooperation of the affected parties, the repayment of the war debts, the Allies' right to restitution as set forth in the Versailles Treaty, and the immediacy of Germany's financial crisis.

Hughes singled out as the root cause

[6]U.S. Senate, *Conference on the Limitation of Armaments*, Doc. No. 126, 67 sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 866.

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of Europe's economic decline the huge reparations indemnity that the victors of the Great War were exacting from Germany. Reparations starved the German economy of capital and fueled inflation. The devaluation of the mark and the contraction of the German economy, in turn, affected trade with the rest of Europe, augmenting economic woes elsewhere on the continent. In late March 1921, a distraught German government, unable to meet the terms of a rigid payment schedule, beseeched the U.S. government to intervene on its behalf. Not one to rush into a delicate situation without forethought, Hughes declined to act; but did not rule out an American role at some future date. In the meantime, he commenced to think and plan.

In Hughes' view, the situation could never be rectified if left in the hands of biased politicians who, by their instincts and predilections, were incapable of reaching a realistic settlement based on what Germany could pay. Their persistent haggling was much in evidence at a series of meetings of the Reparation Commission established under the Versailles Treaty to assess Germany's obligation. On December 29, 1922, an exasperated Hughes finally determined that the issue should be turned over to "men of highest authority in finance in their respective countries" who could best judge the state of Germany's economy and its capacity to manage the indemnity. But neither France nor Belgium were amenable. In retaliation for Germany's default on its reparations, their troops seized the Ruhr in early January 1923. Amid a general strike and panic in German markets, the country's credit collapsed and the German mark was rendered virtually worthless.

Hughes now saw the urgency of the problem and, luckily, American intervention was aided by a change of heart in the office of the French Prime Minister, Raymond Poincaré. Once France softened its position, Hughes created an American presence in new negotiations of the Reparation Commission by urging the creation of two independent committees with no connection to the Versailles Treaty. Hughes then selected three prominent financiers as unofficial advisers to these committees—Charles B. Dawes, Owen D. Young and Harry P. Robinson—with the understanding that they were to serve as private citizens and to make recommendations only. Judicious and correct, Hughes had the invitations mailed to their homes, lest some Congressmen contend that the U.S. government was slighting the Senate's direction to keep a distance from Versailles.

Dawes, a Chicago banker and former head of the Bureau of the Budget, chaired the more prominent of the two committees. He identified as central to the restoration of Germany's credit the twin tasks of budget balancing and currency stabilization. That judgment served as the basis from which all measures of reform evolved. His final report, which extended far beyond the original mandate, was a comprehensive examination of the structural problems in the German economy. It prescribed the steps required to restore the government's solvency and allow the country to meet its financial responsibilities. The thickly-documented economic blueprint was welcomed by American and European businessmen, who saw the need to base Germany's economy on sound fiscal principles.

Hughes' perception of Europe's worsening economic condition and his faith in the Dawes Plan obliged him to campaign for its acceptance during a visit to Europe in the summer of 1924. In France, he told Premier Edouard Herriott that his cabinet "must endorse" the plan. In Germany, he warned Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann that, if the Dawes recommendations were not accepted, America

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"was finished" with trying to mediate the problem. Hughes was a brinksman extraordinaire (when Richard Nixon was only eleven years old). To Hughes, the Dawes Plan was the best way to ensure the peace and prosperity of the continent, which ultimately would benefit the United States in trade and war debt repayments. While the plan was clearly an American initiative, it was unofficial and did not require approval by the Congress. (Nor, therefore, could it be derailed by the Congress.)

The Dawes Plan did not require any Congressional appropriations. The financial transfusion that began in October 1924 relied primarily on the American *private* sector as the source of funding. Wartime animosities were set aside as individual investors rushed to take advantage of the higher yields offered on German government bonds backed by gold when they were floated on the New York Stock Exchange. In total, Germany received an estimated $2.5 billion, which was deposited into reparations accounts, and $2.6 billion returned in time to the United States from 15 debtor nations. For the next five years the German reichsmark fluctuated less on the foreign exchanges than did other European currencies, and American businesses profited.

The radical remedial intervention proposed by the Dawes Plan at Hughes' behest was not meant to be a permanent fixture but a temporary solution for a nation in a particular economic crisis. Yet its significance should not be minimized. An innovative precedent, the Dawes Plan became the precursor of the more comprehensive foreign aid programs that were adopted after World War II, including the Marshall Plan. But these, in contrast, were funded with taxpayer dollars and run by bureaucrats with big hearts as opposed to bankers with sharp pencils. The Dawes model still has much to recommend it, particularly as the problems of providing effective foreign aid are becoming ever more readily apparent.

The Immigration Act of 1924

HUGHES' success at circumventing Congress in the creation and implementation of the Dawes Plan came at a price. Hughes suffered a major defeat in April 1924 when Congress, against the vociferous opposition of the State Department, enacted a harsh immigration law by a huge majority in both houses. This legislation soon had a disastrous effect on U.S.–Japanese relations.

The Immigration Act of 1924 was deliberately aimed at blocking the entry of Japanese workers into the United States. The restrictive legislation, which had been brewing for some time in Congress, was in response to the agitation rising in several western states for legal restraints on Japanese migration. A series of informal exchanges between the State Department and the Japanese government (the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreements") had previously limited the numbers allowed to enter the United States each year, but all acknowledged this mechanism to be imprecise and inadequate as a longer-term solution. To allay Senate criticism over the State Department's management of the problem, Hughes pursued a strategy that badly misfired. Instead of confronting the legislators directly, Hughes asked the Japanese Ambassador, Masanao Hanihara, to prepare a background statement on the question in the hope that such a detailed explanation would calm the Senate's furor. Hanihara's memorandum, however, had the opposite effect: Congress expressed annoyance at Japan's intrusion into a domestic matter and was angry at Hanihara's insinuation that the intended discriminatory law would have "grave consequences." Underlying the criticism

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in the Senate was a noticeable resentment toward the towering eminence of Hughes which, by comparison, seemed to dwarf the image of Congress.

As Hughes had predicted, the inclusion of the discriminatory clause severely damaged Japanese–American relations, which Hughes had assiduously cultivated at the Washington arms conference, and which had been aided by generous American humanitarian assistance to Japan after the disastrous 1923 earthquake. It also dealt a serious blow to the Coolidge presidency's reputation for justice and fair play. Cordiality gave way to cries of injustice and prejudice as Japanese militants exploited the incident to strengthen their political position. Hughes thought of resigning, but Coolidge assured him that he had acted correctly.

TO COOLIDGE'S regret, Hughes did tender his resignation on January 5, 1925. Though asked by Coolidge to remain in office, Hughes thought the time was right for him to return to private practice. The country faced no pressing questions that required his presence; then, too, there were financial issues. The costs of maintaining his position in Washington greatly exceeded his yearly salary of $12,000. A laudatory editorial in *The Times* of London on January 13, 1925 summed up Hughes' achievements:

> He knew his America and he knew the world. He also understood, as perhaps no one else did during a very difficult period, the nature of the relations between a changing America and a world that was changing still more swiftly. He knew, moreover—and this is his chief title to fame—how to interpret these unstable and uncertain relations in a policy that was at once coherent and convincing to people at home and people abroad.

If anything, *The Times* understated the matter. Despite setbacks, Hughes' four years in office redefined America's position in world politics. He prevailed in the face of an ambivalent public, an often obstructive Congress, a Republican Party largely tone-deaf to foreign policy, and, especially at first, without the resources at the State Department that he required. He understood the importance of management, of shaping images and especially of boldness: above all else, Hughes understood as if by instinct that only new ideas and new methods of operation could work at the cusp of an age yet to be defined. Certainly, he was by far the most influential and innovative Republican internationalist of the post-World War I era.

In the common canon of knowledge about U.S. foreign policy, it is the Truman Administration—especially Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the President himself—that is given credit for recognizing the need for change and for stepping up to the historic tasks before it. Taking nothing away from their great accomplishments, it is perhaps not too much to say that Hughes as Secretary of State was nearly their match. Future secretaries could do worse than to study his extraordinary record in office. □

> When we lose the right to be different, we lose the privilege to be free.
>
> —Charles Evans Hughes

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

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A Low, Dishonest Decadence

David Satter

AFTER 15 YEARS of tumultuous change in Russia, Moscow is booming and parts of the city give the impression that they are part of the West. Tverskaya Street, the capital's principal artery, is filled with strollers, late model cars and outdoor cafes. On Novoslobodskaya Street, coffee houses are filled to capacity and consumers crowd the new "Friendship" Russo-Chinese shopping center. Everywhere, restored buildings reveal the beauty of Moscow's 19th-century architecture and, at night, the illuminated façades of the buildings and gleaming cupolas of the Orthodox churches create an atmosphere of dynamism and resurgent grandeur.

On July 31, 2002, a milestone of sorts was reached with the announcement by Vladimir Sokolin, the chairman of the State Statistics Committee, that Russians' living standards had returned to the level they had attained before the financial crisis of August 1998. Sokolin said that the real cash incomes of the population in June 2002 exceeded the August 1998 figures by 5.4 percent.

The atmosphere of the Moscow streets, so stunning in contrast to the uniformity and shabbiness of the communist era, has evoked the enthusiasm of Western observers. Michael Binyon, a correspondent of *The Times* of London, wrote that, "Many Russians have never had it so good." Leon Aron, a biographer of Yeltsin, wrote in *The Weekly Standard*,

> The produce shortages and ubiquitous lines of the Soviet era have been forgotten. Fresh and delicious food is available everywhere. For the first time since the 1920s, Russia not only feeds its people and livestock but is a net exporter of grain.

And Anders Åslund, an economic consultant and author, wrote in *The Moscow Times*, "As the rest of the world sinks into recession, Russia booms. . . . It is time to realize that Russia is a country that solves its problems with an efficacy and speed that the West can only envy."

Unfortunately, however, the true state of Russia is not simply a matter of surface appearances. The reforms that have remade Moscow's urban landscape took place without the benefit of higher values, and they bequeathed to Russia a moral vacuum. The result is that behind the façade of relative prosperity made possible by its improving economy, Russia faces underlying problems—criminalization, lawlessness, disregard for human life and a deep spiritual malaise—that threaten the country's long-term survival.

David Satter, whose *Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State* (Yale) is just out, is affiliated with the Hudson Institute, the Hoover Institution and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

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The Rule of the Lawless

THE LAWLESSNESS in Russia defines the tenor of everyday life. Russian business operates according to the law of the jungle in which the most basic functions can only be carried out with the protection of armed force. The impact of criminalization in Russia is evident both at the street level, in the terror unleashed on society by gangsters, and in the corrupt operations of the clan system at the highest levels of power. At the street level, gangsters create a sense of permanent insecurity for millions of citizens. It is not possible in Russia simply to run a business. That business must have protection, which Russians refer to as a "roof" (*krysha*). This roof is provided by a criminal gang that protects the businessman from other criminal gangs (as well as from itself) in return for a share of his income.

The system of roofs is so well established in Russia that entire regions are divided up between rival gangs, and businessmen turn to the gangs to settle their disputes and collect their debts. Moral boundaries in the process become so blurred that many Russians treat the demand that they hand over a share of their income as a legitimate obligation.

The only real competitors of the gangs are the law enforcement agencies. For a long time, the gangs had a near monopoly on extortion but, as the heads of law enforcement agencies saw the enormous profits that were possible, they too entered the protection racket. Today, security firms connected to the ministry of internal affairs, the directorate for the struggle with organized crime (RUBOP), and the Federal Security Service (FSB) also offer protection to paying clients, particularly in Moscow. The official "roofs" have some advantages over the criminal ones. They are less likely to betray their clients and, unlike the gangs, they can be fired. But the involvement of police agencies in the protection racket undermines the whole notion of law enforcement and implicitly treats extortion as a normal part of life.

While the protection racket dominates Russian business at the street level, the government serves as the roof for oligarchic businesses that have their own security forces and are not vulnerable to crude racketeering. When the reforms in Russia began, money was in the hands of gangsters and black market operators, whereas property was in the hands of government officials. The first priority of virtually every new enterprise was therefore to buy government officials. The successful purchase of one government official made it possible to buy others, and Russia soon came to be dominated by oligarchic clans that had, in effect, put the government on their payroll. The result of this system was a country characterized by both massive poverty and a striking concentration of wealth. Eight oligarchic groups today control 85 percent of the value of Russia's top 64 private companies and the combined sales of the twelve top private companies equal the revenue of the government.

An example of how the system operates was provided by MDM, one of the most powerful banking groups in the country. In the years since Putin acceded to power, MDM acquired Russian industrial giants, including defense plants, at a speed that would not have been possible without the protection of the government. It became interested in Nevinnomissky Azot, one of Russia's largest fertilizer factories, which had an annual profit of $30 million. MDM met resistance, however, from the factory's director, Viktor Ledovsky, who set up a firm through which the workers could buy up shares in the factory. He then appealed to the government not to sell its stake in an enterprise that was making a profit.

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In response, the tax police of the Stavropol region accused Ledovsky of hatching a scheme to steal money from the workers. Ledovsky produced a statement from the Russian Institute of the State and Law that his activities were legal and that workers' rights were protected, but this was ignored. He was arrested on July 4, 2001, ostensibly to prevent him from fleeing the country. Evidence of his intention to flee was a ticket to Munich purchased in his name on July 8, four days *after* his arrest. With Ledovsky in prison, the Russian Federation Property Fund sold the state interest in Nevinnomissky Azot for $25 million, virtually the starting price, to a group representing MDM.

Many of the principal oligarchic clans were united by their connections to Boris Yeltsin and his immediate relatives, known collectively as "the family." With the accession of Putin, however, the family has faced competition from the "Leningraders", for the most part associates of Putin and veterans of the intelligence services. The basic situation, however, has not changed.

One of Putin's favorite oligarchs is Oleg Deripaska, the director of Russian Aluminum, which produces nearly 80 percent of Russia's aluminum. Dzhalol Khaidarov, a former close associate of Mikhail Chernoy, a partner of Deripaska with close ties to organized crime, described how the system works in an interview with *Le Monde:*

> You ask why Russian Aluminum gained one or another factory. They will say that the shares were purchased. But if you look, you'll find that the former shareholder is in prison, became a 'drug addict' or disappeared. When I worked with Mikhail Chernoy, the group every year gave bribes of $35 to $40 million dollars a year. It was always possible to buy a judge, a governor, or a law. In the early 1990s, they murdered. Now they prefer to file a case or put someone in prison. They can do anything.

Live and Let Die

BESIDES lawlessness, the future of Russia is threatened by society's disregard for human life. In the first place, the low value attached to human life in Russia is reflected in everyday events. In Russia today, there are 40,000 murders a year, three times as many as there were in 1990. This gives Russia the second highest murder rate in the world (after South Africa). Unfortunately, however, this figure may be a serious underestimate. According to Russian demographers, in addition to the confirmed murders there are another 40,000 violent deaths per year in Russia in which the cause of death—murder or an accident—cannot be established, and there are 20,000 cases a year where individuals simply disappear.

According to the journal *Demoscope Weekly*, the figures for all categories of violent death in Russia far exceed their Western equivalents. A comparison of Russia and England, for example, shows that a Russian is five times more likely to die in a traffic accident than an Englishman, 25 times more likely to accidentally poison himself (usually with alcohol), three times as likely to die in an accidental fall, 31 times as likely to drown, seven times as likely to commit suicide and 54 times as likely to be murdered.

Among the reasons for the lethality of Russian life is that when a life threatening situation does occur, Russians can rarely count on timely help. In January of last year, Taras Shugayev, a young Moscow resident, left a pool hall drunk and awoke to find himself inside a moving garbage truck, dodging massive blades that were slowly grinding collected refuse into pulp. For 23 minutes, according to a transcript

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of a series of calls made on his cell phone to Moscow's rescue service operators, he pleaded and cried, saying he was being squeezed and begging for help. The operators, however, only advised him to alert the driver by banging from inside the truck. No discernible action was taken by Moscow's various police forces that, according to one rescue service spokesman, dismissed the report as a prank. "Are you in a joking mood to be calling us like this at 6 o'clock in the morning?" a police dispatcher reportedly said.

By Shugayev's fourth call, during which the rescue service was mainly concerned with trying to learn who might have put him in the truck, Shugayev was desperate. His last recorded words were, "This is it, I think I am suffocating. This is it." The police only responded 24 hours later after Shugayev's family reported him missing. They then pieced together what had happened with the help of phone records. By that time, however, there was nothing to do but sift through a suburban dump, looking for possible remains.

Besides the hazards of everyday life, the low value assigned to Russians' lives is reflected in the readiness of the government to sacrifice them. In a general sense, this was reflected in the nature of the economic reform program that was undertaken with little regard for its effect on the health of the population and was accompanied by five million premature deaths. The death rate in post-communist Russia was not an accident. It was the product of specific policies that reflected the authorities' lack of concern for individuals. In the first place, the government removed all restrictions on the sale of alcohol. The result was that at a time when the purchasing power of the average Russian was cut in half, his salary in relation to the cost of vodka increased threefold. The era of cheap vodka coincided with the peak of the privatization process and the resulting tranquilization of the population lowered resistance to the criminal division of the nation's wealth, albeit at a cost to the nation's health.

At the same time, the government failed to finance the system of public health. For the first time, Russians had to pay for many medical services, from necessary medicines to lifesaving operations, and the inability to pay led many to give up on their own lives. The government even failed to finance adequately such hospitals of "last resort" as the Vishnevsky Surgical Institute in Moscow, which was underused despite the surge in the death rate.

THE DISREGARD for the value of human life has also been reflected in the Chechen wars in which the authorities have shown little concern for the lives of either Russian soldiers or Chechen and Russian civilians. But there was no more graphic, specific illustration of the authorities' indifference to human losses than their actions during the hostage crisis when in late October of last year 800 persons were taken captive by Chechen terrorists in Moscow's Theater on Dubrovka.

From the moment that the theater was seized, it was clear that what was involved was a test of the government's attitude toward the lives of its citizens. Never before had so many persons been taken hostage in a major capital. The terrorists included 18 suicide bombers who had bombs strapped around their waists. Dozens of other bombs were fastened to the building's main supports. The terrorists threatened to detonate the bombs and obliterate the theater if their demands were not met.

As the crisis began, President Putin said that saving the lives of the hostages was his first concern, and there were clear indications that a peaceful solution was possible. The terrorists initially demanded an end to the war in Chechnya and the

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withdrawal of Russian troops, steps that, according to polls, were supported by 65 percent of the Russian population. On October 25, the second day of the crisis, the terrorists even agreed that the hostages would be freed in exchange for a statement by Putin that the war was over and the verified withdrawal of troops from only part of Chechnya.

At the same time—and perhaps more important—many of the terrorists' bombs, including a huge one in the center of the hall with a force of forty kilograms of dynamite, had not been activated. This suggested that the terrorists never really intended to blow up the building and kill the hostages. The FSB was aware that many of the bombs had not been activated because an FSB agent was among the hostages, and he provided detailed information to his superiors by cell phone about the number of terrorists and the condition of the bombs.

Despite the fact that negotiations appeared possible, however, the Russian authorities never engaged in, or apparently even considered, serious political negotiations with the terrorists. The authorities did not react to the proposal for a partial withdrawal from Chechnya; instead they agreed to talks between the terrorists and Viktor Kazantsev, a presidential representative, at 11 a.m., October 26. But this was only a diversionary maneuver. The theater was flooded with toxic gas and stormed by FSB and special forces units six hours before the talks were scheduled to start.

In the end, the Russian forces killed all 41 of the terrorists, shooting many of them while they were unconscious. The number of dead hostages has been variously put at 129 and 136, with 75 persons who were believed to have been in the theater still missing. All but three of the dead hostages died as a result of poisoning by the gas used to "rescue" them.

Not only the refusal to negotiate but the nature of the rescue effort suggested that the storm was undertaken to destroy the terrorists, and that saving the lives of the hostages was a very low priority. Doctors arriving at the scene were not told that the hostages had been gassed and not provided with the antidote that had to be injected immediately. The order for ambulances to proceed to the theater came 45 minutes after the beginning of the operation, the result being that many hostages had to be taken to hospitals in buses, microbuses and cars. In one case, 30 hostages were put in a twelve-seat military microbus, including on the floor, and a 13 year-old girl was crushed under other bodies and died en route. Although the Moscow health authorities had days to prepare for the aftermath of the storm, nearly one hundred persons who died from gas poisoning or other causes could have been saved if the rescue effort had been properly organized.

Besides criminalization and society's disregard for human life, Russia's future is threatened by a more fundamental problem: a deep spiritual malaise that reflects the inability, so far, of Russia to find a new moral orientation in the wake of the fall of communism.

The communist regime was based on "class values", the notion that right and wrong are determined by the interests of the dominant class. In the wake of communism's fall, moral coherence for society could, as a result, only be achieved through the establishment of universal values. That, as a practical matter, required the efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church and, perhaps, the government. The church, however, was crippled by its history of collaboration with the KGB, and successive governments emphasized not the sanctity of the individual as a source of values but the prerogatives of the state.

The story of the post-communist Russian Orthodox Church is one of lost

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opportunities. After the failure of the 1991 pro-communist coup, Gleb Yakunin, a dissident priest and member of the parliament, was briefly given access to a section of the KGB archives which showed that the top hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate were agents of the KGB. The most important KGB agent was the Patriarch, Alexei II, himself. Yakunin wrote to Alexei and said that he and other church leaders should deny the charges of collaboration or ask for forgiveness, pointing out that "our people are forgiving." But only one archbishop, Khrizostom of Lithuania, had the courage to acknowledge that he worked as an agent for the KGB and to reveal his codename, "Restavrator." All of the other implicated church leaders remained silent.

With the transition to capitalism, the church quickly became the beneficiary of official privileges, including the right to import duty-free alcohol and tobacco and to trade in diamonds, gold and oil. Not surprisingly, this gave rise to widespread corruption. Although the church claimed to lack funds for charitable activities and religious education, its business interests produced enormous profits that then had a tendency to disappear. For example, in 1995 the Nikolo-Ugreshsky Monastery, which is directly subordinated to the Patriarchate, earned $350 million from the sale of alcohol, and the Patriarchate's department of foreign church relations earned $75 million from the sale of tobacco. But the Patriarchate reported an annual budget in 1995–96 of only $2 million.

Against this background, the role of religion in the country's moral resurrection was necessarily limited. Church hierarchs pursued their commercial interests and were in turn imitated by ordinary priests who pursued theirs, blessing businesses, banks, homes and automobiles and exorcising "unclean powers" for a fee. At the same time, the church did not allow itself the slightest political role, remaining silent on such genuine moral issues as Russia's pervasive corruption and the killing of noncombatants in Chechnya.

The government, meanwhile, contributed to Russia's moral malaise by seeking new legitimacy for authoritarian rule through the glorification of state power. One aspect of this effort is the cult of personality that has been created around Putin. First, a children's alphabet book appeared in Russia illustrated with photographs of Putin as a boy. This was followed by the production of sculptures of Putin and paintings of the president gazing out from the Kremlin over the Moscow River in the visionary manner of Stalin or Kim Il-sung. Then, on Putin's fiftieth birthday, he was the subject of laudatory hymns from youth groups, all of which were given extensive coverage in the press. He was presented with a crystal crocodile from Moldova, a slow growing Siberian pine tree from Tomsk, a reproduction of the Czarist Cap of Monomakh and a golden crown encrusted with jewels. He also had a mountain named for him in Kyrgyzstan.

Putin is also the beneficiary of his own youth movement, "Forward Together", which announced its existence with a pro-Putin rally at the Kremlin wall in which young people in T-shirts emblazoned with Putin's picture carried signs declaring, "Together with the president" and "Youth follows the president." Forward Together has since embarked on an effort to "purify Russian literature." On June 27 last year, the group organized a protest in Moscow directed against Vladimir Sorokin, a popular contemporary writer. Forward Together members rigged up a huge toilet bowl as a supposed monument to the writer, then tore up his books and threw them in the bowl, pouring in chlorine after the ripped pages as a supposed disinfectant. Two weeks later, government prosecutors charged Sorokin with pornography, although there is no provi-

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sion in Russian law for punishing an author for his work.

Perhaps more important than the Putin personality cult, however, is the development of a new ideology that identifies Russia's future well-being with the power of the Russian state. Propounded by intellectual and political figures who describe themselves as "statists" (*gosudarstvenniki*), this outlook treats Russian history as the story of the development of the Russian government, in which the Soviet period was but an episode. An inevitable result of this approach is the *de facto* rehabilitation of communism and the glossing over of the lessons of the communist period, making it that much harder for Russian society to gain the democratic moral orientation it so desperately needs.

This is particularly obvious in the teaching of history in which the Gulag and mass repression are described as a tragic page in the nation's history but not the most important. Instead, attention is drawn to the Soviet Union's victory in the Second World War, the improvement of the material standard of living and the building of a superpower. There is no attempt to say that the Gulag was the basis of the Soviet system, or that the system was itself defective. Nor is there any effort to analyze seriously the Soviet ideology or to compare Soviet communism with its competitor in mass annihilation, Nazism.

In keeping with the tendency to see the Soviet past as part of a progressive trend that was on the whole positive, some now seek to rehabilitate even those figures from the Soviet past who were directly involved in mass repression. Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov has suggested that the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the first head of the Cheka and the founder of the "Red Terror", be reinstalled in the square in front of the headquarters of the FSB (formerly the KGB headquarters). A plaque commemorating Yuri Andropov, the former Soviet leader who, as head of the KGB, was responsible for the suppression of the dissident movement in the 1980s, has already been reinstalled on the wall of the main FSB building.

More Building, Fewer People

THE PROBLEMS of lawlessness, lack of respect for human life and moral disorientation shadow the visible changes in Moscow that have led many to describe Russia as a political and economic success. The improved appearance of Moscow (although not the rest of the country) is indisputable, but it is mainly a product of the high price of oil. Every dollar difference in the price of oil translates into roughly $1 billion in budget revenue; a high price for oil has therefore become the key to the government's ability to balance the budget, pay state employees and repay Russia's foreign debt. If the price should fall significantly and stay relatively low, as it did in much of the 1980s and 1990s, Russia will be plunged into a severe economic crisis. At that point, the invisible moral factors in Russia's situation will be become critical to its stability.

There has been a very unfortunate tendency, both in Russia and the West, to interpret success in Russia strictly in economic terms. Much of the discussion of the Russian reform experience, for example, concerned the relative merits of "shock therapy" versus government regulation. But a market economy is based on a system of equivalent exchange that can only be guaranteed within a framework of morality and law. Without such a framework, the result is no longer a free market but just another articulation of the rule of force.

In the final analysis, Russia can only overcome the systemic problems that threaten its future on the basis of respect for the dignity of the individual and the establishment of the authority of transcen-

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dent values as reflected in the rule of law. Unfortunately, this is precisely the element that has been missing in the whole reform process. W.H. Auden famously called the 1930s a "low, dishonest decade." What we see in Russia today is a low, dishonest decadence.

Perhaps the most striking example of the way these factors shape Russian society is the country's progressive depopulation. Russia combines one of the lowest birth rates in the world with the death rate of a country at war. According to Igor Gundarov, the head of the Russian state center for prophylactic medicine, if present trends continue, the population of Russia will be reduced by half in 80 years, to about 73 million, making the present Russian state untenable.

In the years 1992–94 there was an almost vertical rise in the death rate. Mortality rose one-and-a-half times by comparison with the second half of the 1980s. The rise was so dramatic that Western demographers at first did not believe the figures.

The rise in the death rate was explained as a result of the sudden impoverishment of the population. Poverty alone, however, could not have been the reason for the rise in deaths. The economic level in the 1990s fell to that of the 1960s but in the 1960s the death rate in the Soviet Union was the lowest in the developed world. Gundarov concluded that poverty, state encouraged alcoholism, and the downgrading of the system of public health accounted for only 20 percent of the reduction in longevity in Russia. The remaining 80 percent was attributable to the spiritual condition of the population in the wake of the failure to offer any new ideal for Russian society after the fall of communism. "There proceeded an attempt to 'transplant souls' and replace the old, non-market soul with a new, pragmatic businesslike approach to life", Gundarov said.

> This change was unaccompanied by an effort to provide . . . a reason for which the change should be undertaken. For many people, who needed something to live for, this change was intolerable and they lost the will to live because life no longer had any meaning.

NIKOLAI Berdyaev, the Russian religious philosopher, wrote that,

> In the soul of the Russian people, there should appear an immanent religiosity and immanent morality for which a higher spiritual beginning creates internally a transfiguring and creative beginning.

In this, he saw the hope for the future. The Russian people, he wrote, need to enrich themselves with new values and replace a "slavish religious and social psychology" with a "free religious and social psychology." They need to recognize the godliness of human honesty and honor. "At that point", he wrote, "the creative instincts will defeat the rapacious ones." We and the Russian people are still waiting for "that point." □

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Books

Religion, Reason and Conflict in the 21st Century

Kenneth Minogue

Phillip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 270 pp., $28.

WHAT IS THE exact nature of the famous "clash" between Islam and the West? Is it merely sibling rivalry, with each civilization having derived much of its heritage from Judaism? Westerners are competitive about everything under the sun; indeed, it is one of the marks of Western civilization. We compete in sport, in the beauty of women, in culture and inventions, even in demography. The West has specialized in being competitive and has invented ways of being—or seeming to be—superior that no other culture has even dreamt of. One might indeed think that the recent vogue for suicide bombing is Islam raising the competitive stakes by advancing a claim to be less afraid of death than decadent Westerners.

But the predominant Islamic response, at least in recent centuries, has usually been to reject competition and withdraw into Islam as an essentially superior identity that has no need to compete on such trivial levels. Competition—that is, rule-bound conflict—seen as a healthy endeavor is not an idea that comes naturally to Muslims. If Allah is your guide, what need of else?

For some few Muslims, however, the clash has been more than a competition. It has become a kind of duel to the death, after which only one civilization will survive. Here we have conflict, but no rules. This has been the attitude of those Muslims who despise the supposedly corroded spirituality of the West and are confident that the evident superiority of Islamic values will eventually lead to the political triumph that evaded the Arabs in 732 at Tours and the Ottomans in 1683 at Vienna. This alarming expression of sheer will that we call "fundamentalism" is in evidence when Muslims demonstrate in European cities (as they did over the Salman Rushdie affair) carrying banners reading: "Islam—our religion today, yours tomorrow."

The Western version of such extremism is so much milder and more con-

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cealed that it hardly looks like a bid for triumph at all. Yet this Western version does exist. It consists in a universalism that yields nothing in conviction and determination to Islam itself. The Western version is to be found in the secular scientific rationalism that is formulated today in terms of human rights and the development of international legal institutions to the point where they constitute, if not a world government, then a world system not far from it. Islam would, of course, survive as a culture within such a world system, though it could not be the all-enveloping way of life that it says it is in both its traditional and fundamentalist forms. And that means, as many if not most Muslims see it, that it would not survive at all.

This Western secularism emerged in Europe out of conflict with its own religious roots in Christianity, which it has largely put to flight in Europe and reduced to a defensive role in the civil society of the United States. It is entrenched in the universities, floating upon a conviction that the secularist elite has liberated itself from the superstitions and prejudices inherited from less enlightened times. In America it is specifically identified with the political doctrine of progressive liberalism, and it has exploited the First Amendment in order to assail Christianity, seen as its own local form of superstition, with everything from rational argument to satirical mockery.

PHILLIP Jenkins, a British subject replanted at Pennsylvania State University, has bad news for secular rationalists. Christianity may be losing its appeal in the European West, but it is spreading like wildfire in Africa, Asia and South America. Jenkins is a master of the extrapolated statistic and is not content with telling us what has lately happened. His prophetic vision is focused on 2025 and 2050, and what he has to say will bring as little pleasure to Muslims as it will to secular rationalists.

The Next Christendom is a piece of demographic fundamentalism that forces us to switch our attention away from the rich and declining West (or North, as Jenkins often prefers to call it) toward developments that have long featured at best on the periphery of our attention. We are dimly aware of festering trouble over religion in such places as Sudan and Nigeria. Jenkins argues that these peripheral issues are likely to become central to world politics within the next few decades because population levels and poverty rates will determine political significance. It has often been thought that Islam will soon outpace us all demographically, enjoying what the French Canadians used to call "the revenge of the cradle", but it now appears that Christians are, if anything, no less fertile. Knowing that many of us grasp realities in terms of images, Jenkins wants to discard the image of Christians as being rich and white. That is the past. Today, most Christian are poor and black, and that is what, Jenkins argues, will make all the difference. Revenge indeed.

His most dramatic chapters are those in which he discusses religious conflict—chapters haunted by the history of religious wars in Europe. It has since become even less possible to separate religious conflict from political than it was then. It was a striking feature of 20th-century ideologies that they diffused the general idea that it is intolerable to have to share the planet with people of unsound opinions. "Islam is politics or it is nothing", proclaimed the Ayatollah Khomeini, and that means that it is a total way of life and brooks no competitors. It is in this light that Jenkins is understandably haunted by the religious wars of the early modern period in Europe. One of his more chilling remarks is that overcoming religious

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intolerance in order to get on with state-building took centuries in Europe, and the process is unlikely to be notably faster in the South.

This is an important observation, for while Christians may think of themselves as "competing" with Islam in the Third World, Muslims see it as a war to the death. Under *sharia* law, Christian missionary work is forbidden and death is prescribed for the apostate who renounces Muslim belief. Muslims have a history of voting the party line, so to speak, and even attempts to encourage Muslim minorities in Europe to disavow such practices as stoning women allegedly found in adultery have often fallen on deaf ears. Islam, like any complex religion, has resources of tolerance both in doctrine and in practice, but as Jenkins observes, "the long-term prognosis for interfaith relations is not good."

The veil of political correctness has recently been extended to cover Muslims out of an understandable fear of popular outrage, and tolerant liberals have contrasted historic episodes of Muslim tolerance of religious minorities—not least of Jews—with episodes of religious persecution in Europe. The simple truth, however, is that religions are not usually tolerant. In the Topkapı Museum in Istanbul, one may see the sword of the Prophet and the swords of the first three Caliphs. Islam did not prosper from an excess of mildness. Christianity is a religion of peace—no one would ever discover the sword of Jesus—but Christian history is a testimony to the ferocity with which lovers of peace can respond to what they conceive to be a challenge. I have never forgotten the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell pioneering a new bit of Third World theology in remarking: "Jesus never said what you should do if he strikes the other cheek."

Jenkins is well aware that Muslim-Christian conflict is by no means the only fault line between religions. Indian untouchables, for example, are coming to espouse Christianity and Islam in a way highly displeasing to the Hindu majority. No one has a grip on human realities who forgets that races and religions don't much like each other. Even liberal rationalists get hot under the collar about racists, sexists and homophobes—not to mention Christians.

THE JENKINS version of demographic fundamentalism is that population is the measure of political significance. He is fully aware that Africa has a lot of people in it but is politically significant at all only as a matter of courtesy. Without economic sophistication, constitutional stability and military efficiency, states have little capacity to project their influence on the world. For Jenkins, however, the most important fact about the Christians of the South is that they are poor. This leads him to a lengthy but uncritical treatment of liberation theology. He seems to indulge a sympathy even for such revolutionary priests as the Colombian Camilo Torres, who thought many communists were true Christians, and who wrote that

> [t]he revolution is the way to obtain a government which will feed the hungry, clothe the naked, teach the ignorant, fulfill the works of charity, of love of neighbor...etc.

The idea—whether Torres' or Jenkins'—that governments feed anybody is a ripe piece of dottiness. Indeed, since governments grow no food, the idea that they do is a virtual invitation to kleptocracy. In Christian terms, the vision of governments bringing about a heaven on earth is the Gnostic heresy that Eric Voegelin used to call "immanentizing the eschaton." Anything to do with liberation seems to have a disorient-

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ing effect on Jenkins. Treating in one brief sentence the Peruvian government in combat with the Shining Path, he has the guerrillas conducting a "fierce" campaign but the military indulging in a suppression described as "bloody." What otherwise might a military campaign be—sweaty?

There is an alarming simplicity of mind in Jenkins' treatment of Third World issues, and the reason seems to be that he has picked up the kind of religious managerialism favored in recent Papal Encyclicals. The belief is that poverty and war are social problems that can be "solved" if only those in authority could be induced to behave decently. I am no theologian, but I suspect that this kind of salvation by politics is profoundly unchristian—not to mention irrational.

It is an aspect of this distortion of reality that Jenkins seems to agree with liberation theologians that Pentecostalists are favored by South American dictators because they are "submissive", in accordance with Romans 13 ("The powers that be are ordained of God . . ."). The Calvinists of the early modern period were no less keen on Romans 13, at a point where they were also tearing Europe apart. The connection between doctrine and reality is always oblique. The liberationist judgment seems like an echo of the 1960s illusion that "taking part in politics" was tantamount to being honorifically active, while merely doing one's duty and looking after one's own interests was "passive" or "submissive." It would be hard to find a belief more convenient to demagogues.

At no point does Jenkins seem to remember the crucial text that "my kingdom is not of this world", and the result is that his view of Christianity is tinged with ideological incitements to perfect a system that is of the world. He seems to favor whatever is passing itself off as reform rather than making the clear demarcation between the spiritual and secular life which, worked out over the centuries, has been the secret, or one of the secrets, of the West's relative peace and stability. The dangers facing Christian clergy in the Third World remind Jenkins of Becket and other martyrs of the Middle Ages. Following this train of thought, he cites the case of the Catholic Archbishop Christophe Munzihirwa, who was murdered by Rwandan troops invading Zaire (as it then was called), and draws a conclusion: such martyrs "were powerful nuisances to secular authority. In death they became indomitable foes." What principle of order does he imagine might curb lawlessness, such as that generated by unreconstructed African tribalism, if not that of authority? He seems to think authority is the same as power. It isn't.

The Next Christendom is no doubt a more important book than these critical remarks suggest. It certainly creates an unfamiliar picture of the emerging world that will undoubtedly become part of the framework of our understanding. What I have been emphasizing, however, is that Third World religious conflicts that now look to be unavoidable are terrifying enough without gratuitously politicizing them. Neither Islam nor Christianity will do much to improve the world unless they operate as real religions, turning attention away from projects of transforming social systems toward an innerness focused on duty and goodness. Something like this was how medieval Christendom generated the moral stabilities out of which the modern world emerged. Politics today is notoriously impatient, while patience is one of the great religious virtues. Better that politics should be moderated by religious virtue than that religion should be contaminated by political toxins.

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THESE prominent themes in the Jenkins argument are paralleled by a recessive one of which much more might have been made. It concerns the status of Christianity in the West.

Jenkins observes that the persecution of Christians occasions very little attention on the American campus. Underpaid peons sewing Nike shoes will get students into a lather; a few hundred Christian martyrs, meanwhile, are a big yawn. Politicians and journalists are anxious to insist that dangerous Muslim fundamentalists are "a tiny minority" of Muslims, as perhaps they are, but no such saving tolerance is commonly accorded to "the Christian right." As Jenkins remarks: "Liberal Westerners are reluctant to appear anti-Muslim or anti-Arab, and doubly dubious about taking up the course [sic] of Third World Christians."

Indeed the situation is worse than that: at both the popular and the elite levels, American secularists are becoming increasingly hostile to Christian believers. The same is true in Europe, where such hostility is even more puzzling because there is a strong feeling among European rationalists that they have already "won the argument." Why has hatred for what is believed, rightly or wrongly, to be a defeated enemy become more intense? This is one of the basic puzzles in Western civilization today; let me suggest an explanation for it.

Secular rationalists in the West believe that their enviable rationality has emerged only after a long struggle with superstition, prejudice, obscurantism and all of the intolerance and oppression and violence they have caused. Building on the rationality of the Greeks, the modern world has created the empirical viewpoint of modern science in a long struggle against the repressive authority of the Christian churches. As rationality, it is believed to be—and I use "believe" very deliberately—the expression of pure human intelligence, owing nothing to culture. Whereas religious and social mores are cultural products, reason is presumed to transcend culture to become the bridge by which humanity finally achieves the unity previously frustrated by religious and nationalist conflict. One might say, ironically, that secular rationalists see themselves as being on the side of the angels. Secular rationalism (incorporating the politics of liberalism) thus becomes the appropriate meta-religion for humanity as a whole.

It is for this reason that the triumph of secular rationalism, in its long march through the international institutions, has been based upon treating Christianity quite differently from other religions. Christianity has been pitted against science as an answer to scientific questions, and inevitably has been found wanting; for this reason it can be discarded as outmoded. Other religions, however, are treated as a part of culture rather than intellectuality, and thus benefit from the tenets of multiculturalism. They must be respected as long as they fit into the pluralist constitutionality of the new world order. If this new world order based on reason is to commend itself to the wider world, it must be based upon the pure intelligence of secular rationalism rather than on the inherited religion of the West, which has a sordid history of conflict with other cultures.

If the new world order were to be associated with Christianity, it would be recognized as an arm of imperialism and other forms of domination, which is why, of course, so many Europeans are so deeply troubled by George W. Bush's overt religiosity. Secular rationalism will bring order and progress to the world only so long as it can be understood as the bubbling into consciousness of pure reason. For that reason, it must liberate itself from any connection with Christianity.

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PHILLIP Jenkins has told us a great deal about the various forms of salvation and redemption that many people thought had been superseded by enlightenment. The real situation, however, is not merely that religion is alive and kicking and that Christianity itself is far from dead, but that there is a Western, secular, post-Christian version of redemption also seeking to dominate the world. Christianity thus finds itself assailed not only by competing religions in the wider world, but from secular rationalism arisen within its own camp. The 21st century will be about this clash, too. □

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A Man of Faith

Paul Hollander

Eric Hobsbawm, *Interesting Times: A Twentieth Century Life* (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 448 pp., $30.

ERIC Hobsbawm's *Interesting Times* is a highly readable and interesting autobiography, providing a wealth of information about the professional and (to a lesser extent) personal life of its author, as well as the times in which he lived. There is no shortage of revelations, intended and unintended.

Born in 1917, Hobsbawm has been a man of the Left throughout his long life. He has enjoyed an extraordinary global reputation in the academic world, foremost among left-leaning intellectuals and liberals. He has been showered with honors as a champion honorary doctorate recipient, conference invitee and subsidized world traveler. He has also been a regular commentator in the mass media of several countries. (A photograph in this volume shows him on Dutch television in the apparently congenial company of Markus Wolf, former head of the East German intelligence service. He appears to share with Mr. Wolf a distaste for expressing regrets about his longstanding political commitments and convictions.)

Like many leftist Western intellectuals, Hobsbawm managed to be at once an egalitarian and an elitist. On the one hand, he believes that his work has considerable historical importance and sees himself belonging to an international fraternity of enlightened intellectuals. On the other he is a champion and brother of the downtrodden. He writes: "The enormous advantage of communism, especially when reinforced by friendship, that one could simply not treat a comrade other than an equal."

A considerable amount of name-dropping supports the imputation of the elitist inclinations. Hobsbawm takes great pleasure in naming his innumerable distinguished "friends" who achieved high

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office, renown or distinguished intellectual status. He relishes his own high-flying career, as he recalls the good old days when the Rockefeller Foundation flew him first class to various exotic destinations. He comes across as a tireless networker affably cultivating his global connections and heartily enjoying the status he had achieved—after overcoming earlier difficulties in his career caused by his obstinate attachment to the British CP. Indeed, this was an attachment that not only ceased to matter after the 1960s but that had in fact become an asset.

Hobsbawm's global acclaim is not merely a reflection of his excellence as a historian, however. His fame and reputation rest in large measure on his successfully personifying a particular political position and mindset—that of the unrepentant leftist and unrepentant believer in Marxism who has held on to his convictions in face of a vast accumulation of historical evidence that should have undermined them.[1] He has not just been the common garden variety leftist academic so abundant in our times, but a remorseless member of the British Communist Party—a "card-carrying communist", as they used to say—and therein may lie the secret of his acclaim.

Those seeking to retain their leftist beliefs have found encouragement and comfort in Hobsbawm's steadfast loyalty to what strike them as noble and idealistic impulses. Hobsbawm has shown such people how one may admit that all existing communist systems were deeply flawed, ("it must now be obvious that failure was built into this enterprise from the start"), concede that the original good intentions of their creators had horrific unintended consequences, and yet continue to regard these intentions and the ideas underpinning them admirable and inspiring. He has thus come to personify idealism in the face of adversity. His high-minded refusal to give in to discouragement or yield to disillusionment, and his unswerving membership in the Party, has come to be seen as an emblem of pride and courage.

Hobsbawm is no doubt aware of all this. He contrasts the seriousness of his youthful commitments with the far more frivolous political play-acting of Sixties radicals: "Unlike the 1968 generation, few inter-war communists went into the revolution as into a political Club Med . . . ." He also makes clear that he was never a Sixties-style radical "cultural dissident." Unlike the radicals of that decade, his loyalties were firmly anchored in the Party:

> The Party was what our life was about. We gave it all we had. In return we got from it the certainty of our victory and the experience of fraternity. . . . It represented the ideal of transcending selfishness.

Another special bond linked him to the Russian Revolution: "I belonged to the generation tied by an almost unbreakable umbilical cord to hope of the world revolution and its original home, the October Revolution."

Hobsbawm insists that

> people like myself did not remain in the Party because we had many illusions about the USSR, although undoubtedly we had some. For instance we clearly underestimated the horrors of what had gone on . . . under Stalin until it was denounced by Khrushchev in 1956.

Elsewhere, too, he pleads ignorance of the worst Soviet atrocities:

> Of course we did not, and could not, envisage the sheer scale of what was being imposed on the Soviet people under Stalin at the time when we identified ourselves with him and the Comintern, and were reluctant to believe the few who told us what they knew or suspected.

[1] See Neil McInnes, "The Long Goodbye", *The National Interest* (Summer 2001).

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Nonetheless, a few lines later he observes that "it is anachronistic to suppose that only genuine or willful ignorance stood between us and denouncing the inhumanities perpetrated on our side", and he adds: "In the total war we were engaged in, one did not ask oneself whether there should be a limit to the sacrifices imposed on others any more than on ourselves." This reminds one not of Marx and Engels but of Martin Heidegger, who said in 1935 (and had published in 1953):

> in the domain of the essential, half-measures are always more fatal than the Nothing that is so terribly feared. . . . [W]hat is peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism . . . has not the least to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement.[2]

Of course, the siren of "total war" has been the time-honored excuse that each and every modern dictatorship has offered for its repressive policies, and the Soviet one for its campaigns of terror in the 1930s here rather unoriginally embraced by Hobsbawm. Stalin's favorite phrase here rises to the mind: "When the forest is cut down, splinters fly."

The abstract quality of Hobsbawm's youthful affections for the Soviet Union is also revealed in his negative reactions to his limited exposure to Soviet realities during the visit he paid in 1954–55, of which he returned "depressed and without any desire to go there again." But even the partially chastened, mature Hobsbawm has retained blind spots of impressive proportions which, for example, enable him to believe that East Germany (he insists on calling it the "German Democratic Republic")

> was not a bad society: work and careers for all, universal education . . . social security and pensions, holidays in a firmly structured community of good people doing a honest day's work . . . open-air leisure and sports, no class distinctions.

His worldview still requires, too, a perception of the Soviet Union as having been relatively weak and lacking in the "global ambitions and aggressiveness of the USA."

These remarks highlight the degree to which Hobsbawm's alignments and beliefs were predicated on the appeal of good intentions, potentialities and a future superior to the present. It was the attribution of these great hopes to the USSR that prevented him from a proper appreciation of its "severe defects" and that enabled him to give them little weight in his moral-political accounting. Neither knowledge nor a certain amount of self-reflection has prevented him from effortlessly subordinating intellect to emotion—a condition far from unknown among politically committed intellectuals. Recalling his teenage years in Germany, he writes:

> The months in Berlin made me a lifelong communist, or at least a man whose life would lose its nature and its significance without the political project to which he committed himself as a schoolboy, even though that project has demonstrably failed, and, as I now know, was bound to fail. The dream of the October Revolution is still there somewhere inside me. . . . To this day I notice myself treating the memory and tradition of the USSR with an indulgence and tenderness.

Such affirmations and reaffirmations are scattered throughout the volume, which is permeated by a taken-for-granted Marxist view of the world. He never discusses how Marxism influenced the failed policies of communist states, and why, if it lent itself to such chronic misuse, it should still be revered. He seems to equate Marxism with truth-seeking and

[2]Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2000), p. 213.

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with the endemic struggle against injustice. Never do intentions and consequences really meet.[3]

HOBSBAWM HAS been a student of modern European history and is well acquainted with the communist systems and movements of the past century. Hence, an ignorance of their failures could not play a substantial part in the retention of his early loyalties largely unrevised in ripe old age; nor is he an unreflective individual, as this autobiography indicates. How, then, does one reconcile all of these seeming contradictions?

Hobsbawm's early life offers clues. His childhood and adolescence were overshadowed by the threat of Nazism, a disorganized family life and the downward social mobility of his parents. Not only had his father been a highly unsuccessful breadwinner, but there was a great deal of social, economic and emotional instability early in his life, years of what he calls "tragedy, trauma, loss and insecurity." His father died when he was twelve, his mother when he was 14. He and one younger sister were raised in different places by relatives.

It was also the period of the Great Depression. From an early age he was one of many Jews (and liberal gentiles) who believed that only the communist movements and the Soviet Union were steadfast opponents of Nazism and its attempt to take advantage of the Depression. Even sixty years later in an autobiography full of historical facts, Hobsbawm could not bring himself to mention the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939.

He attended seven different "educational establishments" in Austria, Germany and England before landing at Cambridge University. His political beliefs and affiliations apparently became the essential foundation of his sense of identity and provided him with life long emotional support, coherence and focus. He recalls with great warmth the mass demonstrations in which he took part as a young man:

> Next to sex, the activity combining bodily experience and intense emotion to the highest degree is the participation in a mass demonstration at a time of great public exaltation. . . . It implies some physical action—marching, chanting slogans, singing—through which the merger of the individual in the mass . . . finds expression. The occasion has remained unforgettable.

Later in life he still found satisfaction in such activities as shown in the photographs of him protesting nuclear weapons in Trafalgar Square reproduced in the book. He includes such a "sense of mass ecstasy" among the five components of his communist disposition in addition to "pity for the exploited, the aesthetic appeal of a perfect and comprehensive intellectual system, 'dialectical materialism', a little bit of the Blakean vision of the new Jerusalem and a good deal of intellectual anti-philistinism." Elsewhere he writes that "what made Marxism so irresistible was its comprehensiveness."

Upon arrival to Cambridge University Hobsbawm was in the position to join or overlap with what he called "the reddest and most radical generation in the history of the university", which included some of the notorious spies of the period such as Blunt, Burgess, Maclean and Philby. He writes:

> I knew those of my contemporaries who became Soviet agents as militant members of the student Party. . . . We knew such work was going on, we knew we were not supposed to ask questions about it, we respected those

[3]See James Kurth, "'If Men Were Angels...' Reflections on the World of Eric Hobsbawm", *The National Interest* (Summer 1995).

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who did it, and most of us—certainly I—would have taken it on ourselves, if asked.

In light of these sentiments it does not shock us to learn that in 1950, while still associated with King's College, he made a special point of inviting Alan Nunn May, "just released from jail for nuclear espionage, to a King's feast."

Besides the weight of youthful commitments and the rewards he reaped on their behalf later in life, Hobsbawm also persisted in his beliefs because he simply disliked those who opposed them: "I was strongly repelled by the idea of being in the company of those ex-communists who turned into fanatical anti-communists." He was also "repelled" by "Cold War rhetoric and free market liberalism" during the 1980s, and much disapproved of François Furet's belief that communism was "a dangerous dream." He further explains that "what made it easier . . . to maintain the old faith, more than anything else, [was] the crusading global anti-communism of the West in the Cold War." It remains his sustaining belief that no matter what the communist systems have done, or failed to accomplish, the corruptions of capitalism greatly outweigh their evils and demand undiminished critical attention.

Hobsbawm reserves his most hostile comments, however, for Israel—"the small, militarist, culturally disappointing and politically aggressive nation-state"—that asks, in vain, for his solidarity on racial grounds. He granted such solidarity far more readily to the Palestinians during his visits to "occupied Palestine."

Hobsbawm did deviate some from the loyalties sketched above. The crushing of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 moved him to challenge the Party line in a letter published in the non-party press. Elsewhere he muses about

living in a land of the blessed: a region [central and western Europe] without war, without the prospect of fear of social upheaval, in which most people enjoyed a life of wealth, a range of choices in life and leisure, and a degree of social security beyond the reach of all but the very rich in our parents' generations.

If so, he seems to admit that there is, after all, such a thing as capitalism with a human face. Toward the end of the book it unexpectedly emerges that "in some ways the United States represent the best of the twentieth century . . . [and] promises greater openness to talent, to energy and novelty than other worlds." Tributes are also paid to American economic, technological and scientific achievements. But these tributes are followed, "on the other hand", by a listing of some of the "human costs" of the system, including the "unspeakable" prisons and huge prison population.

AS AN OLD leftist and old-style Marxist, Hobsbawm is properly critical of identity politics and intellectual undertakings such as black, queer or woman's studies. Commendably enough, he favors moving "beyond one's roots. . . . History needs distance not only from the passions, emotions ideologies and fears of our own wars of religion but from the even more dangerous temptations of identity." As to his own identity, Hobsbawm sees himself as one who "recycled" himself

from militant to sympathizer or fellow traveller, or . . . from effective membership of the British Communist Party to something like spiritual membership of the Italian CP, which fitted my ideas of communism rather better.

But this progression understates his commitments and obscures the bases of his sizeable self-esteem. Besides pride in his wordly successes he sees himself as a man

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of the best possible intentions, a Candide stripped of naïveté, and a fighter for a better world who has tried to ensure that humanity will not "live without the ideals of freedom and justice."

If he is anything, Hobsbawm has been and remains an orthodox man of faith seeking a new Jerusalem—his words of choice, not mine. As is the case with all orthodox religion, the devotion to a belief is praiseworthy the *more* improbable the belief is, not the less.[4] Had Hobsbawm not rejected the religious heritage of his birth, it is as certain as such a thing can be that he might have been not a Reform or an assimilated Jew, but an Orthodox one. The fulfilment he has found in Party camaraderie and mass demonstrations he may have found studying Talmud in a yeshiva and in communal worship. As it happened, Hobsbawm elected to reject most vigorously the other religion, the one into whose heritage he was born. Since one cannot believe in two demanding religions simultaneously, special effort must be made to put distance between the accepted creed and the renounced one.

It is ironic and sad that a man who devoted much of his life and work to support, directly or indirectly, some of the most inhumane and mendacious political systems and movements of modern times is capable of such self-satisfaction at the end of his long life. Such is life, however, and human nature. □

[4]The phenomenon of cognitive dissonance that helps to explain this was treated classically by Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken and Stanley Schechter in *When Prophecy Fails* (New York: Harper's, 1956).

Paul Hollander's latest book is *Discontents: Postmodern and Postcommunist* (2002).

Zakaria's Complaint

Thomas Carothers

Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 256 pp., $24.95.

FOLLOWING the paths of Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kaplan and other authors of highly successful "state-of-the-world" articles, Fareed Zakaria has turned his much discussed 1997 *Foreign Affairs* essay, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy", into a book. With more than five years having elapsed in the passage, his slim volume is well-shielded against the possible charge that it is merely an "instant book." The intervening years also allowed a longer-term evaluation of how his original thesis is holding up.

Zakaria's original article hit a major nerve. Enthusiasm about "the worldwide democratic revolution" was rampant in the 1990s. Perceptively sensing that all was not well in the dozens of celebrated

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democratic transitions around the world, Zakaria punctured that enthusiasm with a sharp analytic arrow. He asserted that the global rush of democratization into previously undemocratic terrain was a dangerous thing. It was producing, he argued, a rash of illiberal democracies, defined roughly as countries where popularly elected leaders, unconstrained by any well-established institutions or habits of law-based liberalism, were trampling political and civil rights and generally making a hash out of democracy. A much better way to proceed, he said, was for a country first to pass through a sustained period of liberalizing autocracy, with gradual expansion of economic liberalization and the rule of law. Only once well down that road should the dangerous wilds of democracy be braved. Like Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" and Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy", Zakaria's article benefited from the inimitable tendency of America's chattering classes periodically to embrace thundering prognostications of gloom and doom as occasional respites from a congenitally optimistic national outlook.

In *The Future of Freedom*, Zakaria reasserts his core thesis and expands its reach. He applies it to Latin America, South Asia and the Middle East, hitting each of these regional nails with the hammer of his much-admired East Asian model of economic and political development. And he turns his considerable critical faculties to bear on the deleterious consequences of what he believes is excessive democratization in established liberal democracies as well, at least in the United States (contemporary Europe is curiously absent from his *tour d'horizon*). Too much democracy, he charges, is the source of most of America's contemporary ills, from the decline of authority in American Christianity to the sad performance of American accountants at Enron and elsewhere. His analysis of America's problems verges into the realm of broad cultural criticism. It has that seductive but ultimately doubtful appeal of most such sweeping denunciations of the terrible erosion that modernization is inflicting on supposedly noble (and usually exclusionary) social traditions and standards. His arguments about the prospects for democracy in the rest of the world remain more analytically focused.

Zakaria's guiding formula, which can be summarized as "economic liberalization and the rule of law first, democracy later" may make sense in some contexts, but it is hardly the unerring guide he holds it out to be. Consider, for example, his favorite comparison in support of the formula: China versus Russia. He praises China's ruling communists, arguing that, thanks to their economic policies of the last twenty years, China is relatively well-positioned today to begin political liberalization and achieve "an extraordinary transformation toward genuine democracy." In contrast, he mercilessly criticizes Russia's post-1991 path, labeling it "Russia's democratic tragedy."

Perhaps in the late 1990s, when Russia was mired in a severe financial crisis and China's growth was humming along, this view seemed compelling. Today, however, it is less so. Russia is far from the economic basket case Zakaria makes it out to be, having implemented a number of significant reforms and enjoyed several consecutive years of solid growth (helped, but not solely caused, by high oil prices). And though Putin is a reluctant democrat with limited tolerance for opposition, Russia has increasingly rooted institutions of political pluralism and participation. Most of Russia's major transformative tasks—both economic and political—are behind it. In contrast, China's economic miracle is now bogged down in the swamp of vested interests that has accumulated around its static, overcentralized political structures. The Chinese government is still hesitating

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over the very idea of political liberalization, terrified that even small steps could unleash turmoil. According to Minxin Pei, whose work Zakaria approvingly cites on Asia's other transitions, China faces an impending governance crisis of state incapacitation resulting from the Communist Party's failings and the absence of political competition.[1] The SARS crisis has only further laid bare the dangers and brittleness of China's governance practices. In short, if one asks which of these two countries is more likely to be a stable, functioning democracy twenty years from now, it is not at all obvious that the answer is China.

Zakaria's application of his thesis to Latin America bounces off a region he clearly knows only glancingly. He holds up Venezuela's regrettable president, Hugo Chavez, as an example of the rise of illiberal democracy in the region. Chavez indeed fits the mold, but his rise cannot be blamed on a rush to democracy without a preparatory period of liberal constitutionalism. Venezuela passed through more than a hundred years of economic development, constitutionalism and various liberalizing (and non-liberalizing) autocrats before finally achieving democracy in the 1950s. The decay of that democratic system in the 1980s and 1990s is a sad story, but one that is about irresponsible political elites and misguided economic policies, not "premature democratization."

More generally, the histories of most Latin American countries are littered with failed attempts to make a transition from liberal autocracies, even sometimes relatively economically successful ones, to democracy. Though it might be nice if countries outside East Asia would mimic East Asia's path, many have tried in one fashion or another and failed miserably. The one positive Latin American example of movement from a liberalizing autocrat (at least liberal in the economic sense) to sustained democracy is Chile, an example that Zakaria invokes repeatedly. But Chile's post-Pinochet democratic success has as much to do with Chile's long pre-Pinochet history of democracy as it does with the economic groundwork Pinochet laid. Uruguay also made a successful transition to democracy in the same decade, without a Pinochet-style economic liberalization program as a precursor, drawing upon a similarly long earlier experience with democracy.

Zakaria is too quick to blame a rush to democracy for the rise of strongmen presidents in many countries. The autocratic leaders in the Caucasus and Central Asia, for example, should be blamed on the legacy of Soviet political rule, not precipitous elections. Zakaria has a point that in some abrupt transitions away from dictatorship, it would surely be better to go slow on national elections and try first to build up a base of liberal restraints and the rule of law. But what to do if the people of the society are pressing for democracy? Should the U.S. government tell them not to? *Can* it?

Zakaria implies that it is the United States that has pushed the many politically transitional countries around the world in recent decades to launch hastily into democratization, and that, if we had just held off that pressure, they might be enjoying a beneficial period of step-by-step liberalization. Yet Argentina's generals, Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, Africa's many post-colonial strongman rulers and numerous other dictators were not driven from power by the United States. They were pushed out by their own people, people desirous of democracy. And the idea that any of those countries might be better off today if such leaders had stayed around for another decade or two, dabbling in slow liberalization, is deeply misguided.

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[1]Minxin Pei, "China's Governance Crisis", *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2002).

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Deferred democratization, which occurs only after the long, slow achievement of constitutionalism, liberalism and prosperity, has indeed worked well in some places and at some times, such as in parts of 19th-century Europe. The problem with this formula, however, is that the global political culture has changed. For better or worse (and I think much for the better), people all around the world have democratic aspirations. Unprepared though their societies may be for democracy, they yearn for a voice and a vote, not several preparatory generations of mild dictatorship. It might be easy to say, for example, that a country like Nigeria—ethnically divided, poor, lacking the rule of law—is badly positioned for democracy and would benefit from several decades of a firm-handed reformist autocrat. But it was Nigerians themselves who clamored for democracy when General Sani Abacha died in 1998, not a meddlesome United States pushing its own ideas on them. And even if Nigerians were somehow to agree they wanted to put off pluralism and opt for a wise, benign dictator, how likely is it that they would find such an admirable figure, given their repeated experience of authoritarians who promise to be reformists and turn into thugs?

Democracy may inspire people all around the world, but not Fareed Zakaria. He shudders almost visibly at the messiness of elections (which he likes to call "mass plebiscites"—the "mass" conveying his sense of the dangers lurking in the empowerment of the common man). The American Revolution was for him all about the rule of law, not democracy. In an observation that most Americans would find genuinely odd, he declares that the leading symbol of the American political system, and other successful Western political systems, is not democracy but the impartial judge. He returns repeatedly to the tensions that can arise between democracy and liberalism, arguing that, due to precipitous democratization, the two are coming apart. But he misses the central fact that the expansion of democracy around the world in the past twenty years, riddled though it is with shortcomings, has brought with it huge gains in liberty. Gross abuses of political and civil rights in many parts of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, central and eastern Europe, and the western parts of the former Soviet Union have dropped dramatically since the arrival of the democratic wave.

The sustained exposition of this book compared to Zakaria's original article also makes much clearer his soft spot for autocrats. The heroes of his narrative are Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, Indonesia's former President Suharto, China's communist leaders, Jordan's current and former kings and Tunisia's President Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali. He gives them the benefit of every doubt. Many readers will be surprised to learn, for example, that Musharraf, whose authoritarian maneuverings made headlines last year, is in fact pursuing "a path of radical political, social, educational, and economic reform." Despite the torture chambers and pervasive, top-level corruption that marked Suharto's rule, he was "far more tolerant" and supportive of the rule of law than Indonesia's shaky but real democracy today. We should be grateful to China's leaders, he argues, for wisely and with great restraint keeping in check a dangerously "nationalistic, aggressive, and intolerant citizenry." And Tunisia's highly repressive police state, recently criticized by Freedom House for "an intensifying campaign of harassment against political opposition", is actually "reasonably open."

The two leaders who draw Zakaria's special ire are not dictators at all but Russia's two elected post-communist presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Zakaria just cannot say enough bad things

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about both of them. His bile toward Putin is especially surprising given that Putin's approach of combining economic reform with constrained democracy actually seems in many ways not far from Zakaria's ideal of liberal autocracy. Suharto can brutally suppress political liberties for decades, abuse the legal system for the massive enrichment of himself and his family, and stubbornly refuse to undertake any significant political reforms, yet earn Zakaria's praise as a liberal autocrat. Putin pursues serious economic reforms, steps on, but does not crush, political rights, and undertakes a genuine albeit limited program of rule of law reform, yet is excoriated as an illiberal democrat. One comes away bewildered by Zakaria's use of the terms "liberal" and "illiberal." One has the nagging feeling that if Putin had just not committed the sin of actually being elected, he would be in Zakaria's pantheon of modernizing strongmen rulers.

THE FUTURE of Freedom falls short not just in diagnosis but also prescription. In a chapter on Islam in the modern world, Zakaria skillfully analyzes the grievous political plight of the Arab states and debunks some of the sloppy ideas about Islam that have bubbled up in the post-September 11 context. As he emphasizes, there is no generalized problem of democracy in Islamic societies, the problem is the failure of democracy in the Arab world. And though that failure has many roots, much of the blame can be laid at the feet of Arab leaders of the past forty or fifty years. But his prescription for solving the vexing dilemma that has seized much of Washington these days—how to democratize the Arab world?—is much less satisfying. Predictably, he calls for a strong dose of the East Asian elixir: a long period of economic liberalization to be followed only much later with political reform and democratization. Egypt, Zakaria thinks, is where we should start by pressing hard for economic reform.

That sounds good, but it overlooks the inconvenient fact that it is precisely the approach the United States has actually been taking for the last twenty years, to almost no effect. Over and over, the U.S. government has pushed and prodded President Hosni Mubarak to get serious about the economic reform program he initiated in the early 1980s. Halting progress has been made, but major structural reforms simply have not been carried out, and there is little sign they will come anytime soon. Why?

Content with his ringing formula of economics first, democracy later, Zakaria overlooks the fact that it is Egypt's stagnant, semi-authoritarian political system that has undermined efforts on economic reform. The static, patronage-ridden Egyptian state is choked with vested, anti-reformist economic interests that thrive in the protected political space around Mubarak. Lacking popular legitimacy that could come from genuine democratic processes, Mubarak badly needs the economic levers of reward and punishment that Egypt's statist economic structures give him to co-opt opponents and reward supporters. In an evasion that does deep damage to his central thesis, Zakaria ignores the fundamental conundrum that crops up in so many troubled countries—though economic failures do indeed often undermine efforts at democratization, the lack of democratic reforms often blocks efforts to make progress on economic reforms. The appealing formula of economics first, democracy later melts in the real-world cauldron that demands market reform and democratization now, together, difficult as that may be.

Zakaria's other brief forays into specific policy advice also suffer from a lack of serious examination of what policies the United States actually follows. For example, he bewails the fact that in U.S. dealings with developing countries, "elections

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trump everything", that Washington will forgive a foreign leader any number of sins as long as he or she is elected. That sounds like a telling critique, but it is a myth. It would certainly be news to Slobodan Milosevic, Aleksandr Lukashenko, Vladimir Meciar, Robert Mugabe, Hugo Chavez, Daniel arap Moi and many other noxious leaders of recent years that their having been elected gave them a free pass from the U.S. government. In the past ten years the United States has often been quite tough on these and other elected leaders it does not like, and has sometimes intervened actively in election processes to try to hang them with their own ropes.

Zakaria urges the United States not to foster political change simply through elections but instead to support constitutionalism, the development of competing centers of power, such as strong legislatures and judiciaries, and civil society. But that is exactly what most U.S. democracy-promotion policies and programs already try to do. The percentage of election-related work in the overall pool of U.S. democracy aid has dropped significantly since 1990 to become only a small portion of the overall effort. As with his suggestions for the Middle East, Zakaria recommends mainly what the United States is already doing. His apparent lack of interest in really delving into the question of what U.S. policy actually is leads him to miss a more interesting issue: given that U.S. and European democracy aid already largely conforms to what he recommends, does the parlous state of democracy in so many countries mean that this approach is incorrect, or that democracy aid providers are simply being asked to tackle problems of a magnitude out of proportion to the resources given to them?

IN THE YEARS since the publication of "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy", the course of global political events has made it much clearer that many of the attempted democratic transitions in what Huntington has called democracy's "Third Wave" are not faring well. Zakaria's article usefully attracted attention to the fact that much was not well in the world of new democracies at a time when few wanted to hear that news. He was also right to highlight the deep connections between economic development and democratic performance, providing a helpful corrective to some wishful thinking by democracy enthusiasts that socio-economic realities could somehow be factored out of the democratization agenda.

But with the passage of time between article and book, not only has the seriousness of the Third Wave's travails become more apparent, but so has the heterogeneity of the problems that struggling democracies are encountering. Zakaria's diagnosis of illiberal democracy remains interesting and relevant. Some countries do indeed face this syndrome. But it is inadequate as a broadly-applicable tool for understanding the dilemmas, dangers and disappointments afflicting democracies all around the world. The recent near-collapse of Nepal's transition from monarchical rule, Moldova's slide back into proto-communist rule, Guatemala's turgid effort to break free from its military-dominated past, Cote D'Ivoire's tragic lapse into civil war, Albania's persistent political fecklessness and dozens of other cases of badly troubled democracy have little to do with the phenomenon of illiberal democracy. They reflect a more complex cornucopia of problems and paradoxes, including the challenge of developing meaningful transfers of power in an age of a single dominant economic model, the question of whether the rapid expansion of civil society is overtaking traditional forms of political interest representation, and the devastating reality of the nearly universal collapse in the public credibility of political parties.

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In the end, Zakaria's continued insistence in *The Future of Freedom* that the problem is simply too much democracy too soon has the feel of a meritorious, medium-sized idea being stretched much too thin. But this is the frequent flaw of trenchant articles whose success as provocations compel their return as books. □

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Europe Challenged

Robert Tucker

Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 368 pp., $27.95.

BY NOW IT is apparent that a significant change has occurred in the view taken of American power. Whereas before September 11, 2001, there was an abundance of articles and books on the brief life of American hegemony, in the aftermath of that event they have radically declined in number. What the Gulf War failed to do, the war in Afghanistan succeeded in doing. It has made converts (however reluctant) of most of those who before were skeptics, not so much of the fact of American hegemony today but of its durability. The "unipolar moment", to use Charles Krauthammer's terminology, has become the "unipolar era."[1] Years have been replaced by decades.

Not all who once doubted have been so persuaded, however. Charles A. Kupchan is one of a diminishing band. *The End of the American Era* presents his case for believing that the days of American dominance are limited.

Kupchan does not question that the fundamental geopolitical fact today is American preponderance. That we live in a unipolar world is indeed his starting point. "The fundamental, inescapable geopolitical feature of the moment", he writes, "is American predominance." The stability of today's global landscape, the absence of any major geopolitical faultlines, follows directly from its unipolar structure. Terrorism will remain a threat, but the far more dangerous threat of great power competition is for now in abeyance. This is the good news. But the bad news is that U.S. unipolarity will be brief:

> Two unstoppable trends mean that America's unipolar moment is unlikely to last the decade. The first is the diffusion of power. No dominant country has ever been able to sustain power indefinitely. Over time, other

[1]Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited", *The National Interest* (Winter 2002/03).

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states catch up. The diffusion of economic strength will today occur more quickly than in most periods. The near term challenger to America is not a single country trying to play catch-up—which takes time—but a European Union that is in the process of aggregating the impressive resources that its member nations already possess.

Although not a federal state today—perhaps ever—Europe nevertheless has a collective weight that rivals the United States in trade and finance. In defense, Europe is forging a common policy and acquiring the means to act on its own. A new center of global power is thus in the making and, Kupchan asserts, "America's power will shrink accordingly." In a couple of decades, Kupchan believes that Europe will be followed by East Asia. "By 2025, America and Europe may both be spending much more time worrying about the rise of Asia than about each other."

The changing character of American internationalism is the second trend that will soon bring the unipolar moment to an end. Kupchan writes:

> Unipolarity rests on the existence of a polity that not only enjoys preponderance, but also is prepared to expend its dominant resources to keep everyone in line and to underwrite international order. If the United States were to tire of being the global protector of last resort, unipolarity would still come undone even if American resources were to remain supreme.

Kupchan finds signs that with the end of the Cold War, America no longer feels compelled—particularly given its favorable geographic location—to play the role of global guardian. And while he sees the attacks of September 11 as putting a temporary hold on America's retreat from global hegemony, he believes that "the political center of gravity has been quietly but steadily moving toward a more limited internationalism."

How far may this waning internationalism be expected to go? For a world still so dependent for its stability on American power and purpose, it is a vital question. Kupchan does not attempt to answer it. Instead, he merely notes the huge difference between reining in our commitments, which he thinks is in any event inevitable and can be done with minimal risk, and a withdrawal from global affairs altogether, which would have dire consequences given the fact that global stability remains so dependent on American power.

Finally, there is the problem of America's unilateralism, which Kupchan finds likely to increasingly define the nation's *modus operandi*, whatever the level of engagement it has in managing international order in the years ahead. "As in the past, America's unilateralist bent stems from fear that international institutions will encroach on the nation's sovereignty and room for maneuver." Unilateralism was once inseparable from isolationism, but today it is the corollary of a policy intent on shaping an international order responsive to American hegemony. The re-emergence of unilateralism, Kupchan argues, may be traced to the absence of Cold War restraints, electoral politics (the appeal of unilateralism to conservative Republicans), and American frustration with its inability to get its way with putative allies and others as often as in the past. The conjoined war on terrorism and rogue states only promises to magnify the impulse to a greater unilateralism. To all the issues that divided the United States from allies and former adversaries prior to September 11, issues only momentarily masked over in the immediate response to that attack, must now be added the problems arising from the conduct of this war.

Kupchan thinks the best we may hope for is that Washington will begin to lay the groundwork for a new and more dis-

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criminating brand of American internationalism that will enjoy the public's support. For the unipolar moment is passing.

> Combine the rise in Europe and Asia with a declining and prickly internationalism in the United States and it becomes clear that America's unipolar moment is not long for this world. America's dominance and its political appetite for projecting its power globally have peaked, and both will be dissipating over the course of the coming decade.

A return to a more familiar world is in the making, and the central challenge for American strategy will be coping with the dangers arising from the new geographical faultlines which, in the final analysis, look a lot like the old geographical faultlines we have long read about in history books.

Kupchan supports his themes by relying on history as well as the logic of contemporary affairs. In a series of essays, Kupchan examines those historical periods that in his judgment best illuminate the dilemmas of present policy. The method of historical analogy is deemed unavoidable. "Unless anchored in the past", he explains in his preface, "analysis of the present is likely to be of only fleeting relevance and risks overlooking the potent sources of change that run beneath the surface and become apparent only in historical relief." But even if skillfully carried out, the question persists—particularly in the study of American history—of the degree to which the past continues to rule over the present.

KUPCHAN HAS much to say in criticizing American foreign policy that is on point. But his principal message concerns the passing of the American era, and it is on this ground that the work must be largely judged. In doing so, I use the same realistic yardstick that Kupchan uses. "According to the book's map of the world", he writes, "the defining element of the global system is the distribution of power, not democracy, culture, globalization, or anything else." Power, not potential but actual power, is the key.

To the extent that the foreseen American decline is attributed to external causes, there is not much to say that has not already been said—both in general and in some earlier reviews of *The End of the American Era*. It may well be true, as Kupchan tells us, that the integration of Europe is "one of the most significant geopolitical events of the twentieth century", and that it represents "a turning point every bit as momentous as the founding of the United States, perhaps more so." Even so, there is the matter of time. Kupchan assumes that the European Union's geopolitical significance will be substantially realized in the course of the current decade. Yet nowhere does he give persuasive reasons in support of this contention.

At present, the states that make up the EU possess resources sufficient to rival the United States. In what period of time they might succeed in converting that potential power into usable power is anyone's guess. One need not be a Euroskeptic to see the process taking at least several decades. If demographic trends unfold as they are now projected, that day may never come. In any event, the EU's challenge is above all dependent upon forging a centralized decision-making body having the authority to act on behalf of Europe in matters of foreign policy, and this would, of course, mean the surrender by the separate states of control over foreign policy. The European response to Iraq has shown that the EU is still a long way from achieving so revolutionary a change, and, with its expansion to include ten new member states, that day is even more distant. In its absence, American domination of the continent may be expected to continue into an indefinite future, particularly if the Bush Administration's *National*

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Security Strategy prevails. The NSS is designed to widen still further the immense gap in military spending and capability that exists today between the United States and any other nation or feasible combination of nations.

If the end of the American era is to come in the foreseeable future, it will therefore have to result largely from internal causes. Kupchan makes the point repeatedly that our global role has depended upon having a major adversary, and that in the absence of one the United States will no longer feel compelled to play the role of global guardian. Nor does he think that terrorism can serve as the functional equivalent of a great power foe. At best, Kupchan argues, terrorism introduces an unpredictable element into policy, "at times provoking America to lash out, at other times inducing it to retreat behind protective barriers." "[I]n the long run terrorism . . . promises to reinforce the unilateral and isolationist trends that were already picking up steam before September 11." It is from the study of American history that Kupchan sees the need of a major adversary to sustain our global role. Since the end of the Cold War, he writes, America's past has been catching up with its present. There is something to be said for this view.

We did need a major adversary to draw us into the role we now play, and prior to September 11, 2001 a growing aversion to bearing the costs of hegemony in the absence of a major adversary was indeed apparent. Still, that aversion did not lead the nation to abandon its pretensions to an order-giving role. Having once gained the commanding position we came to occupy, we were reluctant to give it up. Kupchan himself calls attention to the new commitments taken on by the United States during the 1990s, though he thinks this was an aberration rather than a reliable indication of the future. He attributes U.S. action to a hangover from the Cold War, an unprecedented economic boom and the "illusion" that war can be waged primarily from the air with minimum loss of American lives. These considerations surely contributed to the persistence of American hegemony in the 1990s. In the end, however, they must be seen as subordinate to the simple rule that global powers do not relinquish their position voluntarily. The United States is proving to be no exception to this rule.

Although the long-term effects terrorism will have on American policy necessarily remain speculative, it seems odd to insist that they must reinforce both unilateralism *and* isolationism. The case for believing that they must reinforce unilateralism is reasonably clear and follows from the administration's conception of the threat and particularly the strategy for combating it. As spelled out in the administration's *National Security Strategy*, the threat terrorists and rogue states pose arises from the marriage of radicalism and technology. The result is a security environment more complex and dangerous than that of an earlier era. In the Cold War, the United States faced a risk-averse adversary; traditional concepts of deterrence worked. Against terrorists and rogue states, however, the former constraints are no longer effective. For them, weapons of mass destruction have been transformed from weapons of last resort to weapons of choice. It is in these changed circumstances that a strategy of pre-emption is both necessary and justified. The concept of imminent threat, says the administration, must be adapted to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.[2]

A strategy that encompasses the notion of pre-emptive war is almost bound to be unilateral. At the same time,

[2]See Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security", *The National Interest* (Spring 2003).

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it may be anything but isolationist. That Kupchan does not give this prospect its due is the result of his reading of the American position today. He has constructed his case around the proposition of an American power that is in decline. If it were indeed true that a multipolar world is already on the cusp, the prospects he holds out—whether of an increasing isolationism or of a more discriminating brand of internationalism—might follow. But if instead American hegemony continues to reign without serious challenge, a third prospect must be given serious consideration: that of empire in everything but name.

ALTHOUGH nothing lasts forever, the only safe bet is that the international system will remain unipolar for a long time. It may well be that American power will go without serious challenge until the middle of this century. In these circumstances, what constraints should the holders of such power observe? The answer given by the Bush Administration seems simple enough. This government alone, it declares, will determine when and for what purposes force should be employed, and it will do so according to its own distinctive standards of judgment. That the decision is unilateral does not necessarily mean that action will also be unilateral. Other states may join in, whatever their reasons for becoming part of the "coalitions of the willing." It may be that a given action will bear the imprimatur of the UN Security Council, or not. Should it do so, the American government would be particularly gratified. Nevertheless, the source and legitimacy of the action will remain independent of the United Nations.

This has been the position of the Bush Administration in the case of Iraq. Should it become the position of future administrations as well, the United States will set itself against world opinion and its own best traditions. What the world apparently fears most is neither terrorists nor tyrants but the untrammeled power of the United States. If this nation is to lead, it will first have to reassure the world about the uses and purposes of its power. How this can be done is the great question, and here, one can do no better than to follow Kupchan. Wrong though he is in his estimate of the end of unipolarity, he is right in his prescription of the ideas that should inform American foreign policy today—the exercise of strategic restraint and the reaching of decisions through a consensus of the great powers. Reassurance would come through the observance of processes that depend upon some measure of compromise and consent rather than simply the fiat of the world's greatest power.

On the other hand, the failure to provide reassurance might lead to an outcome not too different from Kupchan's isolationism. What gives the prospect of isolationism some plausibility is the possibility of a pendulum effect should the Bush Administration overreach in the Middle East. Too great a swing in terms of an over-commitment that goes badly could prompt an exaggerated swing in the opposite direction.

Then, too, isolationism could be the result of an America that is increasingly disliked by the world, with all that this implies in terms of political opposition, criticism, obstructionism and general disaffection. For a nation as desirous as ever to be liked, how long would the United States be willing to go on playing an unpopular role, one that would perhaps have to depend more and more on naked power? Prospects not to be dismissed, they should give pause to an administration hell-bent on having its way. □

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Letters

Continental Divides:

There is a strange divergence between the body of Josef Joffe's argument in "Continental Divides" (Spring 2003) and its conclusion. Most of the piece describes the fall of the Atlantic Alliance before the necessities of realpolitik. With unmistakable professional, if not political, satisfaction he explains how "patiently and skillfully" the French carried out their "supple balancing strategy" to "entangle" the United States at the United Nations. It "should not come as a surprise", he coolly says. After all, "[t]hese are the ways of world politics."

While one could argue that, for all the misery M. de Villepin and Herr Fischer were able to cause us, in the end the United States came out the winner because the process made it possible for Prime Minister Blair to defeat his internal opposition and join us in the war; so Joffe's general point seems sound. Relieved of the fear of the Soviet Union, "Old Europe" is feeling its oats and would like to have its own back—and, as Joffe also rightly observes, on the cheap. So far, so Machiavellian, and so fine.

But why then does Joffe leave us with the pious advice not to forsake the "'co' in 'coalition'—as in 'consensus' and 'cooperation?'" Was not it precisely that advice that represented the bait that allowed those patient and skillful French to outwit us at the United Nations? They did so by implying, falsely, that our cooperation would be met with theirs. Thus, Secretary of State Powell is reported to have told M. de Villepin that he ought not vote for Resolution 1441 if he were not prepared to vote for a second resolution, and Villepin is reported to have promised he would. (The subtle, skillful part came when he went back on his word.)

On that basis, it would be reasonable to announce that the Alliance is done for, that all bets are off, and everyone will henceforth make the necessary deals in a spirit of cheerful rivalry and (potentially duplicitous) self-interest. Consensus and coalition would then still exist but would be *ad hoc*, a matter of immediate common interest. Thus, Joffe would agree with Secretary Rumsfeld that the mission would define the coalition. But to speak of coalition, consensus and cooperation as goods in themselves, for whose sake the United States is peculiarly required to sacrifice its immediate interests, can only make sense in a world in which there is still a presumption of reciprocity, of a common interest in commonality; i.e., the very world that was so professionally and skillfully scuttled by those subtle Old Europeans at the United Nations.

Of course, one could argue that we were no more sincere than the French. We were going to invade Iraq no matter what; they were going both to stay out and seek to frustrate us no matter what. But by going to the UN we were inevitably testing whether the presumption of reciprocity—the bedrock of the Western, as of any, alliance—was still there. Had the French wanted to preserve it, they would have done better to state, like the Germans, early on and straightforwardly that there was no use talking to them about Iraq. Now the inevitable result of their brilliant diplomacy is that they have used up the very moral capital that enabled them to "entangle" us.

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Imagine a future situation in which the United States has to choose either to construct an *ad hoc* coalition that will do what Washington wants (either because its members agree with us or receive concessions from us), or to seek consensus for its own sake with those who really don't want to go along. Why should it expect the prospect of consensus to be any less of a *fata morgana* than it was this time? Why shouldn't seeking it just become another opportunity for skillful entanglement by those whose real purpose is to weaken American (or, as Villepin put it recently—in the same context where he complained about Zionist influence on President Bush) "Anglo-Saxon" power? Thus, Joffe's appeals to the United States to remember the "co" in "cooperation" have been made barren and even parodic by the very cleverness he is so taken by.

Of course, Joffe is kind enough to observe that the indicated strategy of *ad hoc* alliances, what he calls "balancing *à la* Britain", is too tricky for the likes of us to handle (it has "not been America's greatest forte"). But is that a reason to recommend to us that we behave like dupes in principle? Then again, maybe Americans could even learn the recondite arts of horse-trading. Some of our domestic politics indicates we have hidden aptitudes for it.

I can understand Joffe sharing the European nervousness about Gulliver on a toot in their Lilliput and thus seeking to persuade him, for his own putative good, to tread gently. But he who opts for realpolitik must live with the consequences. Maybe the current French gamble will succeed and the United States will come crawling back to Europe like Tigger in Rabbit's fantasy: meek, humble and unbounced. But if it fails, it will be a little late to try humbugging us once more. Perhaps Joffe should rethink his enthusiasm for the professional skill of the new Talleyrands. Maybe they have just managed to saw off the branch from which they have been kibitzing these many years.

FRED BAUMANN
Professor of Political Science
Kenyon College

Josef Joffe ("Continental Divides", Spring 2003) misses the central point of what he calls the Atlantic Alliance. The reality is that the United States is, and has been since World War II, not just frangibly allied to western Europe, but, in terms of real political power, as much an integral part of it as any of the Continental nations. This is the natural end of a cultural, political and economic process that dates back to the 19th century—beginning with the Monroe Doctrine, growing with the Spanish-American war and then World War I, and finally (and probably irreversibly) sealed with the decisive American participation in World War II.

Despite the much beloved concept of a *novus ordo seclorum* and the insistence of Crèvecoeur that the American was "a new kind of man", Americans have always been essentially west European in culture. The "new man" of the 18th and 19th century was not the American frontiersman, who was a very old type of man: the outrider of a civilization expanding into a new continent to displace the "indigenous" peoples, who were themselves immigrants of an earlier age. The unprecedented "new men" of that time were the white and blue-collar workers of the industrial revolution, which arose not in the United States but on the still-fertile dungheap of "Old Europe." As for today, both Americans and Europeans have notably failed to accept that the United States can reach across the Atlantic Ocean quicker than the British could cross the English Channel in the 18th century and early 19th century.

This logistical fact, and the events of the 21st century, have confirmed the place of America in the community of European nations. In fact, America is, paradoxically, the only really European country in the world, having taken all the national strands of Continental civilization and combined them into one political entity in a way that the bureaucratic experiment of the European Community has miserably

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failed to do with a perennially ill-sorted set of nations.

Recent history has shown that America is not just a member, but the political and military center of gravity in the "Western" (ie. European) community of nations. Nothing of any major international military or political significance can happen in or with "Old Europe" without the active support, and usually the direct participation, of the United States. Even early stages of the failed attempt to build the European Community into a transatlantic "countervailing" force depended upon (in my opinion rather misguided) American encouragement and support.

The recent, rather pathetic attempt by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg to sidestep NATO with some sort of "European" force will not change any of this. The French have already tried to use the UN to "compete" with the United States and have ended by making themselves look ridiculous. As difficult as it may be for Americans (and, indeed, for Europeans) to accept the fact that America is an integral part of Europe, it is, from where I sit, impossible for them to escape it—and the responsibilities of *puissance oblige* that go with it.

HERB GREER
Salisbury, England

Joffe replies:

Fata sua habent libelli, ye olde Romans used to say, and thus with my "Continental Divides." I was surprised that Professor Baumann chose to misunderstand the tone and message of my contribution. No, I did not express "unmistakable professional, if not political, satisfaction" when explaining "how 'patiently and skillfully' the French carried out their 'supple balancing strategy' to 'entangle' the United States at the United Nations." I would think that "explaining" is not "celebrating", and that an academic hailing from such a distinguished institution as Kenyon would grasp the dilemma faced by No. 1 as it confronts the balancing strategies executed by the lesser powers.

In short, the United States could always respond by "balancing back", as it did when it mobilized the "Wall Street Eight" and the "Vilnius Ten" against the Euro-hegemonic designs of France and Germany. Not very elegant, but effective, as it turned out. But for Gulliver Unbound to escape the slings and arrows of the Lilliputians, a wiser course seems more productive in the long run. Any leader, whether a kid in the classroom or a CEO in the boardroom, instinctively knows the essence of enduring pre-eminence. Spider-Man's Uncle Ben put it very nicely: "With great power comes great responsibility." In translation the maxim reads: "Pursue your interests by carrying along those of others." Or: "The harder your power, the more you must soften it by trust." To counsel thus is not to chime in with the Euro-weenies, i.e. "a European veto *über alles*." Of course, the United States will sometimes have to act alone. But it is equally true that stable coalitions not only improve the economy and legitimacy of diplomacy but also undercut the impulse for "ganging up."

Complicated? Yes. But both professors and politicos know that so is life.

"The Rudest Man I Ever Met":

A footnote to Hume Horan's review (Spring 2003) of John Boykin's book about Philip Habib, *Cursed is the Peacemaker*. I was a correspondent for the *New York Times* in Japan and Korea when Phil was the American ambassador in Seoul. He often invited to his office a correspondent who was finishing up a week's work, as he wanted to know who we had seen and what we had learned. The correspondent had to be careful to protect sources even though those meetings were off the record, with no one else in the room. One time, Phil was expanding on the politics of President Park Chung Hee's government when I interrupted to say: "Come on, Phil, you're just plugging the party line. You sound like an Armenian rug merchant." Phil exploded: "Halloran, you sonuvabitch, don't you

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call me an Armenian rug merchant. I'm a Lebanese rug merchant."

Please tell me how one dislikes a man of such refreshing candor, no matter how gruff.

RICHARD HALLORAN
Honolulu

Imperial Temptations:

In Jack Snyder's article "Imperial Temptations" (Spring 2003), many points invite comment, but I shall confine myself to three:

First, the author contends that Alfred von Schlieffen was defying "elementary military common sense" in arguing that "if one is too weak to attack" an enemy's entire army, "one should attack a section." In 1757, however, when Prussia's Frederick the Great faced the superior strength of a hostile coalition, he attacked and defeated one part of the coalition's forces at Rossbach and, a month later, a second part at Leuthen. In 1944, moreover, the forces that the Allies could put ashore in northern France during the early days of the invasion were too weak to attack the whole German army in that region. They achieved success by fighting only one part of the enemy's forces, those in Normandy, while Allied deception tied down other German divisions in the Pas de Calais. Schlieffen's plan for a quick victory over France was unrealistic, but that is no argument against the principle behind it—the advantage to be gained from concentrating your own strength to overcome first one part and then another of the forces opposing you.

Second, in criticizing the idea of early preventive war against Hitler, Snyder assumes that it would have begun in 1938, when Germany was militarily much stronger than in 1935. It was in 1935, however, that Hitler first provided grounds for war by overtly violating the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. At that time, had she been willing to act unilaterally, France could certainly have defeated Germany, occupied Berlin and forced a change of regime. Instead, the French preferred moderation, restraint and containment—the policy of the Maginot Line. Five years later the Germans were in Paris.

Third, in worrying about an American "general strategy of preventive war", Snyder fails to note the significance of the U.S. quest for anti-missile defense. The Bush Administration would presumably see no need for such defense if it regarded preventive war as a feasible means of dealing with all emerging nuclear threats. Fear of preventive war may deter some unruly regimes from seeking missile capability; others may be deterred more effectively by the fear that whatever capability they succeed in acquiring, no doubt at great cost, will be rendered useless by American defensive technology.

KENNETH H.W. HILBORN
Professor Emeritus of History
University of Western Ontario

EuroIslam:

Olivier Roy's "EuroIslam: The Jihad Within" (Spring 2003), although thought-provoking and challenging, contains a few errors and misconceptions that need to be questioned.

His claim that a universalistic Islam, different in structure and implication, is emerging in Europe is simply not true. What he calls a universalistic "EuroIslam" is none other than the one conceived by 20th-century Islamic scholars such as Abu Ala Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. Maududi denounced all nationalism and envisioned Islam as a de-territorialized religious force. Using Marxist terminology, he advocated a struggle by an Islamic vanguard against both the West and traditional Islam, attaching the adjectives "Islamic" to such distinctively Western terms as "revolution", "state" and "ideology." Qutb's Islamism was informed by his knowledge of both Marxist and fascist critiques of modern capitalism and representative democracy. Most of Roy's "EuroIslamists" are heirs to this modern, imported, relatively "secular" and intellectually-stimulating version of Islam.

Roy's attempt to categorize the Salman Rushdie affair as a watershed for reversing

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the flow of Islamism from the Muslim world to Europe is inconsistent with facts. *The Satanic Verses* was published in September 1988. Its publication invoked widespread riots in India. Consequently, the book was banned there on October 5, 1988. It took Bradford Muslims in England four months and a lot of persuasion from Arab embassies in London to stage the public spectacle of book-burning, which took place on January 14, 1989. Far from making the British Muslims more radical and willing recruits to Roy's universalistic "EuroIslam", the Salman Rushdie affair, coupled with the negative media publicity that it engendered, made them more pliant and retrospective. Witness how the publication of Anwar Sheikh's *Islam: The Arab National Movement* (1995)—in which the author attempted to deconstruct the theological architecture of Islam so that its twin towers, the Quran and the Prophet, collapse simultaneously—failed to raise even an eyebrow among European Muslims.

RANDHIR SINGH BAINS
Essex, UK

Roy replies:

Some of Mr. Bains' remarks may be accurate, but they are not relevant to the points I made. It is, of course, not supra-nationalism which is new in EuroIslam, but the attitude toward the state and (Muslim) minority status. The neo-salafism that is spreading now among many young Muslims has nothing to do with Hassan Al-Banna and Maududi's Islamism. Although both of them advocated a supra-national Islam, the organizations they built were aimed at taking an active and open part in national politics and at building an Islamic state in a given nation-state. Maududi, for example, after opposing the creation of Pakistan, claimed that Pakistan should be defined as an Islamic state, with an Islamic constitution and institutions. Most of the contemporary Islamist parties have a national agenda (from the Turkish AK party to the Algerian FIS). The neo-salafists, by contrast, refuse any involvement in domestic national politics and are not interested in building an Islamic state in a particular country. Neo-salafist movements are not even shaped as political parties, but as networks of preachers and activists (Al-Qaeda is not a political party).

There were certainly riots in India after the publication of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*. I never wrote that British Muslims initiated the protest. (By the way, I do not buy the idea that they were persuaded by Arab embassies.) What is relevant for me is that the demonstrators in Bradford asked the *British* government to ban the book, invoking a *British* law on blasphemy: it is thus for me a part of a process of integration—not of radicalization—based on an endeavor to define common conservative religious values with the Christian churches. I subsequently wrote that most European Muslims have found their own way to be both good citizens of a European country and good Muslims. As usual, the problems come from a small but violent minority.

Taba Mythchief:

David Makovsky wants to show that Yasir Arafat is the reason there is no peace agreement with Israel, and that Arafat's behavior supervising the Taba negotiation is further evidence to prove it. Though there is certainly a case that Arafat has walked past a number of peace opportunities, Taba does not help that case much. Makovsky thinks he has found a myth, that the parties reached an agreement at Taba, and, perhaps to keep Arafat from getting any credit for such an accomplishment, he says that no such agreement was reached. On this he is about 85 percent wrong.

What was accomplished at Taba? I have interviewed most of the participants who were there, and by putting together their various accounts along with the documents and maps that were exchanged, it is possible to summarize as follows. First the negotiators had most of an agreement on the refugee question. There

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was still a small gap on the precise language describing responsibility for the origin of the refugee question, and there was still a significant, though by no means impossible, gap on the question of how many Palestinian refugees would be allowed to return to Israel. Second, the negotiators had agreed on the division of Jerusalem and were working on the nature of a border running through the city. Third, the negotiators were a few kilometers apart on the size of the "blocs" that would surround the remaining Israeli settlements. They had agreed on a swap of Israeli land in return for the settlement land and had come close to the precise ratio of that swap, but they had not agreed on the location of the Israeli land to be swapped. They made no progress at all on the issue of the holy places, being stuck on the issue of sovereignty.

Taba began on a Sunday night. Enough progress was made in 24 hours that Gilad Sher, Barak's chief of staff, called his boss to say that he could see agreement possible on the issues of security and borders. On Tuesday night, the Palestinians called for additional staff because they saw the possibility of an agreement on the refugee question. But on that same day two Israelis were murdered in Tul Karm, and Barak, over the protest of his negotiating team and the anger of the Palestinian negotiating team, decided to pull out most of the leaders of his team. He let them return at noon on Thursday, at which point progress continued, and on Saturday Barak terminated the process. Arafat did not object to this termination then, and never has since. (That Sunday, in a speech in Switzerland, he lambasted Israel and never mentioned Taba.)

The parties were close when Taba ended and said so in their press conference. Interviews with the negotiators show that if they had four more days to negotiate (and those four days were available, though the Israeli election was fast approaching), they could have achieved a framework agreement on all issues except the holy places. The momentum was there, and the solutions each side was willing to entertain matched those of the other side. The only reason of substance to believe that a framework agreement would not have been achieved is the complete lack of progress on the holy places. The negotiators were stymied. Could the leaders have made a breakthrough, or could they have agreed to postpone the question? One cannot know, though the possibilities for both were there. What one can know quite clearly by looking at the record is that it was the leaders on both sides, neither of whom were present at Taba, who made the decision to end the process—and in this it was Barak who took the lead.

One can perform endless mind-reading tricks to produce a story "explaining" why Barak and Arafat made the decisions they did, and perhaps both had good political reasons to avoid an agreement. But it is misleading to the point of being wrong to deny the accomplishment of the negotiators. What they did was no myth.

DAVID MATZ
University of Massachusetts
Boston, MA

Makovsky replies:

David Matz, a professional mediator, apparently applied a "let's-make-a-deal" approach to his reconstruction of the Taba talks. The facts, however, tell a different story. There is no basis for believing the parties were on the verge of peace, nor is there a shred of evidence to suggest that Chairman Yasir Arafat, the unquestioned sole decision-maker on the Palestinian side, was ready to sign such an agreement. Regarding the specifics of Taba, there was some progress, but differences in key places usually outweighed them, and the gaps widened between the parties.

First, on security related issues, Shlomo Yanai, Israel's chief negotiator at Taba and Camp David, said the Palestinians "retreated from understandings with us and President Clinton at the summit."

Second, on refugees, the most important question was always whether Arafat would agree to a quota on the num-

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ber of Palestinian refugees allowed to enter Israel apart from unrestricted immigration to Palestine. No such quota was reached. Western diplomats aware of these talks say Arafat refused any quota whatsoever.

Third, on Jerusalem, the Palestinians retreated from the idea they initially supported at Camp David of a "special regime" for a Holy Basin around the Old City where no side would enjoy full sovereignty. Creative formulas on Jerusalem's holy places that were rumored in advance of Taba were not reached as the Palestinians refused to budge on exclusive sovereignty. The Palestinians agreed that Israel could have sovereignty over only a sixth of the Western Wall, but even this could not be admitted publicly.

Fourth, on the issue of territory, as I note in my article, the Palestinian position hardened at Taba. They hollowed out the idea of settlement blocs that was accepted at Camp David. Leading Israeli dove Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was a top negotiator at Taba, told *Ha'aretz* that the Palestinians "presented a counter-map that totally eroded the three already shrunken [settlement] blocs and effectively voided the whole bloc concept of content." Israel would have to uproot 100,000 people and the Palestinians refused to redraw the map to allow a single interspersed Palestinian village to be inside Israel. This is hardly a compromise.

My refutations are buttressed by the assessments of Arab and Palestinian leaders, and by Arafat's own words, which refute Matz's revisionism. In a speech on May 20, 2001, Arafat asked rhetorically whether the Palestinians missed an opportunity by not reaching a deal at Taba. While admitting some progress, he derisively referred to compromises being floated, saying "our people will not accept them after a century of struggle."

In an interview with *The New Yorker* published on March 24, 2003, Saudi ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar bin Sultan lamented that a deal was not reached. Bandar, who spent time with Arafat during the final days of the Clinton Administration, and who dealt with Arafat for years during the peace process, said Barak's position was "so avant-garde that it was equal to Prime Minister [Yitzhak] Rabin." He added: "It broke my heart that Arafat did not take that offer." Asked why he spoke out, Bandar replied, "I was there. I was a witness. I cannot lie."

Now, finally, in a sharp break that would have been unthinkable in the past, leading Palestinians are starting to take Arafat to task for his failure. Nabil Amr, a minister in Arafat's cabinet who subsequently resigned in protest, wrote an open letter to Arafat in the London-based Arabic daily *Al-Hayat* (September 2, 2002): "Didn't we dance to the failure of Camp David? Didn't we deface pictures of President Bill Clinton who courageously put on the table the proposal for a Palestinian state with minor modifications? Aren't we doing just that, dancing in the face of a grand failure? Yes. But were we honest in what we did? No." Muhammad Dahlan quit as Arafat's top Gaza security official, telling the *New York Times* that he left "because I didn't feel the Palestinian Authority had a political vision."

As I stated in the article, I do think peace is possible and certainly necessary between Israelis and Palestinians. It is vital that both sides reach an honorable agreement that ends this ongoing tragedy. Yet we do nobody any favors by mythologizing the near-miss that wasn't at Taba.

An Inky Wretch:

Dubious congratulations to Professor Rahe and *The National Interest's* editors in producing the *non-sequitur* article of the year. A long, detailed and mildly amusing disquisition about a Cromwellian publicist is linked to a violent attack on *New York Times* editor Howell Raines, who is accused of heavily slanted journalism. I am still trying to find the connection. If the author meant to enlist his readers in "an assault on the gross misreporting of the *New York Times*", his principal sources for that charge are, to put it mildly, suspect. To

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regard Krauthammer or, especially, that reliable Republican running dog, George Will, as objective critics amounts to wild hyperbole. As for the editorial page editors of *The Wall Street Journal*, one assumes from their product that they genuflect before votive images of George W. Bush at the start of each working day. Not a single instance of editorial sloppiness, gross misreporting or telling silences in the *New York Times* is cited. Our only evidence is Professor Rahe's invective.

Don't you have editors who are supposed to clear up such laughable misconceptions in your authors' work? In any case, running up an article like this will not gain much respect for your editorial competence.

FRANK B. GIBNEY
President, The Pacific Basin Institute at Pomona College

Rahe replies:

Professor Gibney appears to be suffering from a malady called "reading deficit disorder", which to an increasing degree afflicts American academics, striking them down when they allow their partisan propensities to get in the way of their recognizing what lies right before their eyes. Had he read the title of my piece, Professor Gibney would have discovered that its subject was the career of Marchamont Nedham, the world's first great journalist. Had he read the first three paragraphs of my article with even minimal care, he would have understood that it was my contention that the attacks launched against the *New York Times* by Hilton Kramer, Ira Stoll and Andrew Sullivan, and later echoed by Charles Krauthammer, George Will and veteran *Times* staffer Bill Keller were largely beside the point. Using Nedham as an example, I argued that newspapers have always been partisan and that partisanship was in the beginning and still is the lifeblood of the press. If, in the one paragraph I did devote to the criticism leveled at the *Times*, I did not bother to spell out what Howell Raines's minions had done wrong, it was because there was no purpose in repeating at length what had been documented in detail by others and then widely discussed in the press. Readers of *The National Interest* are usually quite well-informed. My initial task was to remind them of what they already knew.

Of course, in the end, I did criticize Raines—but only on the ground that transparent misreporting subverts the trust that enables a great newspaper to be an effective partisan. That my judgment of Raines was correct and that it is shared by many *Times* reporters was most recently confirmed by the case of Jayson Blair. To discover the truth about this matter, Professor Gibney would have to compare the *Times*' self-serving account of the scandal with the reports printed in journals less to his liking. This, I fear, he is loath to do.

The Editor replies:

When Paul Rahe and I were discussing his submission, we did give some thought as to whether to take a deft approach to the connection between Howell Raines' reign at the *New York Times* and Marchmont Nedham's life and times, or whether to use a more ball-peen-hammer-to-the-cranium method. We settled on the deft method, reasoning that only the dense or the ideologically unredeemable would miss the point. Judging by Frank Gibney's *ad hominem* approach to commentary, notable as regards Charles Krauthammer and George Will, I see that we were right. □

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Twilight of the Idols

(or How to Make Foreign Policy with a Hammer)

Christian D. Brose

ROUGHLY A year ago, James Ceaser interpreted George W. Bush's post-September 11 foreign policy rhetoric as a direct attack on Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophic legacy—a legacy that ironically finds its most vocal contemporary cheerleaders on the Left, which Nietzsche despised.[1] In calling evil by its name, wrote Ceaser, the President was engaging in what amounted to a broad assault on the dishwatery moral relativism that (post)modern liberalism clumsily drew from the pages of Nietzsche's writing.

This is competely correct. As a man who identified Jesus Christ as his favorite political philosopher, President Bush is the natural antithesis to a philosopher who gleefully described himself as the Antichrist, as well as to those liberals who today peddle misunderstandings of Nietzsche as moral dogmas. The President and his administration detest nihilistic destructiveness; they do not worship the will to power. They are certainly attackers of Nietzsche misunderstood, but perhaps they share something in common with Nietzsche *properly* understood. Obvious interpretive errors aside, shades of similarity do seem to exist between the Bush Administration's approach to foreign policy and Nietzsche's approach to philosophy.

Christian D. Brose is assistant editor of *The National Interest*.

The Dawn

The greatest events and thoughts—the greatest thoughts, however, are the greatest events—are longest in being comprehended: the generations which are contemporary with them do not experience such events—they live past them.

Friedrich Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil, *1886*

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation. . . . But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. . . . It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat.

The National Security Strategy
September 2002

IN "THE Parable of the Madman" from *The Gay Science* (1882), Nietzsche describes the individual who first grasps the horrific reality of nihilism while everyone else lives in ignorance of it. Holding a lantern burning brightly in the early morning hours, "the Madman" enters town seeking God and confronts a crowd of nonbelievers who do not share his religious passion. He is suddenly overcome with the realization that these modern men,

[1] "Bush vs. Nietzsche", *The Weekly Standard*, April 1, 2002.

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feeling as though they have outgrown such antiquated superstitions, have murdered God in their impious hearts. The Madman offers the townspeople his knowledge of the death of God, but they fail to grasp either the reality or the cataclysmic nature of this event. "I have come too early . . . my time is not yet", the Madman proclaims as he shatters his lantern and retreats.

Taken as the metaphorical point of departure for Nietzsche's philosophy, this allegory precipitates the attempt of the knowing individual to dispel the illusions of the unenlightened, forcing them to accept the terrible implications of God's death. Nietzsche thought the recognition of nihilism, though harsh and discomforting, was more intellectually honest and psychologically healthier than the continued denial of it, and so he chose to force the issue. Only in this way could modern man overcome his spiritual decadence. Desiring to awaken his fellow men to this realization, Nietzsche willingly courted their ire and ridicule. His approach to philosophy—the candid, strong-willed embrace of provocation and, if necessary, destruction—was fundamentally unilateral and sustained by little more than Nietzsche's own courage.

On September 11, 2001, the world felt the first major shockwave of the presumably new and unknown era of international relations that rumbled into existence over a decade ago with the collapse of the bipolar order. That morning's terror attacks were the symptom of a larger geopolitical condition: the "unipolar" world, now stripped of its illusions of order and seen in the reality of its violent resentment and upheaval. Though it had been a long time coming, a U.S. administration finally awoke to the collapse of the old order and began working through the attendant implications.

In order to ground U.S. foreign policy in this new world, the Bush Administration critically examined post-September 11 reality from both a strategic and moral standpoint. America's national interest was recalculated and recast. Longstanding dogmas about law and alliances, established by many as fundamental truths of international politics, were re-evaluated. The utility of deterrence was weighed against the perceived need for pre-emptive strikes and preventive wars. The Westphalian norm of external sovereignty was reexamined in light of America's compulsion to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of other states. The relevance of Cold War alliances and security architectures was no longer assumed; they had to be proven effective in the post-9/11 world. The traditional practice of amoral realpolitik was challenged by a new strategic logic rooted in moral principles: "a balance of power that favors freedom", as September's *National Security Strategy* proclaimed. In a world of murky, deadly threats from non-state actors and their patrons, the Bush Administration claimed the United States had no choice but to address the internal character of foreign regimes, not just their external behavior.

Such a dramatic reconstitution of national security by the world's evident hegemon could not but elicit suspicion and anxiety from other states. What, wondered weaker states, was to be of international law, the United Nations, the International Criminal Court and other mechanisms useful for controlling American power? From the perspective of foreign states, the Bush Administration demonstrated a frightening willingness to question the strategic and moral value of institutions and ways of thinking that much of the world viewed as the pinnacle of historical progress. Hence, what the September 11 attacks (supposedly) revealed about the nature of the unipolar world compelled the Bush Administration

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to initiate an unprecedented revaluation of international political thinking. Foreign states could come along willingly, reluctantly or not at all with the new U.S.-wrought dispensation, but they certainly would not be allowed to "live past" this monumental event. They would be compelled to realize not that God was dead, but that the old order was no more.

Thus Spoke W.

Our institutions are no longer fit for anything. . . . But the fault lies not in them but in us. Having lost all the instincts out of which institutions grow, we are losing the institutions themselves, because we *are no longer fit for* them.

Friedrich Nietzsche
Twilight of the Idols, *1888*

We created a United Nations Security Council so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes. . . . Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?

George W. Bush
September 12, 2002

NIETZSCHE intended his philosophy to be provocative. He thought the illusory promises of Platonic metaphysics and Christian otherworldliness had produced the gradual degeneration of Western civilization. These old ideas were undergoing a crisis of meaning in the modern era as human beings lost faith in their professed rewards. As the idols declined and fell, they revealed the fundamental meaninglessness of life. Nietzsche wanted his readers to cast off hope for moral and metaphysical certainty and accept the reality of nihilism so as to be able to overcome it. He thus approached his philosophy, as he was so fond of saying, with a hammer—smashing the old to make room for the new. This act of destructive ground-clearing was cruel but necessary, for it would set human history down an illusion-free, life-affirming path.

Ontological hand-wringing aside, the Bush Administration has engaged over the past year in a similar act of provocation. On September 12, 2002, President Bush stood before the United Nations and systematically called to account its member-states for their failure to address the threat of Ba'athi Iraq. The President's speech, however, served a much broader end: it was an intentional provocation designed to compel the (so-called) international community to dispense with illusions of security that veil "gathering dangers", and to accept the unipolar world in all of its frightening instability. The message was similar to the command of Zarathustra: "Become hard!" Like Nietzsche, the Bush Administration views a bitter but necessary dose of reality as redemptive, and both intend to be forceful with the spoon.

A significant point of difference, however, must be noted: The Bush Administration is no Nietzschean wrecker of the contemporary international order. Nietzsche took great joy hammering into fine powder anything that smacked of Christian morality or Platonic metaphysics. The administration—at least the majority of it anyway—never sought to destroy the United Nations, nor did it wish to kill off time-tested traditional alliances. That said, one should not confuse the administration's reluctance with irresolution. Though it sought the counsel and blessings of other states regarding its policies, the Bush Administration demanded that these states and the institutions they formed must accept its way of thinking about international politics. And this way of thinking is certainly unpleasant: a long-enduring, unipolar imbalance of power that is threatened constantly by transnational terrorist groups and their rogue state allies, both of which are getting

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closer by the day to acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

As Nietzsche understood, the idols and orders that human beings imposed on the world possessed one fundamental purpose: to enable human life to flourish. If, instead, they spawned decadence and retarded human achievement, they must be destroyed and replaced with something new. As the Bush Administration insisted throughout the past year, such is the case also with the traditional dogmas, institutions and alliance systems of international politics. They exist as means, not as ends in themselves. For this reason, one might say the Bush Administration made its foreign policy with a hammer throughout the entire Iraq debate—using this tool, as Nietzsche advocated, as a tuning fork to "sound out" the integrity of international institutions and normative behavior. This constituted a form of shock therapy applied to its allies in the United Nations and NATO, as well as to the institutions themselves and the strategic thinking that underpinned them. It tested whether they were "relevant" for this nasty world of terrorists, rogue states and proliferating weapons of mass destruction. If the idols of international politics rang hollow, then new arrangements would have to be made.

The most significant development in this regard was the promulgation of the Bush Administration's *National Security Strategy* in September 2002, which sought to shatter illusions of security and critically challenge conventional dogmas. Much of the serious debate over this document concerned the alleged tactlessness with which the administration brandished a "doctrine of pre-emption." Many argued that pre-emptive military attacks against clear and mounting threats were rarely required in international politics, and when necessary, they were justified by common sense and hardly deserved doctrinal enshrining. Philip Zelikow, however, who had a hand in creating the document, argued differently in these pages:

> The new strategy is somewhat provocative, but it is deliberately so. It must be provocative if it is to foster the painful worldwide debate that must occur in order to condition the international community to think hard about these new dangers, and about how the cadence of security threats has changed.[2]

Of course the administration expected harsh reactions from those it soaked with this glass of cold water. But then no one who initiates a *Götterdämmerung* should expect to make many friends.

Human, All Too Human

Our highest insights must—and should—sound like follies and sometimes crimes when they are heard without permission by those who are not predisposed and predestined for them.

Friedrich Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil, *1886*

We meet here during a crucial period in the history of our nation, and of the civilized world. Part of that history was written by others; the rest will be written by us.

George W. Bush
February 26, 2003

CRITICS OF the Bush Administration's foreign policy, like many early critics of Nietzsche's philosophy, are discovering the great difficulty of their task. This is because both the current administration and the German philosopher put forward a way of thinking that clashes head-on with accepted idols and dogmas. In so doing, both Bush and Nietzsche force their critics to acknowledge the intellectual chal-

[2]Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security", *The National Interest* (Spring 2003), p. 27.

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lenge they advance before formulating their disagreements with it. An adequate defense against their ideas, therefore, must first begin with a thoughtful consideration of them. Bush and Nietzsche both win initial victories over their critics by forcing them onto their provocative intellectual turf. That, or the critics relegate themselves to the sidelines with cheap *ad hominem* attacks, empty partisan ballyhoo or outright silence.

Leo Strauss once wrote that it was intellectually insufficient to refute a way of thinking simply by labeling it a "*reductio ad Hitlerum*"; it must instead be shown to be a *reductio ad absurdum*. One cannot simply criticize Nietzsche or the Bush Administration because one finds distasteful the implications of their thinking. It is not enough merely to bemoan the cruel vision of a dead God, a meaningless world and the doctrine of the will to power; one must concede its possibility before attacking it. Likewise, it is logically unsatisfactory to claim that pre-emptive military strikes against gathering threats, or a foreign policy that focuses on the internal nature of regimes, is too challenging to conventional security dogmas. One can only successfully contest the Bush Administration's strategic thinking by first addressing the conception of world politics that lies at its center. Criticisms that fail to do so cannot hold up beneath the weight of the different provocations that Nietzsche and the Bush Administration advance.

Reviewing the worldwide debate that transpired over military action against Saddam Hussein's regime, few critics of the Bush Administration confronted the central ideas from which its strategic thinking followed. They refused to acknowledge, first and foremost, that America's hegemonic power is the sole guarantor of international security and normative moral order. Furthermore, most critics failed to address the premise that Western civilization's core principles are besieged by apocalyptic terrorist groups and their rogue state allies, both of which crave weapons of mass destruction to further their agenda of devastation. Unlike traditional combat between the mass armies of nation-states, threats in this new environment emerge instantly and catastrophically. Rather than genuinely engaging these provocative ideas, dissenting opinion from Paris to Berlin, Cambridge to Berkeley, Moscow to Beijing, only evaded it. A vast majority of the Bush Administration's critics employed a determined will to ignorance that asserted an unbridled American will to power as the root cause of the September 11 attacks. Such thinking could neither understand nor refute the urgency of disarming the Iraqi regime by whatever means necessary.

America's post-9/11 foreign policy has been radical. With a peck of carrots and a mighty stick, the Bush Administration has determined to coax and prod a large pocket of hold-outs down that inevitable path toward history's end. For those critics willing to engage the administration's provocation, but choosing to travel at a different strategic trajectory thereafter, there is, of course, the possibility for vindication. The Bush Administration may well turn out to be mistaken for having adopted a messianic response to a potentially isolated incident of apocalyptic violence. History, albeit with no end in sight, could ultimately prove either side of this debate terribly wrong.

THERE ARE those, however, for whom the Bush Administration's strategic thinking is highly appealing. Nietzsche, too, found his allies among this same group: the young. Unlike their elders, the young have not yet been shaped by traditional convictions and are thus more willing to examine them critically. It might seem

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implausible that the Bush Administration's greatest domestic support would come from younger Americans. Their parents and professors have preached mostly of their peace movement experiences with the use and abuse of American power. They have warned how every American war could fast become a bloody quagmire. One could have reasonably expected to find large numbers of young Americans opposed to war in Iraq particularly, and to the Bush Administration's grand strategy more generally.

Yet this is not the case. Prior to war in Iraq, a *Time*/CNN poll found that 63 percent of Americans 18–29 years of age supported military action against Ba'athi Iraq; this was eight percentage points greater than any other age group, and support for war decreased as age increased. On April 5, 2003, the *New York Times* reported even more interesting trends on many elite college campuses: "Across the country, the war is disclosing role reversals, between professors shaped by Vietnam protests and a more conservative student body traumatized by the attacks of September 11, 2001." Speaking of his student's political disposition, Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis remarked: "These are the kids of Reagan. When I lecture on Reagan, the kids love him. Their parents are horrified and appalled." Their teachers are too, as a whiny professor of women's studies at Amherst College made clear: "We used to like to offend people. . . . We loved being bad, in the sense that we were making a statement. Why is there no joy now?" The Bush Administration seems to find its greatest champions in the young, who appear eager to hoist "Bush/Cheney" reelection placards while some of their parents and more of their professors go marching beneath protest banners that equate Bush with Hitler.

In this same vein, is it really so surprising that "Old Europe" cast itself as the Bush Administration's antagonist, while "New Europe" rallied to America's side? Is it surprising that the administration's strategic thinking is inherently appealing to "new" European states that have a fresh memory of tyranny, and that have not grown self-satisfied beneath the U.S. security blanket? These young democracies have been eager to jump aboard a lifeboat of English-speaking peoples brandishing riches and rifles for the common defense while Europe itself begins taking on water. These states also had material incentives to do so, it is true; but one should not be so quick to debunk nobler aspirations, especially considering that "New Europe" has been eagerly waiting in line to board an overcrowded European vessel. These states only court disfavor with their elders by affirming the Bush Administration's provocative strategic thinking; and for his part, French President Jacques Chirac, ever the dyspeptic parent, has already given a spanking of sorts to his "poorly brought up" children. But the blood of these new democracies is hot, and they are captivated by the American vision of a better world once the war against terrorism is won—a desire that will surely get them grounded by their EU elders on more than one future occasion.

FRIEDRICH Nietzsche's goal was to chart a path "beyond good and evil" for his intellectual descendents to follow. With an entirely different purpose, but in much the same manner, the Bush Administration appears resolved to lead the United States (and, for that matter, the rest of the civilized world) beyond Cold War thinking and security architecture—to exactly where, however, no one is quite sure. Bush and his principals have dared to provoke conventional wisdom about interstate relations in light of post-Cold War strategic realities. Those old doctrines, institutions and norms certainly served their historical purpose, but

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wondering whether they have finally reached their twilight is now necessary, not foolish. Perhaps a new day is indeed dawning; perhaps even the most cherished "truths" of international relations are showing inevitable signs of mortality. But as Nietzsche discovered, and as the Bush Administration is learning, the life of the provocateur—the "Madman" whose insights arrive before their time—is a lonely one. He is hated in the present and only understood much later, if ever or at all.

As was the case with Nietzsche's philosophy, the provocateur can be extremely successful at smashing old idols and winning young, impassioned hearts and minds. *But what can he build in their place?* If the traditional thinking about international politics now rings hollow, what new alternative that embraces present realities will achieve a comparable amount of enduring stability and broad-based legitimacy?

Though the Iraq War appears to have been a success that (temporarily) quieted the chattering doomsayers, the Bush Administration, along with its youthful allies at home and abroad, is now charged with winning the peace. In that light, it is perhaps fitting to recall Prince Faisal's aphorism from *Lawrence of Arabia*:

> Young men make wars, and the virtues of war are the virtues of young men: courage and hope for the future. Then old men make the peace, and the vices of peace are the vices of old men: mistrust and caution.

Whether they be U.S. policymakers and legislators, or America's "old" European allies who recall how the story of their empires ended, "old men" will be summoned in due course (and with all their "vices") to undertake what it is they do best. This is not entirely regrettable, for the United States will undoubtedly need help chewing what it has bitten off. After all, provocateurs are known more for their courage than for their prudence, and the young are defined more by their exuberance than by their judgment. Though the Bush Administration views courage in the service of liberty as no vice, one hopes it still understands moderation in the pursuit of justice to be a virtue. Nietzsche did not, and look where it got him. □

Virtue and Profit

What enterprise that an enlightened community may attempt is more noble and more profitable than the reclamation from barbarism of a fertile region and large populations? To give peace to warring tribes, to administer justice where all was violence, to strike the chains off the slave, to draw the richness from the soil, to plant the earliest seeds of commerce and learning, to increase in whole peoples their capacities for pleasure and diminish their chances of pain—what more beautiful ideal or more valuable reward can inspire human effort? The act is virtuous, the exercise invigorating, and the result often extremely profitable.

—Winston Churchill
The River War (1889)

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"HUMILIATION SELDOM metastasizes into gratitude."

—Douglas Porch

"A GOOD POLITY always needs to balance power, wisdom and virtue. Today, triumphal America has too much power and thinks it has too much virtue."

—David P. Calleo

"IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD (and increasingly in western Europe), anti-Semitism has become a dangerous form of auto-intoxication and self-destruction—the intellectual equivalent of the suicide bomb."

—Robert S. Wistrich

"IT WAS A STRIKING feature of 20th-century ideologies that they diffused the general idea that it is intolerable to have to share the planet with people of unsound opinions."

—Kenneth Minogue

"POWER REQUIRES wealth, and wealth cannot protect itself without power."

—Richard Rosecrance

"IF THE EUROPEANS wish to be genuine allies of the United States, they must act seriously in those domains where they have the ability to do so."

—Geoffrey Kemp

"THE NOTION THAT the United States is a 'benevolent' hegemon has been shredded."

—Christopher Layne

"THE GOVERNMENT removed all restrictions on the sale of alcohol. The result was that at a time when the purchasing power of the average Russian was cut in half, his salary in relation to the cost of vodka increased threefold."

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